

JPRS-USS-88-004  
2 AUGUST 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 6, November-December 1987

# Soviet Union

## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 6, November-December 1987

JPRS-USS-88-004

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2 AUGUST 1988

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

### A Comparative Analysis of the Social Development of the Union Republics

18960003a Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 3-10

[Article by Yuriy Ottovich Ginter, graduate student in the management department of the Higher School of Management of the Agroindustrial Complex of the Estonian SSR, his first appearance in this journal, and Mikk Kharriyevich Titma, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and chief of the social structure sector of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute, and a regular contributor to this journal, under the rubric "In Anticipation of the 19th Party Conference: The Theory and Practice of Social Transformations"]

[Text] A comparative study of the ethnic and regional-community structures and identification of the general and the specific in the development of our multinational state make it possible to take into account factors of territorial self-regulation when working out the prospects of social policy. It is impossible today to construct social policy blindly or on some a priori, artificially selected theoretical premises; that would entail unpredictable, global consequences. How much the theories and practice of the "sociology of uniformity," which predominated in resolving the nationality question until recently and which in fact meant leveling our regional specifics, have cost!

But life copies the straightforward path traced by the theoretician [sic]. The endless zigzags, side digressions, and even short-term movements backward mark the most multidimensional continuum of actual events in which only the average equivalent line can identify a typical or predominant trend. And the greater the diversity of objects, the more difficult it is for us to identify the general and the more often an "enlarged scale" must be used.

In order to construct a model of the social dynamics of the Union republics and establish the leading trends in their economic and national development, that is, identify the possible range of variation of indicators, we had to use the following method of calculating and classifying the objects of study. First of all a sufficiently large time frame was adopted—a quarter of a century (1959-1983). It was in this period that the socioeconomic policy in the country was characterized by strict centralization and significant constraint on local (regional) initiative. The condition of the republic in each year of this period was taken as the unit of analysis and estimates encompassed those Union republics and those years when the value of each indicator was known [Sources 1-16]. The 15 variables selected to make up the model characterize the

entire process under study in a precise and comprehensive way. The following were the criteria for selecting them: 1) lack of "gaps," 2) comparability, and 3) variability.

It is useful to dwell on a description of the indicators used(1) in more detail. First of all they are **demographic processes** (per 1,000 residents): 1) birth rate, 2) mortality rate, 3) migration balance, 4) and population growth. Then come the **level and rate of urbanization** and the proportion (in percentages): 1) of city-dwellers, 2) increase in the urban population, 3) percentage of capital inhabitants in the total population, and 4) increase in the number of inhabitants of the capital. Finally there is the **structure and dynamics of the employed population**, the proportion (in percentages): 1) of employed population (the average annual number of workers, white-collar workers, and kolkhoz members which make up the entire population), 2) the increase in the employed population, 3) the increase in the average annual number of workers and white-collar workers, 4) the increase in the average annual number of kolkhoz members, 5) the percentage of women in the total number of workers and white-collar workers, 6) the percentage of industrial-production personnel in the entire employed population, and 7) the increase in industrial-production personnel.

Factor analysis was used to aggregate the indexes [Sources 17-18], in particular, the four-factor solution had the greatest descriptive possibilities. Indicators in factors were represented with a weighted value of 0.6 and more, and only the two indicators of communality are less than this value. After rotating the factor matrix using the "varimax" method, the first factor yielded 38 percent, the second—17 percent, the third—11 percent, and the fourth—10 percent of statistical variance.

The following have the most factor weight in the **first factor**: birth rate (-0.95), population growth (-0.92), mortality rate (0.77), as well as the proportion: of women among workers and white-collar workers (0.94), of employed population as a whole (0.84), of industrial-production personnel (0.84), and of urban population (0.67). All these variables make up one factor index, in this case the "demographic potential" factor, which in one aspect or another characterizes any republic. And the following pattern was found: the higher the value of the factor index, the lower the republic's demographic potential and consequently the less opportunity for extensive development of production. For if the birth rate is low, then the increase in the number of workers is small and opportunities for additional change in female labor and involvement of the unemployed population in labor are practically exhausted. And there is more. Inasmuch as the mortality rate is very closely related to the age structure, one may assert that the older age groups predominate in the make-up of the population of the Union republics with high values of the factor index and the average age of the able-bodied population is relatively high.

In the **second factor**—rate of urbanization—the following indicators have the highest weight: increase in proportion of industrial-production personnel (0.77) and of the urban population (0.76), growth in the number of capital inhabitants (0.66), and in workers and white-collar workers (0.63). An intensive process of urbanization is occurring in the Union republics where the value of the corresponding factor index is high. The agrarian economy and rural way of life which dominated earlier are rapidly being replaced by industrial production and a typically urban way of life.

In the **third factor** the migration balance (0.83) and the proportion of the capital's population (0.73) had the greatest weight. That is the factor of concentration which characterizes the small and more-developed republics in the socioeconomic sense. Where the value of this factor index is great, an intensive stream of inhabitants from other regions is noted. The reason is the concentration of a large part of the republic's population in cities, above all in the capital, where there are relatively better living conditions and the infrastructure is more developed. In the fourth factor the increase in the proportion of employed population (0.89) and the increase in the number of kolkhoz members (0.69) have the greatest factor weights. In Union republics where the value of the factor of extensive development is especially high, production efficiency per capita increases due to the involvement of the labor of people who formerly were not employed in the economy.

This research shows that the value of the "demographic potential" factor index is highest for the Latvian SSR (1.48). An intensive demographic situation also took shape in the Estonian SSR (1.33), in the RSFSR (1.29), the Ukraine (1.26), Belorussia (1.17), and the Lithuanian SSR (1.13). The process of decline in demographic potential continued in these regions up until 1980 (until 1979 in the Estonian SSR). It declined especially rapidly in Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Lithuanian SSR, where the weight of this factor was 0.2 (even 0.1 in Lithuania). In other regions of the country the demographic intensity was lower. In the Georgian SSR the indicators fell to 0.38 in 1978 and then stabilized. In the Kazakh SSR 1981 saw the lowest value of the factor index (0.22). Compared with the other Union republics, demographic potential declined most rapidly in the Armenian SSR, where the factor index reached 0.16 in 1983 (the Armenian SSR used to be part of the same group as the Central Asian republics).

In the other Union republics—the Kirghiz SSR (-0.54), the Azerbaijan SSR (-0.61), the Uzbek SSR (-1.03), the Turkmen SSR (-1.14), and the Tajik SSR (-1.63), the demographic situation was favorable in 1983. A characteristic feature: back in 1961 the situation in the first four republics was approximately the same (from -1.8 to -1.6), but then in Kirghizia and Azerbaijan the demographic potential fell quite rapidly since the proportion of the native population in them was lower.

The prediction may be made(2) that the situation with demographic potential that is characteristic of the more developed republics (the Latvian and Estonian SSR's and the RSFSR) in the 1980's will reach the Moldavian SSR in 20 years and the Ukrainian and Lithuanian SSR's in 15 years. Georgia is "behind" Moldavia by 8 years and Kazakhstan—by 15 years. At the same time Armenia is "behind" Georgia by 7 years. Azerbaijan is separated from the Armenian SSR by 15 years. Kirghizia needs 15 years to reach the current level of the Kazakh SSR, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia will need 10 years to reach the level of the Kirghiz SSR, and the Tajik SSR will need 20 years. The time lag between the levels of development of Latvia, Estonia, and Tajikistan is 60-70 years. Consequently, the Central Asian republics will reach the demographic indicators characteristic of simple reproduction of the population in two generations.

Before building social policy on the basis of hypothetical estimates, one must remember that the rate of economic development, the ethnic characteristics, and the population's way of life in each of the republics differ so much that we cannot speak of any forced convergence of national regions. Attesting to this in particular are factors which used to be believed to level out the living conditions of people. For example, the rate of urbanization is declining in all Union republics: extensive development of industry—the basis of urbanization—has reached its limit. In the Russian Federation this indicator fell as long ago as 1962 and in the Estonian and Latvian SSR's—in 1970. It happened in the Ukraine in 1972, in the Lithuanian SSR in 1978, and in the Belorussian SSR in 1983. But Moldavia especially markedly lags behind its neighboring republics in terms of this indicator, and the rate of urbanization there has been high up to the present time.

Urbanization is occurring much more slowly in the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia and in the Kazakh SSR, even though the proportion of urban population there is lower than in the republics of the European part of the country. The factor index had a negative value in all these regions for a number of years. Changes are occurring especially slowly in the Turkmen, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR's, where the level of urbanization was higher than in the other southern republics in the early 1960's. By the 1980's the differences between the republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which had been very marked, had diminished. However, the convergence occurred at a relatively low level, and therefore the difference between the average regional indicator and the average indicator for the republics of the European part of the country increased.

The concentration factor remained positive in the Latvian, Estonian, and Armenian SSR's for a quarter of a century, but the mechanical gain in population there declined. In contrast, the amplitude of the fluctuations in Armenia was maximal: from 2.8 in the early 1960's to 0.8 in 1983. The proportion of the capital's population in

the population of these republics is the highest. A positive migration balance was characteristic of the Latvian, the Estonian, and, until the mid-1970's the Armenian, SSR's. The weight of this factor was positive in the republics of Central Asia in the early 1960's, when the migration balance was also positive. In the following years the value of the factor index remained negative and an especially great change was observed in the Kazakh SSR (from a very high mechanical gain to a negative balance).

In the Azerbaijan SSR in the 1960's the value of this factor was positive, then it dropped (the value of the factor index depends on the size of the republic's capital—Baku, where, including the suburbs, a large part of the republic's population lives). In Lithuania this indicator is close to zero, but it has steadily increased (-0.6/+0.2). In addition, the value of the factor index rose in the Russian Federation (-0.8/-0.3) and in Belorussia (-2.3/-0.5). This value was already negative in the 1960's in the Ukraine and in Moldavia and a decline was observed in it in subsequent years as well.

In the early 1960's the spread of another factor index—migration—in the Union republics was from +2.6 in Armenia to -2.3 in Belorussia. In 1983 it was from +1.2 in the Latvian SSR to -1.6 in the Moldavian SSR. However, there is no reason to predict further leveling among the republics for this indicator because development trends are different. For example, in the RSFSR and the Belorussian and Lithuanian SSR's the factor index is rising (it has even become positive in the latter) and in the republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia its value was actually lower than in the republics named for many years, and even now a clear trend toward decline continues. The real processes here are these: at first basic redistribution of the work force within the boundaries of the region occurs and therefore the values of the factor index of migration of the republics in the region differ fundamentally. Then the level of development of the regions becomes uniform and the proportion of interregional redistribution of work force increases while the factor weights within the boundaries of the regions level out.

Our estimates show that the dynamics of extensive development of the Union republics are also dissimilar. Thus, in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR's the value of this factor was negative for a number of years and in subsequent years it declined even more. In the 1960's Belorussia, Lithuania, and Moldavia developed on an extensive basis, but in 1983 these republics entered the path of intensification. In contrast, in the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics extensive growth (the value of the factor index is positive) was observed even earlier, and in recent years it has become especially noticeable.

But still, identifying factors of differentiation of republics is still not enough to classify them. That may be done when one knows the factor indexes of all the republics

during the entire period under study.(3) Analysis has shown that in their development regions do not go through the very same stages and steps. And at various stages the same republic can be either at a high or at a low level of development and in terms of rate of development be at first like Georgia and then like Latvia, as in the case, for example, of the RSFSR from 1964 through 1973 and from 1974 through 1983. So, not only must the republic be classified, but also the stages of development of each of them, distributing them in different groups (see the Index). The RSFSR and the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian SSR's are the most similar and form the basis of type A1. This type is related to the other Union republics through the first subtype, which includes the Kazakh, Georgian, Kirghiz, and Moldavian SSR's in addition to the Ukraine.

Despite a certain similarity, the republics enumerated above are still at different levels of social development. Thus, in the 1980's the RSFSR was ahead of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian SSR's by 5 years and of the Belorussian SSR—by 9 years. The same time lag was observed in the conditions in the 1960's and 1970's, and a trend toward decrease in the lag between Lithuania and the Ukraine was observed. On the other hand, although the Kazakh, Georgian, and Kirghiz SSR's at one of the stages of their development seemed to reproduce the indicators of the RSFSR, their forward movement is characterized by specific features (in particular, all of them had significant reserves of work force); in the 1980's they made up the second type. The Kazakh SSR reached these indicators in 1981, Georgia—in 1976, and Kirghizia—in 1979. Due to the fact that common features used to be noted in the development of these republics and still are, they made up an independent type (C2), which can be considered a kind of bridge which joins types A and B.

In the 1960's the Armenian SSR also had features in common with type B1. Its development was the only one of its type (types F1 and F2) and in the 1980's it approached type E3, which initially included the Estonian and Latvian SSR's. The development of these republics differed substantially from the other regions but it was very similar in the two republics.

Thanks to this analysis one can name several types of development of the Union republics. The Estonian and Latvian SSR's make up an independent type: they are similar and substantially differ from the rest, they went through all the stages of development at the same time. The Estonian SSR surpassed the Latvian SSR in some economic indicators, but Latvia, in turn, encountered certain demographic problems earlier. They differ from the other republics of the USSR in terms of historical past: the capitalist structure and developed economy and industry which significantly transformed the social sphere of society already existed on their territory before the arrival of Soviet Power. That is where the specific demographic processes—the fall in the mortality rate and the birth rate—come from. In this group of republics

historical stages differ among themselves much more than in other types. In the 1980's Estonia and Latvia moved from extensive development to intensive development. This process had its own stages: in the beginning of the period a number of indicators changed in one direction, in the middle period they were relatively stable, and in the end of the period they changed in the opposite direction.

The main type represents the large industrial centers—the RSFSR and the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian SSR's. The RSFSR was the first to pass through all stages of development but in a short time the rest took the same path. A characteristic feature of this group of republics is not the difference but the similarity in main stages.

The Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Georgian SSR's make up an independent type. The first two are characterized by a number of common features (the development of industry and national culture began only after the victory of Soviet Power, and two large ethnic groups with fundamentally different models of behavior in the sphere of labor and daily life are simultaneously present in both). The Kirghiz SSR lags behind the Kazakh SSR somewhat in its development. The level of development of Georgia in the years of revolution seemed to be intermediate between the level of development of the Union republics of the European part of the country and the other regions. Therefore, the average indicator of Kazakhstan and of Kirghizia proved similar to the average indicator of the Georgian SSR. The existence of two models of behavior also characterizes the latter, but this involves only the native population; the social development of the cities, especially the capital, and the countryside differs very fundamentally, and this is most clearly manifested in the mountainous regions. These models of behavior had a number of features in common with the models of development in the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR's.

The development of the Armenian SSR was distinctive and only in the 1980's did it acquire features in common with the development of the Latvian and Estonian SSR. Armenia differs very fundamentally from Georgia, with which it shared the same level of economic development before the October Revolution. Above all this was a result of the repatriation of the Armenians as well as population growth, which for a number of years was the highest in the Caucasus, the insignificant proportion of older age groups, and the like. Social development in the Armenian SSR occurred very rapidly; therefore individual stages vary substantially.

Similar features are characteristic of the model of development of the republics of Central Asia and the Azerbaijan SSR. Even before the war industry in Azerbaijan was more developed than in other Union republics belonging to this type. The oil-refining industry of Baku was its center. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics have many historical, ethnic, and religious features

in common. And still social processes in the Azerbaijan SSR proceeded at a more rapid rate as compared to other Union republics belonging to this type.

Rapid development of industry before the Great Patriotic War characterizes the Turkmen SSR, and here this development for the most part occurred through work force coming from the outside. Therefore, the average level of its development even in the beginning of the period under study, that is, in the 1960's, slightly exceeded the level of the neighboring republics. Later the influx from the other oblasts declined and the proportion of migrants in the social make-up fell. Now the development of the Turkmen SSR is proceeding more slowly than on the average throughout the region.

The development of the Uzbek and Tajik SSR's was similar. These republics are historically closely interrelated. Even today a significant number of Uzbeks live in Tajikistan, and Tajiks—in Uzbekistan. However, the Uzbek SSR passed through the stages of its development somewhat earlier than the Tajik SSR. The fact that Tashkent is considered the cultural and historical center of Central Asia accounts for this.

So, we have every reason to posit a significant differentiation among the republics of the USSR. This differentiation is expressed at the very least in the fact that the typical conditions which characterized their social development in various years have no points of transition among themselves. One must take into account that during the study obvious differences were eliminated (the size of territory, natural-climatic conditions, size of the population, method of settlement, main types of production, and others). But of course one must not consider such a model equivalent to reality. For example, the subjective factor, which had and continues to have no small impact on general development, was not taken into account. Otherwise, how can the fact be explained that the rate and character of socioeconomic dynamics vary fundamentally for republics whose indicators are fairly close. Let us recall that diversity did not diminish even in conditions of centralization of resources and a relatively uniform method of economic activity and distribution of appropriations. Obviously that "centrifugal" function which regional interests have always played by appearing sometimes in the role of an obvious factor and sometimes a hidden factor must not be excluded.

Undoubtedly, a unified national economic complex has been formed in the seven decades that have passed in the country and the international foundations of the spiritual life of Soviet society have become stronger. At the same time, however, uniformity of paths of social development, of which a great deal has been written and is written in our country, in no way means a certain mechanical leveling; and features of national-regional uniqueness are becoming more and more noticeable. When the prospects of social policy are being worked

out, taking into account factors of regional self-management become especially important. If the resolution of most questions is transferred from the all-Union level to the regional level, that will ease the workload on the central organs. In order to accelerate the development of the republics it would also be useful to apply flexible management. We are speaking not so much of eliminating directive planning as of creating those differentiated conditions of activity under which the regions themselves would have incentive to achieve higher results. In light of this the problem of planned development of regions is at times treated in an oversimplified manner. It is assumed that everything—from the raw material base to prices for the final product—can be rigidly planned. Such a model leaves no room for local maneuvering and consequently multiplies the number of management mistakes and increases centralized control. Planning from the center is reasonable only with common features and only in those cases where we are able to predict its results and maintain balance. Unfortunately, social knowledge is such today that we are unable to predict everything even on the level of the country. We are at times forced to pay dearly for rigid planning. The curtailment of the community structure in large areas of the country, the priority of the sectorial structure over the regional, and the bureaucratization of the management apparatus are all the costs of directive-order planning which may ultimately bring social development to an impasse. We think that one of the main prerequisites for decentralizing authority and strengthening local initiative is a differentiated approach to regions.

#### Footnotes

1. These indicators have a single base which does not depend on the size of the republics, and that is of decisive importance when comparing such different objects.

2. Of course, this is a simple extrapolation, but the predicted values obtained have a high level of reliability. Factors (with the exception of extraordinary ones) will hardly be revealed which are able to change the trends which have been formed.

3. Typology [classification] is meaningful only when several Union republics at once become part of one group, and each of them must also be included in several other groups. This proved to be possible since the rates of development were taken as the initial indicators: they vary considerably more than the indicators of level of development.

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#### Appendix

##### Clusters of Social Development of the Union Republics (1961-1983)

A1. RSFSR. 1970, 1974-1983. Ukrainian SSR. 1978-1983. Belorussian SSR. 1983. Lithuanian SSR. 1979-1983

A2. RSFSR. 1964, 1966-1968, 1971-1973. Ukrainian SSR. 1973, 1974. Lithuanian SSR. 1978

A3. RSFSR. 1962, 1963, 1969. Ukrainian SSR. 1973, 1976. Belorussian SSR. 1977-1982. Kazakh SSR. 1970. Georgian SSR. 1975. Lithuanian SSR. 1970-1977

A4. Ukrainian SSR. 1962, 1963. Kazakh SSR. 1967-1969. Georgian SSR. 1968, 1969. Moldavian SSR. 1973. Kirghiz SSR. 1975

A5. RSFSR. 1961, 1965. Ukrainian SSR. 1961, 1966-1969, 1971. Belorussian SSR. 1964, 1967, 1970-1974. Lithuanian SSR. 1962, 1963, 1969. Moldavian SSR. 1970, 1974-1976

B1. Uzbek SSR. 1969, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1978, 1980-1983. Georgian SSR. 1962. Azerbaijan SSR. 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978-1981, 1983. Kirghiz SSR. 1970, 1971. Tajik SSR. 1979, 1981, 1983. Armenian SSR. 1962. Turkmen SSR. 1963, 1969, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1974-1979, 1982, 1983

B2. Uzbek SSR. 1976, 1979. Azerbaijan SSR. 1967, 1971. Kirghiz SSR. 1972, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1980. Tajik SSR. 1982. Turkmen SSR. 1968, 1980

B3. Kazakh SSR. 1960. Uzbek SSR. 1962-1968, 1973, 1974. Kirghiz SSR. 1963-1964, 1966-1968. Tajik SSR. 1963, 1968, 1969

B4. Uzbek SSR. 1961. Azerbaijan SSR. 1961-1963. Tajik SSR. 1967. Turkmen SSR. 1961, 1962, 1964

C1. Kazakh SSR. 1971-1983. Georgian SSR. 1971, 1976-1983. Kirghiz SSR. 1979-1983

C2. Kazakh SSR. 1966. Georgian SSR. 1963-1967, 1970, 1973, 1974. Kirghiz SSR. 1974

D1. Belorussian SSR. 1965, 1966, 1968. Lithuanian SSR. 1965. Moldavian SSR. 1967, 1969

D2. Uzbek SSR. 1964, 1965. Lithuanian SSR. 1966-1968. Moldavian SSR. 1976, 1980, 1981

D3. Moldavian SSR. 1961-1963, 1968, 1971. Lithuanian SSR. 1961

E1. a) Estonian SSR. 1959, 1961 b) Latvian SSR. 1961, 1965, 1968 Estonian SSR. 1965

E2. a) Latvian SSR. 1962-1964, 1966. Estonian SSR. 1960, 1962-1964 b) Armenian SSR. 1977, 1981, 1983

E3. a) Latvian SSR. 1976. Estonian SSR. 1969-1971, 1976. b) Latvian SSR. 1967, 1970-1975, 1977-1983. Estonian SSR. 1966-1968, 1972-1975, 1977-1983

F1. Armenian SSR. 1963, 1966-1969

F2. Armenian SSR. 1970, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1978

##### Memory and Culture (On the Meaning-Forming Principles of Human Action)

18060003b Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 11-22

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[Text] Chingiz Aytmatov's novel "And the Day Lasts Longer than a Century" [Source 1] cites a legend filled with poetic force and philosophical depth. It tells of the most terrible of all conceivable and inconceivable evil deeds which man has ever thought of. It tells of an operation of fantastic cruelty which a certain Eastern people, the "Juanjuan's," customarily performed on captives in order to turn them into "ideal slaves," called "mankurts." The goal of this operation was to remove a person's "living memory," including the foundation, grounds, and natural element of any cultural memory (unlike the "natural," which man has in common with animals): a man's consciousness of his own ego. In philosophical language this is called self-consciousness.

With striking artistic force Ch. Aytmatov showed that both for an individual person and for a whole people (and a multinational country, and all mankind) the question of historical memory is a question of the "secret essence" and of what makes a people a people, a culture a culture, and a man a man. It is a question related to the

problem of the idea of human existence and of the meaning-forming function of human culture and at the same time, as even Max Weber showed, a question of the idea of individual human actions.

### What Spurs Us on to the Highest Tension of Spirit?

As a living being who through one of his hypostases, corporality, is linked to the animal world (and to the plant world, and even the inorganic world), man possesses an organic-corporal memory with the automatism characteristic of that memory. However, the specifics of his memory as not only a natural-corporal but also a cultural-supernatural being are not related to it. The specifically human facets of memory are related to the fact that people simultaneously belong to a culture, and as a result of this culture's emergence the human form of community proved fundamentally and qualitatively distinctive from all other "natural communities" which we encounter in nature (the "community" of ants and bees, bands of apes, and others).

The uniqueness of human memory is that it is no longer innate-natural memory but sociocultural memory [Sources 2-4]. And to the extent that culture in turn is nothing but the self-aware (philosophers would say "reflecting") history of human development and constantly accumulating experience in interpreting this history which is again and again immersed in the direct process of historical creativity in order to participate in it [Sources 2; 3], cultural memory is not mechanical. Nor even automatic in the organic sense. It is historical. It is always the experience of experiencing history, that is, the temporal process, the process of the future becoming the present and the present becoming the past. In other words, it is always the experience of continued attempts to deal with the entropic processes of "temporality": with the irreversible trend of annihilation of the past and its dissolution into nonexistence. In this sense a specific feature of cultural memory as historical memory is its orientation to preserving the past and the conscious struggle against oblivion (that is, nonexistence) [Sources 5; 6].

Direct experience of the diverse processes of individual development is not yet experience of history and historical experience. It becomes historical only against the background of the successive link of generations, the history of the tribe, the people, and the country (which each time is interpreted to a certain extent together with the history of the human race as a whole). In this case "clan memory" appears not as an unconscious automatically operating instinct, but as culture. Culture at the same time presupposes conscious goal-oriented activity of man and forms the illuminated field of human consciousness (what was at one time called the natural light of reason), and is permeated with this consciousness [Source 7].

But to the extent that consciousness—unlike instinct, which acts unconsciously and precludes any kind of awareness—is that "clan" ability of the individual which presupposes a certain level of personal initiative and spontaneous action [Sources 8; 9](1), no matter how restricted this level is at first, so to that extent historical experience inevitably proves to be individually slanted personal experience: the experience of the ego. And, in two senses of this phrase: experience "by the ego" of the historical process and experience "by the ego" of itself experiencing this process. In other words, cultural, that is, (if we look deeper) historical memory—conscious "clan memory," instinct which has become cultural consciousness—necessarily presupposes a certain degree of development of the personal principle and consciousness of oneself as the ego, self-consciousness.

A person has no gap between "clan memory" and individual memory. To the extent that his instinct is recognized and appears as culture transmitted by the previous generation and assimilated in the process of upbringing and education, it acts in the psyche not as something obscure and unconscious, but, on the contrary, as a bright and illuminating field of consciousness. It is against this background that individual cultural memory is expressed and which, unlike mechanical-automatic memory, is not memory of the body but memory of the ego, of a self-conscious individual. Cultural memory as memory of the ego is correlation of the past not with "traces" and "reactions" of my body, but with impressions and perceptions of my consciousness which self-consciousness always has. And above all it is the ego's memory of itself,(2) in whose "field" are laid impressions and perceptions shot through with more and more separated and generalized forms leading from consciousness to thought: ideas, concepts, and categories.

But the ego itself, despite its attachment to the uniquely individual, is a clan product, the product of human culture, this altogether special form of "clan experience." This is a specifically human form of "clan memory" or "species" memory which comes to replace the animal form of memory—instinct. And therefore the ego (self-consciousness) does not emerge in the human young at his birth. Just as a child does not "remember" himself from the very first days or the very first months after his birth. The emergence of this ego or "I remember myself" is not a one-time act but a process, even though it happens quite early. But no matter when it happens (depending on the "early" or, in contrast, the "late" development of the child), it becomes the basis of the very first recollections of impressions of early childhood, even though they may not be completely distinct and by no means retained recollections in all people. As our corporal existence is the gift of our parents and through them of nature as an integrity of empirical existence, our own ego, our self-consciousness which is experienced and recognized in the most intimate way is the gift of the family and the race, the tribe and the people, in short, the gift of culture as summarized history.(3) History inspiring the present and, in turn, revived by it.

In the very same way that culture as a whole is a "collective" (or rather, common to all mankind, universal) form of human memory, self-consciousness (the ego) is its individual (intimately personal) form.

In that sense the original folk idea that consciousness understood as a man's consciousness of himself, that is, as self-consciousness, is memory is absolutely true. And vice versa: memory (we are speaking of cultural and historical memory, but not natural and mechanical memory) is self-consciousness. And let us add that it is self-consciousness of an individual person to the same extent as the self-consciousness of a people and mankind as a whole. The question of "Who am I?" addressed toward oneself indeed sounds as in the legend retold by Aytmatov: "Do you remember whose you are? Whose are you? What is your name?" It is a question in which one's own name is linked by no means accidentally with the name of those who gave you a name and together with it existence in culture. "Your father is Donenbay! Donenbay, Donenbay, Donenbay, Donenbay!"—that is how the unhappy mother, trying to awaken his self-consciousness, his free ego, entreats her son whose memory has failed and who has become a *mankurt*. In the very same way in "fateful moments" people appeal to the collective memory and cultural tradition by calling out the names of great ancestors. Their example should arouse descendants to the greatest spiritual tension. The first question of social self-consciousness and self-consciousness of a particular cultural-historical community sounds the same as the first question of the individual who is aware of himself.

But fate raises the question:  
Who are we in this old Europe? (V. Bryusov)

### Memory of the Spirit and Memory of the Hand

In order to picture more concretely the difference between "natural" and cultural memory which is noted not only in comparing man's memory with an animal's memory but also in analyzing various "levels" of human memory (despite their indissoluble link with one another in the human psyche), let us turn once again to the legend retold by Aytmatov.

After unsuccessfully pursuing the mother who stole to her son in secret, the "senior Juanjuan" (one must assume the master himself) and the "junior Juanjuan" (obviously his son) unmercifully beat the unfortunate *mankurt* and decide to use the son who has lost his memory against her.

"She is no mother to you! You don't have a mother! Do you know why she came? Do you? She wants to tear off your hat and steam your head," (4) they tried to intimidate the unfortunate *mankurt*.

"At these words the *mankurt* paled and his dark face became pale grey. He drew his neck into his shoulders and after grasping his cap began to look around like a wild animal.

"But don't you be afraid! Hold onto this!" the elder Juanjuan put abow and arrows in his hands.

"Here, take aim!" The junior Juanjuan threw his cap high in the air. The arrow pierced the cap. "Look!" the owner of the cap was surprised. "His memory remained in his hand!"

Here too the writer not only did not deviate from artistic truth but did not deviate from scientific truth either. The authoritative testimony of the prominent Russian scientist-psychiatrist S.S. Korsakov confirms this. In his doctoral dissertation, "On Alcoholic Paralysis," published and defended in 1887, he analyzed, among other things, the disorder of mental activity which is manifested in more or less prolonged loss of memory (amnesia). It is true that unlike the condition of complete loss of memory of the past which the legend attributes to the *mankurt*, people suffering from alcoholic paralysis (the case of the voluntary *mankurt*, "their memory ends within a month or two weeks before the illness" [Source 10, p 277].

"The first thing that strikes one," writes S.S. Korsakov, "is that although the sick person is not at all aware that he has traces left of those impressions which he receives, still these traces in all probability remain and one way or another influence the course of ideas, at least in unconscious mental activity. This is the only thing that can explain the quick shrewdness of some patients; thus, for example, two patients who before their illness did not know me at all, always guessed that I was a doctor even though they resolutely assured themselves that they were seeing me for the first time (every time). Then sometimes it happens that you come in to see a patient for the first time and he puts out his hand and greets you. Then you leave and in 2-3 minutes you come again and the patient no longer puts out his hand and does not greet you, even though to the question posed directly of 'did he see me just now?' he answers that he did not" [Source 10, pp 277-278].

As we can see, the purely corporal mechanisms of memory associated with the ability of its nerve-physiological substrata to retain "traces" of external stimulations by establishing the most simple links among them are preserved. Also preserved in the same way is the ability to "actualize" them—to unconsciously "recollect," as must be assumed in cases of unthinking correction of a motor scheme of behavior. (In one case the hand is offered in greeting and in the other—it is not, even though in the second case the patient guessed that he was seeing the doctor for the first time). And they are those same mechanisms which man and an animal have in common and make up the universal natural memory which is direct and unconscious in nature, unlike the

specifically human—cultural—memory which is characteristically reflective and purposeful. The examples cited by S.S. Korsakov are convincing evidence: in this case it is the cultural memory which is afflicted. But as for "natural" memory, it is preserved on the level which would be completely sufficient for the normal functioning of the animal.

"Recollections" of perceptions—auditory, visual, and tactile—are preserved in the *mankurt's* psyche. The ability to correct the scheme of his motor reactions in accordance with these "recollections" is preserved. Finally, even the "memory" of experiences which accompany these perceptions and motor reactions is preserved, in the most abstract form, to be sure: is it pleasant or not, does it provide satisfaction or not, does it arouse fear, anxiety, or irritation or not.

But in all these cases the "only" thing that is missing is the one thing that would turn this animal memory into strictly human cultural member. The inability to bring its contents to the light of consciousness and into the field of the human ego by correlating it with self-consciousness, that is, the ego's knowledge of itself. (But this relating action is what makes up the essence of what is called having "common sense and solid memory"). And to the extent that the ego (consciousness—self-consciousness) is nothing but the individual form of culture which has replaced instinct as a specifically human "clan memory" or "memory of the clan" (encompassing all its past and actualizing all its past into the present), so one more fundamentally important circumstance is revealed. It turns out that the above-mentioned "consciousness" of the contents of the "animal" memory is nothing other than its immersion in the element of culture and its endowment with those specific meanings which it can acquire only in the cultural "ether," that is, in the ideal measure of human existence [Source 7]

In this way, the *mankurt* is a person who has lost his clan memory, the individual form of which (and field where the contents of the animal memory should be illuminated for the first time by acquiring an intelligent—and therefore intelligible!—characterization) is the ego, consciousness—self-consciousness. And what falls on this "field" is already acculturated in a definite way. Therefore it is "socialized," it represents a "sociological phenomenon." And only the corresponding instrumentation is needed in order to translate this—sociocultural—content into a specifically sociological language. The language of concepts in which the idea of social action is articulated.

But the difference between the *mankurt*-slave from the legend and those voluntary *mankurts* whose sick psyche S.S. Korsakov studied is only that in the first the person's own ego was amputated altogether,<sup>(5)</sup> while in the second this ego was only partially "cut off" and this lasted for a limited time period—the period of alcoholic paralysis.<sup>(6)</sup> But even in the second case where the form of the ego is preserved, although in a certain seemingly

"torpid" condition, and the person still can answer the question "Who am I?"—even in this case a sharp "narrowing of consciousness" is ascertained. It is a fact which impels one again and again to consider cultural memory a *fundamental structure* of consciousness—self-consciousness without which the latter is deprived of what is most important and fundamental.

Indeed let us ponder once again what we mean when we say the word "consciousness". The first thing that Vladimir Dal draws attention to when he develops its meaning is this: "Consciousness, consciousness of oneself, full memory, the condition of a person of sound mind, able to give account of his actions." And the most popular turns of speech are cited as examples: "Our patient is already lacking consciousness, lacking memory, delirious. She fell into unconsciousness, she fainted, she fell into a swoon... The conscious condition of the patient, full memory, sense and freedom of the distinct will." Again and again they link consciousness and memory, and it is within the framework of this linkage that consciousness is above all affirmed as "consciousness of oneself," that is, the ego's memory of itself. We are speaking of a profound identity of consciousness and self-consciousness in which, using the language of classical German philosophy, the nature of the "self-identity of consciousness" is expressed. But this is only one side of the matter.

The other side is revealed when we begin to analyze the word "consciousness" by comparing it with another word which is part of its meaning: "knowledge". In Dal the verb "to know" means: "to know", to understand, to know how to, firmly remember, be familiar"—meanings in which memory also figures. But "knowledge" itself means "the condition, state of knowing something." Knowledge is the same "state of knowing," "understanding," and "ability to do," that same stable presence of something particular in the memory, no longer taken as an action but as a condition of man. Is the condition of "presence" in the human ego of a certain contents which man perceives as an expression of the real essence of something which is outside this ego all the same an object, an event, or some process?

In the last case we are speaking of some one thing which is at least more or less clearly defined. But as for "soznaniye," here we are speaking of "knowability" as such, that is, of my condition (the condition of my ego) taken not in relationship to some particular object, event, or process but in relationship to all objects, events, and processes of the world around me. In short, in relationship to all this world as a whole, which at each given moment appears to me as something "knowable" that I firmly understand and in which I am well oriented, despite the fact that by no means all subjects, phenomena, and processes are thoroughly known to me. That is the condition which we usually call being of sound mind and solid memory.

As numerous examples from the field of psychopathology confirm, the condition of "obscuring" "confusion" of the consciousness is brought about not only by the state of the external world, but also by the mental life of each particular individual. By comparing various cases of "obscured" consciousness with the condition of its normal "functioning," we come to an interpretation of the fundamentally important "function" (it is precisely that which is reflected in the prefix meaning "together"). Consciousness is a bringing together of the world, which has been broken up into an innumerable multitude of momentary impressions and divided into numerous "aspects," but only in order to be immediately reconstructed anew. And so, our consciousness is the "field" in which this "gathering" is carried out and its pole is the unifying force, the pole which is the unity of the human ego, the consciousness which is equivalent to self-consciousness (consciousness—self-consciousness). That is, the ego's memory of itself which forms the field of tension in which the diverse mental processes are generalized into a realized "projection" of the world as something known to me in advance and open to an active "presence."

That is why the concept of a conscious man is revealed as identical to the concept of an acculturated (and, therefore socialized) man. Then the question arises of the various directions of this socialization and of the conflicts of the socialization which has already taken place, and so on. But there is certainly no question about the "start" of this process. It is precisely its initial phases which most convincingly attest to the identity of the "acculturating" and "socializing" aspects. Their divergence is the result of unsuccessful but already accomplished socialization.

The above-mentioned "gathering" of the world within the framework of a certain "horizon"(7) is made necessary not only just by psychological factors but also by ontological reasons which are independent of the method of "assimilating" the world and turning it into part of individual life. The point is that the broader the cross-section in which we view the surrounding world, the more it appears unchanged, equal to itself, and "resident." And, vice versa, it proves to be more changeable, unself-identical, and "evasive," the smaller the scale which we apply to it. At each given "point" it acts as something which is on the vacillating edge between existence and nonexistence.

As long as we are able to divert ourselves from the temporal aspect of our existence (and we are most able to do this in childhood), the world around us appears to be populated with solid, impenetrable things. Of course, against the background of this general stability, we also notice numerous changes, fast occurring events, and the like, but they cannot shake our initial perception of the immutability of our world. But we only have to change the perspective (which comes to a person only as the years go by) and look at the world in its temporal context, and looking back at our past, we begin to notice

our involvement in the constant and ever-quickening flow which carries away this world particle by particle into nonexistence, replacing those particles with newer and newer ones

The task which our consciousness—self-consciousness performs—to restore the integrity of the world—is very complex. For the essence of the problem is not only to unify the endless diversity of our perceptions and impressions and bring this whole into accord with the surrounding world and thereby "open" it for our active "presence." But before doing this (and in order to do it), we must keep the diversity of perceptions and impressions which the new moment of the present brings from submerging into nonexistence and from becoming what "no longer is."

Memory, which keeps the past from disappearing completely and turning into nothing, is also used to carry out this process. In that way memory fulfills the same "antientropic" function in culture which any living form carries out, although in its own way and by its own methods—it resists nonexistence.

Man wants to know his past certainly not because he expects some "benefit" to himself from it. He thirsts for the answer to the questions—"Whose am I?" "Where am I from" and "What is my father's name?"—simply because he is not a *mankurt*. And this "act of discovery" is just as important for raising his "cultural level" as it is for "socializing" him. And the main thing is not to let the moment slip by. For such an "act of discovery" occurs (if it occurs at all) at an extremely early age.

#### A Little About the Phenomenology of Memory

How mankind's cultural memory manages to keep the past in its "pastness" precisely, that is, in what is most "original," "valuable in itself," and, consequently, most differs from the present, is "what no longer is" and what perhaps does not even represent "empty nonexistence" but definitely resides outside any empirical existence. To do this simple "traces" of the past which remain in the nervous-physiological substratum of our psyche are certainly not enough. They are not enough if only because they "are actualized" and in one way or another affect variations of behavior within the common bounds of its "motor scheme" and only in the presence of the appropriate external objects which are no longer in empirical reality as soon as we have the past (taken to mean something altogether different from the present) in mind. Natural mechanisms of memory are no longer suitable since the past has lost ties with the present in that sense and since it does not repeat itself with regularity in the empiricism of the present in a similar form. There is no longer the opportunity to even simply "compare" this past with the "traces" which remain in the corporal substratum of the psyche. In order to preserve that past and ensure a constant possibility of

reproducing it in memory, new—cultural—mechanisms are needed, because of which memory becomes really historical and able to operate upon the past.

Philosophy long ago groped for approaches to comprehending these mechanisms (although we are still a long ways from the scientific discovery of them) and established that their most important if not basic element is the sign and operations with it [Sources 8; 11-13]. The sign is "empirical reality" of a special type created by mankind and used by him for his own specific purposes. On the one hand, on the side of its "body," it represents something perceptible by his senses, since a sign is always something visible or audible, tangible or even smellable. (The smell of perfume, for example, can serve as a sign of a person's belonging to a particular social milieu). However, on the other hand, this sensibly perceptible "body" would not have the nature of a sign if it did not have a meaning which one of the sense organs could derive from the physical shell: either it is imperceptible or, rather, extraperceptible.

There is no such meaning in the sensually perceptible "exterior" of a sign as there is no such meaning in any other empirical subject, and at the same time it still "is" somewhere. Otherwise we would not comprehend that meaning by seeing (or hearing, or feeling) the corresponding sign. In this sense it is very similar to the past which, after all, is also "not" in empirical reality. At the very least, for those who know that it was, then, "somewhere," it somehow still "is." For that very reason signs proved to be so suitable for retaining the past in human memory which, strictly, also became specifically human due to the unique ability of such "retention." It is precisely because of that memory that long before Goethe's Faust, mankind did not simply pose the question of whether one can make a moment "stand still," but in fact learned how to "try to make it stand still" [Sources 14; 15]. Culture in the precise sense of the word began at that time.

The meaning is not contained in the sensibly perceptible "body" of the sign for the additional reason that the latter is always an indication of something else which is not in an "innate-natural" relationship with it at all: an indication of a certain definable content which may be whatever one likes—dependent of whether this definable content exists in the empiricism of the present or not. Meaning is always a certain relationship or attribution of a sign as designating the content designated by it [Sources 13; 16]. And it is not "given" by nature but by society: a system of interhuman contacts "concerning" nature (and not just nature alone). And "in reality" the meaning exists only in the heads of people who perform an infinite multitude of acts of such attribution designating the meaning, and vice versa. Language, called even by Hegel the "highest creation of the productive memory of man, is the universal sign element by whose model and in whose bosom many different "sign systems" are thereupon created. It is language that is the initial element of culture which is given directly to anyone who

has mastered this language and which structures the "field" of his consciousness by turning animal subjectivity into a genuinely human self-conscious ego [Sources 4; 11].

A sign taken from the side of its sensibly perceptible form represents a completely specific "external stimulus" which differs from all other physical stimuli which leave their trace in the corporal substratum of human memory. It invariably "attests" not only—and not so much—to itself. But it attests precisely to the fact that, strictly speaking, it cannot be expressed in principle through itself, since it does not have empirical existence: it attests to the meaning which "exists" only in the field of human consciousness—and as an "element," a "cell" of that field. But the field is nothing other than memory which is in a condition of tension and represents a "vigilant condition" of human consciousness: the self-consciousness of the ego. The latter, that is, that which is constantly remembering itself as "I," is also the "center" of the sphere of consciousness and its "periphery." In other words, this sphere itself is simultaneously both the "pole"—the source of tension—and the "force field" arranged around it. And the source of the world and this world itself: it is the natural world of reason.

Relying on the past, man "distances himself" from the present and only because of this reveals the future to himself and thereby existence as the unity of all three dimensions and as something "residing," despite their insurmountable "temporality." The "distancing" arises because of the fact that between the "stimulus" and the "reaction" of yesterday's living ancestor of man a "sign" appears which brings about an absolutely unexpected and fundamentally new mental process—transference of its content (in this case memory) from the physiological-corporal level to the meaning, that is, ideal, level.

The idea of "distancing" each time relies on a unique circle: one must "distance oneself" from the present in order to discover the past for oneself and, in contrast, one must rely on the past in order to "distance oneself" from the present. But where does this circle break through? Precisely in the sign which for the first time reveals to us the *ideal dimension of human existence* which represents "the condition of possibility" of distancing per se. But this again returns us to that pole of consciousness for which meanings exist only as meanings, that is, irrespective of their corporal shell—of the self-conscious (remembering itself) ego.

The sphere of our consciousness woven of numerous and diverse meanings attributed to our self-conscious ego as a unity regulating and organizing them—a correlate of the unity of the sociocultural world surrounding us—is the sphere of constant tension of memory. There are two basic forms of this tension taken in the strictly human aspect(8): they are "external" speech—conversation intertwined in our interactions with other people—and "internal" speech—the silent unending conversation we carry on with ourselves irrespective of whether we are in

a passively contemplative or actively energetic condition—and whether we are pondering things abstract or creating a physically perceptible “thing.”

We mean not the external—purely verbal—form of this constant stream of consciousness, but its internal structure consisting of the strictly regulated “chain” of meanings and their world-revealing nature. For if the “meaning of existence” of a sign is to—within limits—wholly disappear in meaning, then the “meaning of existence” of this latter is to sacrifice itself and reveal the “world” to man. And to reveal this world as it is *per se*, irrespective of the most complex mechanism which man uses to reveal it for himself [Sources 4; 7; 15; 17].

So then: the “vigilance” of a man(9) is the condition of “discovery” of the world given to him directly which corresponds to consciousness of the transparency of the ego in which the individual is clearly aware of what is happening to him and the “world” surrounding him in each given moment of “presence” in it. This is also the condition which is justly characterized as man’s being “of sound mind and solid memory.” For here the “solidness” of memory which keeps the “world in its integrity and undamaged state” for a man is no less important than the “healthiness” of sense which sums up more and more impressions under the unity of the ego which remembers itself.

Incidentally, this is also that condition of “normality” (and, accordingly, legal mental capacity) of consciousness whose definition up to now represents a mystery for psychopathology and jurisprudence, and even for sociology. How and by what signs can it be ascertained whether a person is “normal” mentally and, accordingly, whether he is able to answer for his actions or not? This is how. If by a man’s actions one can infer the extent to which he remembered himself (that is, the degree to which the continuity of his ego was preserved) and understood the situation—the “world” correlated with his own behavior in a limited space and time of “direct action” where and when he carried out a particular act, then it is completely possible to fix the level of his consciousness and the measure of his responsibility for his actions.

As we can see, even when the actions of a particular person “in fateful moments” are evaluated, we again and again begin with the question of memory—“he remembered himself” or “he did not remember himself” (or he allowed himself “not to remember,” continuing, however, to remember that “he did not remember” when he committed a particular act). And here the *ethical* aspect of the ego’s memory of itself is revealed. Recognition of the ego as identical to oneself, despite the changeability and “fluidity” of consciousness (the “stream of consciousness” which reflects both the replacement of the conditions of the “world” and the modification of the conditions of the psyche), means acceptance by the self-conscious individual of responsibility for his actions and at times—even for his “intentions.”

That is why for such penetrating thinkers as, for example, Kant, even the laws of logic were filled with moral sense: the law of identity expressed by the formula “A equals A,” for example. For this formula is translatable into another in the most straightforward and direct way: ego equals ego, which expresses the self-identity of the ego. And from it comes the ethical demand addressed to each person: “Be faithful to yourself!” and “Be faithful to the word given to you!” In general remember that “You are you!” when we are talking of the you who gave the word (or who committed any particular act) a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or many years ago. That is why popular consciousness associates the word “consciousness” with another idea which at first glance is not directly perceivable in this word—consciousness of guilt (let us recall the popular turn of speech “he confessed”). Taken in this sense—and such great creators of our moral philosophy as Dostoyevskiy and Tolstoy invariably affirmed it, consciousness of guilt restores a man’s unity with himself and saves his self-consciousness from pathological bifurcation by returning his primordial self-identity.

And, as is not difficult to note, the initial identification of the “clear conscience” and “solid memory” remain as before the meaning background against which it becomes possible to identify the gnosiological (“to recognize oneself”) and the ethical and hence the juridical (“to confess”) ideas of one and the same word. That is not without deep meaning. For only if the ego constantly remembers itself and again and again renews the successive link with itself—yesterday’s, the day before yesterday’s, and the day’s before that, that is, if it invariably resides as consciousness—self-consciousness equal to itself; is it in general possible for a person to be “made responsible” for anything—either by himself or by other people.

Whatever is true for each particular person in this case is true for all people together—for the family and the clan, the tribe, and the people, and for human culture in general. Memory of the past is not only recollection of past exploits and victories and of the heroic accomplishments of a people and its military leaders. It is also a reminder of failures and misfortunes, mistakes and errors—conscientious memory. “Don’t throw out the words of the song”—do not eliminate from folk memory the distressing, the sad, and the tragic events which a people have had to experience, suffer, and endure throughout their history—both long-past and recent history. For what is applicable to individual people—“To live your life is not so easy as crossing a field”—is also true for the life of a whole people... And in exactly the same way as all attempts to “shorten” the memory of a people as soon as it is a people (rather than a featureless throng of mankurts) are doomed to failure. For the memory of a people like that of a particular individual is unified and indivisible—in exactly the same way as his self-consciousness is unified and indivisible. The only alternative to such unity of self-consciousness is splitting

consciousness into two, three, or four, that is, disintegration: the condition known in psychopathology as acutely ill.

#### The Court of Memory—Creation of Culture

"It turns out," the hero of Ch. Aytmatov's novel reflects, "a man's head can't stop thinking for even a second. Because that's how this stupid thing is set up—whether you want it or not, one thought comes out of another all the same and it goes on like that forever, until you die, most likely!" [Source 1] Edigey made this discovery after he caught himself continually thinking of something along the way. "And thoughts followed thoughts like wave after wave in the sea" [Source 1]. That is the form, as we saw, in which the strictly human "waking state" occurs. And it is by no means an accident that the association of thoughts unfolds in Edigey's consciousness like the association of more and more of his recollections. Memory is a most important element ("constituent," expressed philosophically) of our waking consciousness. So the favorite artistic device of the writer Aytmatov is based on the firm foundation of this primordial feature of consciousness—self-consciousness.

Here before us is the "stream of consciousness," but not the one invented in the bosom of modernist-avant garde art which replaced the transparent—to the human ego—association of thoughts with the association of "unconscious experiences" which is just as obscure as it is fantastic (so the "stream of consciousness" has turned into a "stream of the unconscious" which has forced its way into the "field" of consciousness and taken complete possession of it—as happens in mentally ill people). In Aytmatov the "stream of consciousness" is the court of memory and the court of conscience, uninterrupted even for a second, without which human life would slip into the purely animal level of "war of everyone against everyone." (10)

But it is more than just a "court" that our waking memory holds over us, constantly reminding us of the most important moral guideposts (we call them absolutes since their presence in the memory of culture is a real "condition of possibility" of self-preservation of any form of human society and of mankind as such). The constant tension of memory of any of us is that force through which human culture again and again discovers life in every given moment. It is that element which is completely permeated with force lines and electrified to the highest degree, that element in which our own past, the past of our fathers and grandfathers, and the past of our people and country is reborn for new life. And to the same degree and extent to which each of us is capable of such constant tension of memory, no matter how many worldly "inconveniences" it affords, all those who have already left us, but certainly not to dissolve in nonexistence "without a trace," will live on with us. The past of a people, a culture, and mankind appeals to the self-consciousness, memory, and conscience of all those living today.

#### Footnotes

1. "Independence" is spontaneous activism of the individual being precisely as an individual rather than a clan being.
2. Here it is the deep source from which the "ego-images" (or images of the ego) subsequently arise, images which replace one another at various stages of a person's individual development.
3. That is why even the "image" of our ego must not be reduced, no matter how much we might like, to the "sum total of processes" of interindividual interaction, as Dzh. G. Mid does.
4. This refers to the "shir," a piece of the thick, heavy, nuchal part of the hide taken from a just-slaughtered adult camel. "Shirs" were put on the freshly-shaven head of a prisoner so that drying out from the scorching Asian sun, the piece of hide would stick to his head forever. As a result the man lost his memory and retained only one recollection—a monstrous headache.
5. It was completely replaced by the ego of the mankurt's master.
6. The period when the ego seems to exist out of inertia—through the next to the last contents of the cultural memory—without being able to include the most recent past (what happened several minutes or even several seconds before) in the sphere of its activity and retain that past in its "ether."
7. On an objective level they are the historical limits of the existing culture, or rather the socioculture and the given sociocultural form and on the subjective level—the limits of human consciousness-self-consciousness.
8. They distinguish it from the purely animal "waking state," which represents readiness to react to any external stimulus which is within the framework of the "actualized" field of instinct (combination of instincts).
9. Unlike purely animal "readiness" to perceive new stimuli which are within the framework of "actualized" instinct.
10. Hegel called this condition the "spiritual animal kingdom."

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## The Idea of Diversity and Scientific Cognition

18060003c Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 23-28

[Article by Vladimir Vasilyevich Shkoda, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent of the department of philosophy of Kharkov State University, appearing in our journal for the first time]

[Text] Indications of a new theme in the methodology of science are coming to light. Like all contemporary general themes it is interdisciplinary. In various fields of social and natural science which are fairly remote from one another, researchers are more and more often comparing two approaches. They are speaking of one-dimensional and multidimensional thinking, of the nonalternative and the alternative, the typological and the populational, the principles of uniformity and polymorphism, of monocentrism and polycentrism. The term "polyphony" unexpectedly appears in works far removed from music science. If the traditional philosophical terminology is used, the pair "unity and diversity" expresses the above-mentioned opposition quite accurately.

It is notable in the situation that clear preference is being given to the idea of diversity. At the same time the long-current idea of unity is being criticized as uniformity. In short, a fundamental change is taking place, restructuring of methodological consciousness: in the most diverse disciplines models relying on the idea of uniformity are receding into the background. It is becoming more and more obvious that over-simplification of the structures of being as well as reduction as a cognitive device—the search for a universal law, a formula, an explanatory scheme, and the like—all are losing their status as inflexible ideals of practice and cognition. The idea that contemporary problems are multifaceted, complex, and all-embracing is becoming more trusted.

## One-Dimensional Thinking

One-dimensional thinking is entranced by the ideal of the single and universal means of optimizing activity. People look for a universal economic indicator, a universal method of social management and upbringing. On the level of ordinary experience people dream of a miracle cure—one for all diseases. Contemporary scientific thinking is overcoming such an orientation toward over-simplification by devoting more and more attention to the unique phenomena of being and culture.

Of course, the task of the theory—to comprehend the essence and the value of knowledge which reveals the nature of an object—is beyond question. But do we not at times leave knowledge of the phenomenon in the shadow? However, that is precisely what man ultimately needs. The primitive-empirical incorporation of reality and its scientific-practical transformation begins with that knowledge. Is not the "list" toward substance and is

not the absolutization of theory the basis of reductionism and the interpretation of unity as uniformity? In analyzing the opinions of Hegel on the phenomenon, Lenin revealed a "living idea" in the "dark obscurity." In his outline "The Science of Logic" he notes: ("the phenomenon integrity, totality) (law = part) (The phenomenon is richer than the law)." The essence of the opinions of the German idealist, Lenin believes, "is the struggle against absolutization of the concept of the law, its over-simplification, and its fetishization"? [Source 1].

Contemporary scientific cognition, which breaks with theorizing as a value in itself, is characterized by intent interest in just what theorizing has always considered inessential—interest in the incidental and unitary, the unique, and the particular in all its complexity. This is illustrated by the timeliness of situational and regional research and the trend to degeneralize knowledge. However, overcoming dogmatism and one-dimensional thinking is not a simple task. A.S. Tsipko did an interesting sociophilosophical analysis of those theoretical ideas which have prevented the implementation of long-standing, urgently needed changes in society. The concept of "uniformity"—a unified view of the world and understanding of social good—is the basis of such views. These ideas sanctioned the corresponding practice: "despite the logic of social life, despite the interests of developing and strengthening socialism through the decades on behalf of science and on behalf of Marxism-Leninism, a struggle was carried on against everything that threatened uniformity" [Source 3].

The roots of these views date back to pre-Marxist gnosiology which was characterized by the isolation of theory from practice and, as a result, theory's indifference to the concrete—which is always complex and varied. Adherents of the strategy of uniformity insist on their "essential" superiority over the world of "phenomena" [Source 3]. This is the, so to speak, subjective side of the costs of theoretical scholasticism. But it also has methodological prerequisites. The "theoretician" prefers to deal with the "essence," above all because traditional definitions of the latter are not only compatible with the idea of uniformity but at times directly justify it. Essence is transparently pure, simple, and basic. Phenomena are complex, diverse, and ephemeral. Essence is majestically wise, phenomena are sensual and seemingly frivolous. A "theoretician" who has grasped the nature of an object does not need either repeated or comparative studies. For him essence once grasped remains unique and invariable. Such associations are inevitable when the movement of cognition is defined as movement from phenomenon to essence and the latter is considered the final goal while the phenomenon is considered in some way transitory and can be forgotten once the goal is reached.

One of the gnosiological roots of the concept of "uniformity" is the exaggerated significance attributed to idealization. As is well known, the product of idealization is an abstract object with which thought operates as

if it were a real thing. Although such intellectual constructs are built by oversimplifying what is real, this does not at all limit the efficiency of human cognition. On the contrary, when real processes are being studied, the opportunity arises to use formal and in particular mathematical methods and predict the development of events. Ignoring the gnosiological status and absolutizing the theoretical content of certain concepts and models turns idealization from an effective means of scientific cognition to an instrument of theoretical willfulness.

When unity in the fundamental has been achieved and the diversity of forms of its manifestation is acknowledged, one should not hurry to struggle to overcome all possible differences and to erase the distinctions. Here there is also a limit beyond which excess zeal results not in unity but uniformity (see [Source 2]).

The forms of rejection of diversity are different and have a long history. Obviously, Christianity played no small role here. In its dogma oneness is the highest value while movement toward plurality is degradation. The significance of a being is less the further it is from oneness and, consequently, the greater the range of that multitude of which the individual is an element. The hierarchical structure of the universe is such that what is closer to oneness becomes its representative and authority for each successive level.

Such an approach has predominated in science and, in particular, in biology for a long time. This was manifested in such a detail, for example, as collectors' desire to have only one, but the most representative "typical form" of a species. And any variation was considered a corrupted or even mongrel version. Naturalists before Darwin, noted A. Wallace, "looked upon variations, especially if they were numerous, insignificant, and ordinary, as a decided curse" [Source 4].

#### Diversity as a Sociological Principle

In the contemporary methodology of science the idea is being asserted more and more actively that in any sphere of study both a typological approach relying on the idea of the single object and a sociological approach where the idea of the mosaic nature of an object (the concept of the "mosaic object") acts as the premise [Source 5] are possible. The history of science attests that this second approach is becoming the dominant one. Things are obviously moving toward a kind of socialization of scientific thought as a whole. This process is closely related to rejecting unidimensionality and identifying science exclusively with the abstract single object and to shifting to the idea of polymorphism. In light of this the very concept of "sociological thinking" can be interpreted broadly—not only as thought about the social but as thought about the diverse.

Let us take juridical science as an example. Education in the struggle against the right-wing views of feudalism promoted the idea of natural law. Its principles stem

from the principles of reason, as was asserted. But inasmuch as reason is natural these principles are absolute. Contemporary legal science quite precisely distinguishes traditional or dogmatic jurisprudence, which gravitates toward monolithic ideas of natural law, and juridical sociology, which relies on the idea of diversity. "The law being studied by dogmatic jurisprudence," writes J. Carbonnet, "is a unified monolithic whole. Juridical sociology breaks up this block into a multitude of atoms in their various combinations" [Source 6, p 141]. And then, continuing: "its national legal system looks monistic in the eyes of the jurist. Law appears as a homogeneous whole and a unified block... But juridical sociology approaches the problem differently, considering the law complex and heterogeneous" [Source 6, p 179].

One may say that sociology begins where "monology" leaves off. And the point is not the subject but the method of research. The term "sociological approach" is now encountered in very unusual contexts which are remote from the contexts of the social sciences. People resort to the expression mentioned when they want to stress the methodological significance and heuristic force of changing from a single object to a multitude (sum total, population, community, and the like) in research. In light of this the word "sociological" is usually put in quotation marks, apparently indicating a metaphor, for the sociological is usually associated with the study of what is social. However, the latter concept originates from the Latin "societas" (society). In turn it is derived from the more abstract "socio"—to unite, join, combine. In other words, the idea of diversity or the idea of the mosaic object is the basis.

Of course, the meaning of the sociological is not simply plurality. The first step is the change from homogeneous (one) to heterogeneous (the many). But in light of this the individuality of the units making up the many should be preserved on the theoretical level. At first glance this is a commonplace demand. In any case it is today customary.

#### Monologue or Dialogue?

So, what is diverse is sociological. From this standpoint sociology overcomes extreme universalism as the cognitive norm toward which the natural sciences gravitate. They try to overcome diversity, sociology cannot exist without diversity. It follows from this that the sociological approach acts as an alternative to any attempts to reduce the subject under study to an abstract single object. In natural-science cognition such a procedure is a common matter.

The methodology of natural science believes that diversity creates a problem situation for the scientific discipline. The goal of cognition is to reveal invariants—constantly preserved regularities in the diversity of phenomena. This is also a search for the general: the law. However, situations arise in which knowledge is

obtained in the seemingly opposite way. Here the cognitive effect is achieved not in the process of overcoming, but, on the contrary, as a result of "creating" diversity. It turns out that by remaining within the framework of the one it is not possible to understand this one. A solution is needed which breaks out of the limits of the situation. M.M. Bakhtin subtly perceived this method of cognition: "The greatest matter for understanding is that the one who is understanding must be *on the outside*—in time, in space, and in culture—in relationship to what he wants to creatively understand" [Source 7]. By deliberately seeking the "outside sphere" we seemingly generate diversity.

The problem of the relativity of scientific knowledge directly involves sociology, inasmuch as it is occupied with the diverse. For the absolute is the only and the relative is the diverse. This idea began to be used as a methodological regulator comparatively recently and gained a definite foothold only in the 20th century. The importance of this approach is difficult to exaggerate. "It should be emphasized," writes T.I. Oyzerman, "that the problem of the relativity of knowledge occupies too little space in our research. However, the study of this set of questions helps prevent dogmatism and facilitates a creative mastery of Marxism-Leninism" [Source 8]. Insufficient attention to this problem is one of the reasons that natural science knowledge was considered outside the sociological problem area for a long time: nature is one, and hence the picture of nature, whose construction is the goal of science, is the only and in this sense absolute. Religious beliefs, esthetic tastes, and moral systems are diverse.

It is becoming more and more difficult to defend this point of view nowadays. Of course, we are not speaking here of the sociology of science in its usual understanding but of the study of the system of normative regulation of the behavior of scientists and their ideals and values, that is, everything that defines the ethos of science. This kind of research has been carried on for a long time. But we mean the applicability of sociological means for natural science knowledge itself. And this becomes possible only after its social relativity and variability is acknowledged. A certain restructuring of epistemological approaches is necessary for the sociology of natural science to be affirmed as a full-fledged discipline. The Marxist idea of the social causality of knowledge must also be confirmed and be comprehensively and concretely elaborated, and not in a truncated way—social conditions speed up or delay obtaining absolutely reliable, indisputable, objectively provable-in-experience truths—but in a more categorical form. Knowledge should be considered a spiritual product whose creation is mediated by available cultural resources rather than a directly known quantity. These resources are variable and develop historically. Accordingly, both the creation and the transmission of knowledge from generation to generation are closely related to the interpretational activity of particular-historical cognition.

Relapses of "sociological extremism" are possible on the way to realizing this approach. An extreme emphasis on the social nature of cognition frequently leads to denial of the principle of objectivity and to extreme forms of relativism.

At the same time, however, denial of the social variability of cognition leads to viewing scientific thought as a process which is individual in its very nature. And that inevitably entails negative social consequences. Galileo's statements about the characteristics of scientific truth are well known. Here is one of them: "Thousands of Demosthenes' and thousands of Aristotles will be unseated by any ordinary mind lucky enough to discover a truth" [Source 9]. Generally speaking, such situations are completely possible. But what will happen if a broader meaning is given to such an understanding of scientific thought? What can happen if people begin to be guided in social practice by the notion that an idea which appears in only one head—if it is scientific truth—should be compulsory for every one? Will one person not receive the authority to decide questions pertaining to all?

Until science had appreciable impact on the life of society, gnosiological individualism was harmless. To a certain extent the fact that collective principles are becoming stronger in scientific activity and the social responsibility of scientists is growing serves as a guarantee against scientific dogmatism turning into administrative willfulness. However, the history of the last decades confirms that such guarantees do not always function. A certain contradiction and lack of unification of the principles of traditional gnosiology and of the sociological approach to cognition is one of the reasons for that.

In dealing with the diversity of cognitive situations, gnosiology singles out general cognitive norms and necessary conditions of any cognition. The main question for gnosiology is how is real knowledge formed? There is no sense asking here—whose knowledge? It is no one's concretely, and at the same time it is everyone's. The result may more or less correspond to the subject being studied, but truly genuine knowledge is all one. And that is why it has no geographic nor historical features. One may even say that this knowledge is eternal. The sociology of cognition begins where the questions of who, where, when, and why study are posed. Recognition that knowledge is variable and diverse is the starting point here.

The new view of the process of cognition also involves changing the approaches to using the results obtained. On a normative basis social law is evaluated by what gives an answer to the question of "what will happen and what to do." In the early stages of development of culture, the regulatory functions clearly dominated over gnosiological tasks (description and explanation). But discovering a law was considered an unpredictable affair: in some unexpected way it can be revealed by the efforts of individual intellect. Another variant is God

communicating instructions to people through a person He chooses for that person's special merits. Such is the "origin" of the laws of Solomon, the laws of Moses, and the like. This individualism in the matter of "law-discovery" or law-making has various forms but the essence is the same: a certain someone presents absolutely genuine imperatives and people—each and every person—are assigned the role of agents. While such ideas predominate, sociological thought cannot emerge. It appears in conditions where each individual's participation in the historical process is at least formally acknowledged and when a social event is considered precisely as a multiple event—the result of the sum of diverse conscious actions. The law here acts as a competent solution made during intelligent collective discussion.

Acknowledgement of each person's significance as a participant in a historical event and recognition of the need to construct social processes with this theory in mind means fundamentally restructuring thinking and substituting a sociological approach for a typological approach.

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# USSR State Committee for Statistics Reports

Average Housing Space Available to the Population for the Start of 1987, by Union Republics (figures per inhabitant, square meters of area)

	Per Inhabitant		Per Urban Inhabitant		Per Rural Inhabitant	
	Total	Housing	Total	Housing	Total	Housing
Union Republics						
RSFSR	15.2	10.3	14.5	9.4	17.1	12.8
Ukrainian SSR	16.8	11.1	15.4	9.6	19.4	14.0
Belorussian SSR	16.3	11.2	14.0	9.0	20.4	15.0
Uzbek SSR	11.0	7.8	11.2	7.3	10.8	8.2
Kazakh SSR	13.0	8.9	12.6	8.2	13.6	9.9
Georgian SSR	17.6	12.7	15.9	10.2	19.6	15.5
Azerbaijan SSR	10.5	7.3	11.9	7.6	8.9	6.8
Lithuanian SSR	17.8	11.8	15.7	10.1	21.9	15.0
Moldavian SSR	16.8	11.9	12.8	8.3	20.3	15.0
Latvian SSR	18.9	12.2	16.9	10.9	23.4	15.3
Kirghiz SSR	11.3	8.1	11.3	7.7	11.3	8.4
Tajik SSR	8.7	6.3	11.1	7.3	7.6	5.7
Armenian SSR	13.7	9.1	13.1	8.2	15.0	11.0
Turkmen SSR	10.2	7.3	10.1	6.9	10.3	7.7
Estonian SSR	20.3	13.2	17.8	11.6	26.6	17.4
USSR	14.9	10.1	14.3	9.2	16.1	11.9

## Rock: Music? Subculture? Lifestyle? (Editors' Round-Table Discussion)

18060003d Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 29-51

[Round table discussion with N.S. Bender, chief of the Main Administration of Culture of Moscow Oblast Ispolkom; I.M. Bakshteyn, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Design of Culture, Sport, and Administration Complexes and Buildings imeni B.S. Mezentssev; V.Ya. Golovanov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent; Yu.N. Davydov, doctor of philosophical sciences, deputy department chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; A.A. Ignatyev, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Systems-Research of the State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Academy of Sciences; L.G. Ionin, doctor of philosophical sciences, managing scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; N.T. Kremlev, scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; A.O. Kryshchanovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences and scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; A.N. Malinkin, junior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; M.A. Manuil'skiy, editor of the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA; V.V. Marochkin, associate of the Moscow City Laboratory of Rock Music; Major V.S. Ovchinskiy, militia, candidate of juridical sciences, deputy department chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs All-Union Scientific Research Institute; N.D.

Sarkitov, teacher at school No 368 in Moscow and graduate student of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; S.A. Efirov, doctor of philosophical sciences and managing scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute; led by G.S. Batygin, doctor of philosophical sciences and deputy chief editor of the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA; materials for discussion prepared for publication by V.A. Popov, under the rubric "Debates"]

[Text] Rock music is 30 years old. A kind of customs ban held it back for a very long time, but can reliable obstacles really be put up against something that is of interest to millions of people? Despite the bans rock music increasingly began defining the musical situation in our country too. In the 1970's the words "rock ensemble," "rock group," "rock star," and "rock opera" began to pop up in the columns of newspapers and journals. It became the dominant musical preference of youth. And it continues to be now. The findings of Estonian sociologist N.P. Meynert, for example, confirm: of the nine genres it is rock music which enjoys most popularity among youth: 79 percent of those surveyed like it (1984 data) [Source 1].

Specialists assert that the attraction to rock is waning. But it was a popular phenomenon for decades and for this reason alone deserves fixed attention from sociologists. And in fact, the musical community has repeatedly addressed urgent questions to sociologists. For example, in a talk with an IZVESTIYA correspondent, A.L. Rybnikov, the author of the famous rock opera "Yunona" and "Avos," proposed clarifying the factors that give rise to questions like "do we need rock or not?" and "do we need classical music or not?" [Source 2]. There is now a shortage of sociological interpretation of the process by

which the musical tastes of youth are formed. This is a professional "duty" of sociologists to the readers of the journal and to society as a whole.

"Rock culture as a social phenomenon." That in the most general form is how we decided to formulate the theme of the journal's regular round table discussion.

Before beginning the discussion it would be appropriate to agree on the central term—"rock music." What meaning do linguists attribute to it? Let us turn to the academic edition of "New Words and Meanings. A Reference Dictionary Based on Materials from the Press and Literature of the 1970's". On page 634 we read: "Rock music. One of the most popular types of modern stage music. It includes elements of folklore, a unique manner of vocalization, and electronic sound effects, with rhythm in a dominant role" [Source 3]. It should be added to this that many things link rock music with authors' songs and that it is divided into the concert, dance, and theater. We hear the first from the stage, in a more or less narrow circle, the second in a discotheque or dance area, and the third on the opera stage. If the meaning of this key term is clarified during the discussion, that will certainly make undertaking the discussion worthwhile.

[G.S. Batygin] let us drop the words "I like—I don't like" for the time being.

I am sure that we have not come together for a discussion of the problem of rock with the results of completed scientific research at hand. As often happens, life itself has posed the questions and it has posed them in an exacting and unexpected way for sociologists. Let us repair an omission. I think that I express the general opinion of those here in formulating the goal of our discussion as a search for the range of alternatives regarding rock. All viewpoints deserve the most serious attention and before the start of our round table work. I was certain that they did not coincide. But difference of opinion can be a real means of finding the truth. I hope that we will not waste time defending our own esthetic predilections. Let us drop the words "I like—I don't like" for the time being. Let us try to understand rock as a social phenomenon: as music, as subculture, as lifestyle. Let us also try to look ahead: does rock have a future, and if it does, what does it give a person and what new opportunities does it open up.

[Yu.N. Davydov] we have before us a confrontation of two ways of life, and it is a social confrontation.

First I will say a few words devoted not to the problem we are discussing itself but to the social context, which is what makes it more critical. The materials published in recent issues of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on the confrontations of the Lyubers and the rockers insistently remind us of this context.

If one is speaking of a sociological approach to rock music, then it must first of all be taken as an element of "rock culture"—a specific branch of the youth "subculture." And here we must bear in mind that we are speaking of a certain way of life and means of carrying out one's calling rather than simply of music. And where it is a question of a person's way of life, means of existence, and self-realization is where the most profound dispute arises. It is a real dispute: because when young people try to defend the just-discovered means of their existence and their rightness by asserting their "exclusivity," it is very difficult for them to find a common language. Here different "modes," as they are called, of human—sociocultural—existence clash. And those cases which we often encounter ourselves and which Yuriy Shchekochikhin recalls in practically every issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA speak precisely of this. We are witnessing a confrontation of different methods of social "self-realization" of a certain number of youth, that is, a social conflict. For the time being I am keeping away from any value characteristics and trying to analyze the phenomenon at its elemental source.

So, the conflict of the Lyubers, the "repairmen", or whoever else, on the one hand, and someone from the rockers, on the other, clearly has its source in the "dissonances" in the ways of life of different groups of youth, which are the first thing that strike young people. Concepts such as "rock culture" or "Lyubers" become social symbols against the background of this "dissonance." And it is particularly difficult here to sort out certain fairly divergent aspects: some of them are more related to the music itself and others to the way of life, while still others are related to its ideology, and so on. But "behind" each of these symbols is the idea of a certain way of life and its "exclusivity" and "incompatibility" with another.

[G.S. Batygin] Yuriy Nikolayevich, if you believe that we are speaking of a clash of two ways of life, then the opposition of these two ways of life should be formulated even before we...

[Yu.N. Davydov] Absolutely right...

[G.S. Batygin] A clash is an expression of "war," but the internal war existed earlier.

[Yu.N. Davydov] Social "dissonance" or even conflict is not always and not necessarily "war." Someone has to make it a "war." And in our case the "repairmen," who make a sociocultural conflict into something like a pogrom, try to do this. Although as we shall see, the rockers are not blameless here either. I would not want to use the word "war" for what the newspapers are telling us about, so as not to stir up passions. But something which gives reason to fear a "war-like" inflaming of passions is in fact happening. And the sociologist is obliged to warn society about this.

The sociocultural conflict which has spilled out into the open in the form of fighting between "repairmen" and rockers is fraught with by no means undangerous possibilities. And we must interpret it at its sources. Let us try to reflect on them. For a start let us cite T.I. Zaslavskaya, who in her article in KOMMUNIST [Source 4] has reminded us that not only the interrelations of different strata and layers, but, at times, the relationships of people living in different regions of the country as well, can assume the character of social tension. If larger amounts of capital are systematically invested in some regions (and even rayons of the same oblast) than in others, then the former will also possess greater social advantages. And this will be experienced as social injustice by the inhabitants of the less-privileged regions.

What this article had to say is applicable to various oblasts of the USSR and also holds true for the sociocultural relationship of Moscow and its close periphery. Even for the center of Moscow and its environs. As a result a Muscovite has a number of clear advantages and privileges which people who live around Moscow do not have. And this is one of the sources of the conflict which Yu. Shchekochikhin has related to us.

[G. S. Batygin] Yuriy Nikolayevich, why do you reduce it all down to a conflict between Moscow and its suburbs?

[Yu.N. Davydov] In this case I am relying on the fact of the existence of such a conflict. On a real fact which I am trying to interpret. It labels itself, for example, with Lyubers, a fairly expressive designation for young people who come to the capital from its suburbs. And then it is rather quickly revealed that Moscow also has its own (internal) Lyubers—those who have sensed their own affinity with the external Lyubers.

[G.S. Batygin] The plenum of the ruling board of the Writers' Union spoke of the need for a new Stalingrad. A "war" was also meant there. Is it not possible to compare the territorial "war" of those same "Lyubers" and metallists and the "war" which the RSFSR Writers' Union spoke of at the plenum?

[Yu.N. Davydov] A different word is more appropriate here—"fight." It is not yet a war. However, the writers' battles are a different topic. We are talking of the tension which is arising in the youth milieu. And it is important for us to outline the sociocultural parameters of this tension which is manifested in the form of ideologically tinged confrontations of young people. The arena of this conflict is no longer an auditorium, small or large. It is not an ordinary acoustic hall where there is no difference between the gallery and the pit. We can discern dividing lines here. We are dealing with the confrontation of two different sociocultural strata divided, in addition to everything else, by spatial distance. But when Yuriy Shchekochikhin restricts his analysis of this phenomenon to criticism of those "backward" people, young or old, who react to someone's "pin" or to something else of this type which singles a person out from the crowd—he

oversimplifies the task. (1) Those whom he criticizes and of whom he speaks ironically reveal here a much greater "sociological imagination" than the author of the articles about the "informals." In this unfortunate pin they see not just one more or less extravagant person who wishes to direct attention to himself but a whole group of people whose way of life they consider to be incompatible with their own and to violate their moral world order: a "trend" that they find unacceptable. The war is not against *this particular* pin, *this particular* bell, or *this particular* hair standing on end. The war is against a way of life which those things symbolize and affirm and against an "alien" sociocultural stratum which possesses broader potential.

Moreover—and it is important to stress this specially—we are speaking here not only of the economic possibilities of a particular form of sociocultural self-realization. We are living at a time when privileges are not rectilinear: one young person has more pocket money while another has less. Although even this, as we are certain, plays no small role. We are speaking of a certain specific self-realization which Shchekochikhin noted well. Forms of social control are more rigid in the suburbs than in the city, especially the capital. In the suburbs everyone sees everyone else, the teenager's opportunities for unregulated self-realization there are to a certain extent restricted and he must adapt himself to these restrictions. In Moscow, in contrast, the lack of restrictions and the unfettered atmosphere are striking to a teenager from near Moscow. Freedom thus seems like a unique privilege of the capital youth and a sign of their social distinction. In this more amorphous social milieu where there are fewer methods of direct control, bells, pins, and other status symbols do not indicate that the one who wears them is a dramatic individual. They express something altogether different, namely that that person belongs to a particular clan which has more freedom of behavior. And as a member of a privileged clan he is allowed what, let us say, that very Lyuber is not allowed, in his suburb at least. That is how the feeling of inequality of privileges arises. And, naturally, internal resistance to the restrictions which the young person who lives in the suburbs feels in those cases (directly from Freud) takes on the character of outside aggression. What I suppress in myself since I cannot realize it, I carry out in a transformed way—in an act of aggression against that person who has allowed himself what is not permitted me. We are still speaking of evaluating the content of what one allowed himself and another did not. In the one case the first may be right and in the other—the second. Truth is always concrete.

For the time being we are examining only the sociopsychological mechanism of aggression. One way or another in this case we face not simple mutual hatred but, if you will, (according to Dostoyevskiy) love-hate: hidden unself-acknowledged "love" for that unfettered behavior which the young person cannot follow "in his own home" which becomes hatred of the person who flaunts

the symbols of the prohibited behavior. This, by the way, is only one aspect of the matter. The other involves analyzing these symbols themselves as rock culture affirms them.

[N.D. Sarkitov] and all the same there is the "stupefying effect"

I would like to direct attention to the fact that rock music exists in the USSR in two forms—foreign and domestic. The milieu which perceives the music is also heterogeneous. For example, the admirers of domestic amateur rock music are as a rule highly educated connoisseurs. The admirers of foreign "metal" differ from them sharply. The latter would not be called intellectuals. Many functions do not coincide in Soviet and Western rock music.

One qualification is necessary here. In our country rock music has gone through three stages of development and is now entering a fourth. The first stage encompassed the period from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's. At first a large number of the ensembles of that time in their creativity followed the best Western rock groups and performers, most often simply reproducing their best compositions "one after another." And that was natural. Domestic classical music went through the very same period in its development at the beginning of the last century.

At the end of the first period the British "hard rockers" who enjoyed enormous popularity both in the West and in our country became the models to imitate for many domestic ensembles (for example, Stas Namin's group "Tsvey" then played like "Uriah Heep"). It was these ensembles which made up the group of representatives of domestic "heavy" rock music in that period.

The end of the first stage coincides in time and is closely related to the appearance of all kinds of bans which ultimately forced rock groups ("Mashina vremeni," "Visokosnoye leto," "Rubinovaya ataka," "Olovnyannye soldatiki") to enter a bitter struggle for existence which became the contents of the second stage of development of domestic rock music. The struggle was long and a large number of the rock groups which did not survive it broke up. Only those who made it to the professional stage could survive (A. Gradskiy, "Mashina vremeni," the Stas Namin group, and "Visokosnoye leto," which became "AvtoGRAF"). They did survive, but in doing so they lost a large part of their "rock character."

The second stage is also characterized by the fact that the elements of new rock were formed in the depths of the youth music culture. In the early 1980's they took shape in so-called amateur rock music which contrasted itself with "commercial" professional rock.

The third stage began on the threshold of the decade and continued up to the present time. It differed from the first two in that, first, by 1983 domestic rock music had become sharply divided into two worldview-contrasting masses: professional and amateur—and, secondly, "heavy metal" flourished in an unusually splendid way, moreover, on both the professional and the amateur stage (amateur groups worked in rock clubs and rock laboratories in this period). The second half of this stage is distinguished by the formation of the third center of domestic rock music—the Ural center (Yu. Shevchuk and "DDT," "Urfin Dzhyus," "Nautilus"), which in many respects defines the worldview and esthetic positions of domestic rock music.

Now the third period is over (by 1986). New times have begun and it is too early to talk of the characteristic features of these times, but certain features can be noted even today. The first thing that strikes a person is the progressive stratification in style within amateur rock (the following directions, for example, have been singled out in the Moscow rock laboratory—heavy metal, mainstream, avant-garde, and "electronic romanticism"). The second is the isolation within amateur rock of the most radical wing which is in opposition to the rock laboratories and rock clubs; elements of counterculture are already clearly distinguishable in this wing (the Moscow group "Svinya," for example). And the third thing is the complete dominance on the professional stage of heavy metal, which has replaced vocal-instrumental ensembles.

I cannot agree with Yu.N. Davydov that rock music is now experiencing a conflict between the center and the periphery. There is a conflict here, but it is a conflict of another kind, a conflict within cultural centers. It arises when a city becomes a megalopolis and contradictions between strata and age groups are formed and new relations between youth and people of the older age brackets arise. Rock music emerges from this conflict between generations living in a large city and between youth and the "society of elders." When it becomes a sufficiently powerful formation it enters into conflict with other phenomena of culture which are external to it, or social life. Rock music is in principle a phenomenon first of all of social life rather than an esthetic phenomenon.

Of course, since sound material is subordinate here to certain laws of development, rock music is still music, even bad music poorly performed. And putting rock music beyond ethics would be simply foppishness and snobbishness. Of course, rock music has various esthetic merits. For example, the group "Chudo-yudo" has come to nothing yet, but then it is a very remarkable social phenomenon. What would I boil my statement down to? To the fact that rock music is the fruit of industrial centers, the fruit of the conflict between generations at a high level of urbanization and social development and of the conflict between the generations' values,

To go on I would like to touch on a question which I already thoroughly dealt with in the pages of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA [Source 5]. I am thinking of the "the stupefying effect," or, in other words, the ability of the most massive forms of popular music to cultivate passivity in thinking and social behavior in young people. Where is the stupefying effect manifested? The primitivization of the sound palette creates a consumer form of music perception. In this sense heavy metal has formed its own standards. The groups "Kiss," "Iron Maiden," "Except," and "Scorpion" are real destroyers of culture. The mechanism of this action is just as primitive as their music is—retardation of perception. In my observation, approximately one out of three fans of heavy metal leaves the "movement" after they finish school. The rest remain in the fetters of good old metallism.

Western hard rock of the 1970's which expressed the failure of the "New Left" and the ideological conception of the counterculture tried to create a new music. It sought this new music in the metaphysical spirituality of the New Time ("Deep Purple") and in Negro blues ("Led Zepelin"). Today's imitators of hard rock—heavy metal—have no such pretensions. This also applies to the representatives of domestic professional metal who swiftly swept aside the vocal-instrumental ensembles which were so popular until very recently.

[G.S. Batygin] As far as I understand, Yu.N. Davydov and N.D. Sarkitov have formulated the idea here that rock music is still "war." People have dreamed of peace for hundreds of years. After all, we have been living without war for 42 years now and suddenly in the most humane sphere of human activity—culture—we find war. We discover it where, it would seem, people should peacefully coexist and aspire to mutual understanding and reconciliation. I think that sociologists are obliged to make a prediction: will there be a war over culture in the future? Does it not seem to you that this is a sphere which we are only just beginning to recognize from the standpoint of its potential as a source of conflict? It would be a small loss if only mere differences of opinions were present here. But obviously violent confrontations among people are also possible on the grounds of culture. And do we not have reason to predict street confrontations as a result of sociocultural differences of opinion? Nikolay Sarkitov believes that rock music signifies a conflict of generations, but after all such a conflict is possible when generations occupy different sociocultural positions. However, I saw the fans of rock music fighting and they were fighting on behalf of the affirmation of esthetic ideals.

[A.O. Kryshstanovskiy] Somehow I have not observed the fans of opera and operetta fighting among themselves.

[A.A. Ignatyev] Don't say that, in the 1930's the female admirers of Sobinov could scratch out your eyes for "betraying" their beloved singer.

[Yu.N. Davydov] The fans of opera and operetta are two altogether different strata. There were actually duels, and they ended in murder.

[V.S. Ovchinskiy] along with the creation of real music masterpieces a rock underground was formed.

You cannot escape the facts: back in the 1950's, that is, at the very start of the triumphant procession of rock music, fanatics or rockers (in a different usage—"teddy boys," "fops," "stilyagi") appeared. At concerts by Elvis Presley and other youth idols the frenzy frequently turned into violence, mass violations of public order, and vandalism. The 1960's and the 1970's "enriched" Western rock music with publicity for narcotics. The mass information media were in great haste to depict the rock stars' predilection for a particular drug. It was precisely because of this publicity that marijuana became one of the attributes of the subculture of the West in those years. In other words, in addition to the development of rock as a new music direction and in addition to the creation of real masterpieces of popular music (the works of the "Beatles" and "Deep Purple" and the rock operas by Weber, and others), the so-called rock underground was formed. It included not only fanatical worship of rock groups but also various forms of social pathology. In the course of time the process of the formation of this underground gathered strength. It reached its peak in 1977-1978, with the formation of the punk movement around the rock groups "Sex Pistol" and others like it. In this situation the underground ceased to be semiopen advocacy of violence, aggression, sex, sexual perversions, drug addiction and crime, occultism, fascism, anticommunism, and anti-Sovietism.

Soviet youth do not live in an isolated world and the expansion of contacts with foreign countries intensified exchange of information. Rock quite rapidly penetrated into our life through unofficial channels. The creators of domestic music policy simply ignored the real situation. Four generations of youth (1950's, 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's) have clashed with the angry condemnation of all directions of rock music by the mass information media. The fear of the spread of "rock-mania" as a source of antisocial phenomena gave birth to "banomania." And now one can still frequently hear official statements like the following: "Today you listen to rock and tomorrow you will sell out the Motherland." As a result, each time our youth have been forced to decide themselves (or with the help of the Western radio voices) whom to chose as a music idol. That is how the homespun "rock underground" with all its negative consequences—fashion for violence, sexual dissoluteness, drunkenness, and drug addiction—came into being.

Forbidden fruit is sweet. Moreover, prohibition puts the situation beyond any social control whatsoever. That is what happened with heavy metal. The barriers that were put up against these directions of rock created spontaneous markets of "metallists" where speculation in

records, videotapes, and recording tapes flourishes and the Samizdat typewritten rock journals URLAYT and UKHO are disseminated. All kinds of "bunkers" (that is what teenagers call basements and attics) have appeared where they listen to "metallic rock." Often this listening is accompanied by the use of toxic substances and law-breaking. Being outside the regular stage, some rock groups and adherents of the heavy metal style strut around because of their semilegal position and actively propagandize the worst forms of punk rock. The press, for example, has reported on the hooliganism and pornographic escapades of the "Chudo-Yudo" group at the festival of the Moscow rock laboratory (in the spring of 1987).

Such are the consequences of "banomania" on new modifications of rock. It is completely understandable that the law enforcement organs are impelled to react correspondingly to such excesses and violations of the law. As a result the impression is created that rock is the source of antisocial behavior. But this is a very profound delusion. It is not rock per se but its incorrect cultivation which creates the volatile situation. A situation has taken shape where youth identify all rock art with the "rock underground." However, as was already noted, contemporary rock consists of more than punk rock.

Now it is important to decide how youth can be helped to separate the grain from the chaff and what has to be done in order to prevent rock from becoming the symbol of deviant behavior and from turning into a counterculture and means of destroying esthetic and moral values. In my opinion, this may be the answer: we must definitely abandon bans and in every possible way popularize the best forms of rock music and bring youth out of the "underground"; in other words, remove the tension of the situation which—I will be frank—breeds crime and is antihuman.

[M.A. Manuilskiy] to join the world and stand up for oneself, to discover one's own ego—that is the supertask of rock culture.

If we want to have a serious conversation about rock music, then we must give up first of all the "syndrome of uniformity" which has been cultivated for decades. For a long time only one form of evaluating new phenomena was allowed: either it is in keeping with some particular principles or it is not. The very idea that a phenomenon could be heterogeneous and contradictory was considered seditious and was seen as a revision of prevailing views and a concession to alien ideology. Echoes of such an approach are perceived even now. Most statements of the mass information media speak of the merits and shortcomings of rock music in general and as a whole. The fact that in addition to the traditional (groundlessly negative) evaluation a positive opinion is also broadly expressed does not change the essence of the matter. The same is true for attempts to single out the positive and negative aspects of rock.

Of course, one must know what the essence of rock music is and what its social content is. That is the supertask, and in order to resolve it we must begin with the fundamental: a scrupulous analysis of the nuances, facets, and directions. It is time once and for all to explain that the plurality of manifestations of the social is inseparable from their diversity and uniqueness. The primordial aim to oversimplify is contraindicated by any objective analysis of or, even more, any approach to contemporary rock music.

It is thought that all youth without exception are captivated by rock. The results of sociological research disprove this popular opinion. As was already noted, according to N.P. Meynert's data, 79 percent of those surveyed in Estonia like rock music. And almost the same number are interested in popular melodies, simply in the stage. In terms of purity of choices the latter lags behind the former by only 0.12 percentage points (on a scale of 1-5). According to the results of the survey done by the laboratory of youth problems of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, from 47 to 73 percent of teenagers are captivated by rock music.

What do these facts tell us? Not only that rock music is by no means the only passion of youth. Many youths and girls consider themselves fans of heavy metal, following the fashion and fearing to lag behind others. Especially now that the official ban has at last been removed from rock music. But in fact a significant number of youth (which ones—we have yet to explain) identify any composition performed in strict rhythm and on ultramodern equipment with rock.

Rock is very heterogeneous and contradictory. Yes, it includes commercial music, hits, and "entertainment." Music and the musicians oriented to "stunning" and "shocking" exist. Twisted persons, wild whistling and wails, torn clothing, furniture smashed to smithereens, doses of drugs—it was and is all right there, in the hall. And not somewhere in California but in Moscow or Ufa. But this froth is whipped up above all by rock culture's many years of resistance both to the official system of values, official in the worst sense of the word, that is, the conventional-bureaucratic, the rationalized, with no emotional attraction, which does not allow the smallest deviation from the principles supposedly canonized by the name of the people and history. No, it is not the youth who have found a sphere for the manifestation of their heresy which in the absence of any meaningful idea becomes an outrageous orgy. After slamming tight the doors to ideological and moral pursuit, blind teaching and cultural dictates themselves brought the monster of counterculture to life. And now we spread our hands in bewilderment: where did this come from?

The situation revealed above in many respects explains the unconventionality and "differentness" of rock music. Despite the relative miserliness of musical means of expression, its works are distinguished by a complex

series of emotions and images and broad use of symbols and metaphors. This is not simply a search for "its own values" but an attempt to discover all the diversity and polyphony of humanistic ideals common to mankind and bring them closer to daily life. The multiple meaning is a fundamental feature of rock music. It rejects the standard, unlike the fad tunes stylized as rock. The world is diverse. Each young person experiences the eternal problems (love, friendship, duty) in his own way. Rock music makes it possible to perceive the fullness and depth of life and to declare one's own unique understanding of it. That is the attractive force of rock.

Rock music is a position. To join the world and stand up for oneself, to discover one's ego and bring it to people—that is the supertask of rock culture.

[Yu.N. Davydov] Rock must not be taken as a purely artistic phenomenon. Only those concepts which are on the border between the sociological and the esthetic work here.

During our discussion we are coming to the need to examine rock culture against the background (and in the context) of a broader sociocultural phenomenon—counterculture. In the book "The Sociology of Counterculture" which I wrote in collaboration with one of our leading critics, I.B. Rodnyanskaya, I devoted a great deal of space not only to a sociological but also to sociophilosophical and even, if you will, "metaphysical" analysis of this phenomenon, taking into account that we will not escape the counterculture epidemic. When we began to analyze these phenomena, such concepts as "counterculture," rock, and others, Western authors already had an absolutely definite philosophical and sociological meaning—which I had already written about in "The Esthetics of Nihilism" (1975). This trend was recognized as a nihilistic, anticultural one: "Down with culture, because it is bourgeois." In a new turn of the spiral a situation developed that was similar to the one in art at the start of the century. During World War I "avant-garde" art also viewed itself as anticultural and did not even want to consider itself art. When we read the manifestos of the avantgardists we see that they declared: "It was in the grave that we saw this art! We don't want to have anything at all to do with this bourgeois breed!" So avantgardism in art, beginning with Dada-ism and ending with Surrealism, was filled with most furious denial of spiritualism as such. And the avantgardists subsequently brought this thesis into life. But then a new generation of art critics arrived and regarding the creations of yesterday's cultural assailants they shouted: "How beautiful!"

Someone said that in the sphere of art there was no fight like those which the Lyubers are waging against the rockers. Not at all! The entire history of the avant-garde of the 20th century is one continuous fight. Each new phenomenon in avant-garde is a pogrom. And regarding these very pogroms art critics write: "How elegant!" and "How full of feeling!" But then a different time arrives,

the 1960's, let us say, and the mastodon of avant-garde, Dubuffet, who lived into the new times, for example, says: "Brothers, I have always asserted that it is not art at all! It is mutiny against art. Let us continue it today—let us put an end to any culture and begin something different, 'counterculture.'" And that is how the ideology of rock arises as a continuation of this trend on the crest of the new leftist "partisan war against culture."

In short, the conversion of "antiart" into "art" and vice versa is by no means a rare occurrence. The same thing may happen with rock when the new—future—generation of rockers tires of our attempts to tame it by presenting in the form of art.

Incidentally, there is another less remote danger. The danger of tamed rock turning into something like a ghetto or niche in which youth who do not want to grow up and be included in the labor life of adults may sit out their lives to old age. In conditions where labor productivity has the potential for colossal growth, and exceptionally high demands are made on each working person, such a prospect does not look quite so utopian at all.

However, here again we face the danger of "being cycled" into the purely sociological aspect of the matter. But we have still not taken the next step—we have not linked rock to the specific problems of contemporary youth which they encounter in the process of socialization. And this could bring us closer to understanding the phenomenon of rock on one level at least. Moreover, on this path we will also come closer to the questions of the "metaphysics" of rock culture. Obviously everyone agrees that rock cannot be taken as a purely artistic phenomenon. Traditional art criticism concepts do not work here. Concepts which are on the border between the sociological and the esthetic and between the sociological and the philosophical work. It is remarkable that a sociopsychological approach is also inadequate, even though it also seems very important in understanding rock. To speak seriously of the young generation means to speak of the method of this generation's growing into the sociocultural milieu. And rock is a method of reaction to the difficulties of this growth.

The problem of socialization is a dramatic problem which youth face today. While previous generations as teenagers were already "little adults" and had a more or less smooth path to the adult condition, now the situation is different. The dramatism of this path is that teenagers are brought up in an atmosphere which has a weak link to "adult life." As a result they are always risking being in a value vacuum because the continuity between their values and the values of adults has been disrupted. Formerly a lad entering adult life had to continue what he had learned to do working side by side with his father and mother. Move along the smooth highway of culture which was already created—that is all. But today a sociocultural and almost a metaphysical gap is noted here. Teenagers face a void.

[S.A. Efirov] The gap is by no means metaphysical.

[Yu.N. Davydov] In the worldview and ideological aspect when speaking of rock music, we encounter skepticism and even nihilism toward anything of a social nature and the sociocultural make-up of life. To a substantial degree this is a result of the fact that the number of unstable families is very high in our country. For it is precisely the family which molds our ideas of social ties.

Today's young person is in a unique situation—he is free to a greater extent than his peers in previous generations. And it turns out here that freedom (do you remember the legend of the Grand Inquisitor told by Ivan Karamazov?) can appear as a heavy burden if we do not know what it is needed for and if we have no meaningful purpose for whose implementation freedom is essential. Then people begin to renounce it and crawl on their knees to the Grand Inquisitor and say: take my freedom but show me the right path. In itself freedom is not identical to the truth—it can be either good or evil.

[S.A. Efirov] But why does the right path always prove to be wrong?

[Yu.N. Davydov] Svetozar Aleksandrovich, anyone who has read the legend of the Grand Inquisitor understands how superfluous the question is.

So, in order to grow up, today's young generation must seemingly create the "adult" existence anew. This problem did not exist formerly: take the example from your parents and everything is all right. And the earlier a person identified himself with them and with their culture, the easier it was for that person to identify with himself.

[V.Ya. Golovanov] And if there is no father?

[Yu.N. Davydov] That is a very pertinent question. The difficulty is exactly that either there is no father or he is changed in the course of the child's life. Accordingly, his "superego" is also shaken and it is more and more difficult for him to understand who he really is. And what his self-identification is. I am astounded by how much some of our sociologists sometimes extemporize, rather than taking the bull by the horns. Various incidental associations do not tell much here. We must grasp the essence of the problem. And that is that in place of the missing "papa" whose image is "modeled" in the child as his "superego," there appears a generalized image of the "bosses" formed by the mass information media. It is also rooted in the weakened, eroded "superego" of the child, because of which the problem of self-identification and the search for himself is extremely complicated for him. That is the reason for the constant anxiety and uncertainty. Deprived of the roots which extend into family morality, his ego becomes diffused. It is then that he turns to nonfamily authorities who explain to him who he is. The less certain the child and

the teenager feel, the more power the "mob effect"—self-identification with the company of peers which reaches denial of himself as an individual—has on them. Rock music and rock culture in general also utilize this effect, by the way. Simply not aware of himself—even though he has already become an adult, the "child" has a heightened tendency to identify himself with the first "strong personality" who happens his way. And every rock idol whose image fills the empty "superego" of the "adult child" passes himself off as such.

So we find that rock is not only music and not only a particular way of life. It is also a method of filling the empty "superego" of young people who have not yet found themselves and a method of, if not self-consciousness, then self-experience. And the main question which we face when evaluating different rock groups is the question of what they take as the primordial features of their relationship to the world, what the moral absolutes for the given group are, and do they exist at all? It is the question of the self-identification of those with whom the perceiving "rock mass" identifies. Where do they seek the main or initial principles for self-identification, "below the belt" or above? And here the problem accordingly arises of demarcating within rock culture itself the problem of its internal boundaries: do the means which rock enjoys allow appealing to the higher—spiritual—rather than physiological principle in man? The problem becomes more acute the more strongly rock culture stands on its own feet and begins to live at its own expense rather than at the expense of denying what prevents it from affirming itself. When the "common enemy" disappears, the question arises of what one's faith is in.

Rock culture is now in this situation, in my opinion. The situation poses for rock "metaphysical" questions and problems of moral-philosophical self-determination.

By the way, a "common enemy" has again loomed up on the horizon for the rockers. They are the Lyubers and other opponents of rock. It is not worth taking them at their word when they say to the rockers: "You are behaving badly so we are beating you up." No, in announcing something like this, the Lyuber is thinking of something else: we cannot allow ourselves to be free in your sense of that word. So we are beating you up: your freedom is a challenge to our freedom, which we do not conceive of without certain boundaries. In short, everyone is for freedom, but each one understands it in his own way.

[S.A. Efirov] That is the most ignoble reason.

[Yu.N. Davydov] It is not the most ignoble reason. If those who are fighting understand that, and they must be helped to understand, they will restrain themselves from pounding on one another next time.

[S.A. Efirov] But what can faith and the absolute be? Perhaps you will enlighten us?

[Yu.N. Davydov] Everyone has his own idea about that.

[S.A. Efirov] And can pluralism without fist-fighting be faith and the absolute?

[Yu.N. Davydov] It can surely be faith but whether it can be sociological reality—we do not see yet. The pluralism of "shopping points" where employees try to live by the principle "serve yourself and spit on the customer" clearly does not manage without fighting.

[A.A. Ignatyev] any leisure culture is based on some music idiom. Rock functions in this capacity today.

I would like to make several comments on what has already been said. In my opinion, in our society in some strange way feminine values have prevailed: fights, people say, are bad. But fight in the masculine environment are at the very least normal. It is bad when fights become extreme: either they become savage or they become a means of earning a living as in professional sports. A rare verbal confrontation when people do not resort to euphemisms and do not spare each other's self-esteem is also a fight. Moreover, real glasnost is simply impossible without fighting.

When we talk of rock we must imagine its functions clearly. The first: any leisure culture is based on some music idiom, some music patterns and methods of expression. There was, for example, a leisure culture based on the idioms of folk dances and there was the quadrille which was danced in worker slobodas. These days rock functions as the music idiom of leisure. Is that good or bad? It would most likely be better if leisure culture were based on a national idiom in every country. But it turned out that in the 1950's the world system of everyday culture began to take shape according to the principle of moving from "the center to the periphery." English-speaking countries became the center. That is how it happened. That, unfortunately, is how even science is forming today. The entire scientific-technical idiom is also of Anglo-Saxon origin. The second thing. Today the idiom of rock is becoming the matrix for urban folklore. The earlier urban folklore which I still found as a teenager was built on the music patterns of so-called thieves' songs. We have a remarkable cultural phenomenon—V.S. Vysotskiy, who took this music idiom to the level of high art. Now urban folklore is different and rock groups have become its vehicle. Someone mentioned V. Kandelaki here. In my opinion, he was the precursor of what we are studying now, the rock group "Zoopark," for example. They essentially are the same "satirical songs" and the direct author's word on what hurts, what hurts right here and now. The third thing. Rock helps people overcome negative social sentiments in civilized forms. In this sense rock represents a homespun counterculture (not all of it, of course, but some part of it).

What Yu.N. Davydov said about rock as a conflict of generations seems fair to me. But we should not be seduced by this. Any counterculture movement begins with one's own, but that is by no means an expression of internal conflict; here we should be talking of consolidating for the purpose of setting boundaries in the future. Finally, we must bear in mind that the "liminal," according to V. Turner's terminology, cultural image which youth groupings spread on a mass scale is not created by them; they merely translate and assimilate it. This model emerges in the previous generation and comes from the milieu of the intelligentsia, for the most part the creative intelligentsia. It is a cultural image which reflects the specific problems of the intelligentsia of the period of stagnation when social alienation and the conversion of the intelligentsia into a marginal social group first reached enormous scale.

[I.M. Bakshteyn] The fact that whereas formerly performers addressed each individual listener, now they address the entire hall became the main stylistic feature of rock music.

But what features of rock music have made it the most acceptable for the self-expression of youth in recent years? Jazz, which was popular in the postwar period was commercialized in the 1950's and in the person of its leading representatives became an elitist music form inaccessible to the youth audience. The advantage of rock music was that it rejected the principle of the individual soloist. The fact that whereas formerly performers addressed each individual listener, now they address the entire hall became the main stylistic feature of rock music.

In order to understand the keen interest of youth in rock groups it is obviously significant that there are many rock groups and the ability to be familiar with them is of special value and an entertaining pursuit. Identification with one's own generation and its ideals and idols is thereby intensified. The rhythmic features of rock music also facilitate this identification. As R. Wagner has already noted, it is "music which is the direct expression of the spirit of a people." Music more strongly than other arts consolidates a community. The intensive rhythm of rock music unites the listeners by provoking an ecstatic response and actualizing the deep mechanisms of consciousness and the psyche. And, finally, one cannot deny that rock music's place is also determined by the process of juvenilization of all European culture and the greater significance of models of youth behavior for each and every person.

[N.T. Kremlev] we must not examine the phenomenon of rock through the prism of a conflict of generations.

I am definitely against the idea that the phenomenon of rock must be examined through the prism of a conflict of generations. Right here we representatives of at least three generations have gathered at one table and we all, it seems, love symphony and jazz and rock music. Of

course, individual tastes exist, there is no question. It seems to me that the subject of our discussion must be examined first of all from the standpoint of the position of informal rock groups in our social system. And since the position of youth is in general vague, and the position of those who are among the representatives of rock groups is even more so, the goals which particular rock groups pursue must be watched. Here, in my opinion, is the solution to the question.

[N.D. Sarkitov] We find very significant arguments when we turn to the self-consciousness of rock musicians. This is what the rock group "Nautilus" from Sverdlovsk is singing: like peas the older generation has been soaked in water and made somewhat soft in order to be eaten; but we are being pounded against the wall so that each pea becomes a bullet and the bullets become a weight and using this weight we will break through all the walls in the world. That is the text. The "Alisa" group also has many songs about the interrelationship of the generations in its repertoire. Of course, we cannot reduce everything to a conflict of generations. But we must also not forget the fact that the rock musicians themselves recognize the existence of such conflict.

[N.T. Kremlev] How they perceive themselves is another matter. If we take this viewpoint, then we will aggravate the conflict and promote confrontation.

[A.O. Krushtanovskiy] A heated argument has flared up among us surrounding the idea of intergenerational and intragenerational conflicts. Yu.N. Davydov even made a digression into the start of the century for this purpose. But let us turn to our time. Let us take rock in 1980. There was rock music, but it was perceived as an intergenerational conflict. There was no conflict between directions which existed then. I actively participated in all that at the time and I do not remember anyone having a desire to go beat up the rock group "Dobrovolnoye obshchestvo" or "Mashina vremeni."

[Yu.N. Davydov] Yes, but still there was "papa, tremble, mama, tremble."

[A.O. Kryshchanovskiy] It was perceived precisely as an intergenerational conflict. But it gradually turned into an intragenerational one. Such a transition began approximately in 1980 when the unambiguous policy that rock was something bad began to be gradually eroded, and the further it went the more active it became. Articles began to appear in ROVESNIK and other publications saying that rock was not so very bad and perhaps even interesting. In short, when before 1980 all rock fans were in a united front against the powers that be, everything was clear. Then when the internal barriers began to be removed, the intragenerational conflict appeared sharper. Fans of various directions of rock began to clash among themselves. Young people who had not learned to defend their point of view and deal with those who held other views resorted to an unquestionably extremist

form of proving they were right. There is only one solution—one must learn democracy and learn to defend one's point of view in a civilized way.

[N.D. Sarkitov] And there is more, I would like to say a few words in defense of rock musicians. Where is their counterculture? It is not here. Who remembers even one appearance of any rock group against culture as such? Our domestic rock music is not creating an alternative culture. It is speaking out against mass commercial culture.

[Rejoinder] It is the Composers' Union that is the counterculture!

[Yu.V. Davydov] each time in serious crisis situations we return to one and the same scale of values and one and the same image.

Inasmuch as the question has arisen here of the prognosis, I would like to give my opinion on that score. Until a mechanism of socializing the young generation and including them in the life of adults and in the common sociocultural tradition is developed which is more effective than what we have now, until then we will deal with the tragedy of growing up late and the tragicomedy of infantilism. Some of the youth will sit it out, delaying the moment of being included in adult life, in the dugouts of branches of youth subculture similar to the rock culture we are examining. Youth's desire to enjoy what they consider the "privileges" of adults without paying for them with any duty and obligations will be realized in these forms. The search for self-identification which does not demand a moral choice, as happens in the case of real—active rather than illusory—esthetic growing up, will also be carried out in these forms.

[L.G. Ionin] Yuriy Nikolayevich, can they be developed, these new mechanisms of socialization, as you suppose?

[Yu.N. Davydov] There will be no escape. They will have to be developed. Though not for all youth, but all the same for a large number of them who one way or another take on the productive duties and obligations of the preceding generations.

[L.G. Ionin] The crisis of self-identification is still a physiological thing... to a significant extent.

[Yu.N. Davydov] No, it is a thing which is not at all physiological.

[L.G. Ionin] Physiological: the development of the organism and the experiences related to that.

[Yu.N. Davydov] When we speak of the personal self-identification of people of the new generations which accompanies the process of their entering adult life and is presupposed by this process, then there is no place for physiology here. It is a sociopsychological and sociocultural process which presupposes a person taking on

certain moral obligations, that is, a certain choice—a choice of oneself as a morally responsible individual. Physiology has nothing to do with it; otherwise, all teenagers who began sexual life early, for example, would already have to be considered adults in the socioethical sense as well. But this is just not happening today: infantile attempts at active, productive, and civic self-realization (with the psychological excesses and moral collisions accompanying it) are being recruited from those very people—that is the only possible means of explaining who I am.

[S.A. Efirov] But if a generation, a besmirched one, so to speak, develops mechanisms of socialization and closes the safety-valve, then there will be complete leveling.

[Yu.N. Davydov] Why? Mechanisms of socialization existed in the past after all, but there was no leveling. The question should not be posed that way if we have historical consciousness.

So, we say what a good attitude we have toward youth and we talk of our concern and at the same time we leave youth in an ethical vacuum, in a void, without a rudder and without sails; seek and ye shall find. That is a form of indifference to youth. At that time I spoke at every scientific crossroads: "Brothers, in 7-10 years we will have a fashion for rock." And I was told: "Come on, how is that possible in our socialist society!" (And not only did they say it but they even crossed all parallels with similar phenomena in our cultural past out of the manuscript of my book). But I answered: "Such a law is observed—in 5-7, well 10 years, what happens in the West in the sphere of culture, especially the youth culture, happens in our country." And at that time we pondered with the critic Ira Rodnyanskaya: can trends which could be considered constructive be identified in the counterculture, in particular in rock culture? As was explained during work on the book "The Sociology of Counterculture. Infantilism as a Type of Worldview and Social Disease" (1980), such trends exist, but they go beyond the bounds of counterculture. I came to the conclusion that the "search for Christ" may be considered just such a constructive idea within rock. The point is that this image, which has emerged in different variations in rock opuses, is indeed a moral absolute and at the very same time a real historical phenomenon which the counterculture youth of the West use as a guidepost in seeking a way out of the impasse of relativism and nihilism. It is the absolute which does not presuppose the stick because its highest sense is love. So around that...

[S.A. Efirov] But what about Christ's famous assertion "it is not peace I have brought you but a sword"?

[Yu.N. Davydov] Do not throw the losing cards of the "scientific atheist" Kryvelev on the table. Anyway, all these observations have permitted us to discover certain trends of self-overcoming in counterculture and make certain predictions: if within the framework of counterculture "Christ" (that is, I repeat, the moral absolute—

no matter what you call it) again is lost, then it is a bad thing: the intensification of this crisis is inevitable. The solution to it is a new search for a unifying esthetic symbol. The alternative is a ghetto of self-satisfied counterculture which replaces the image of Christ with the image of the enemy. But again there are inevitable crises within the ghetto because counterculture pluralism presupposes fighting—that is what the enemy is needed for. Within the framework of counterculture pluralism the "common enemy" means that each person battles him in his own way, risking unintentionally taking his neighbor for the enemy.

[S.A. Efirov] So they are not only "against" but also "for" things?

[Yu.N. Davydov] That is just the point, that no "for" is yet observed in them unless we have in mind the "for" which has in general already gone beyond the bounds of the rock- and counterculture, as was already noted above. We do not find the "for" either in the one or the others. The task of some is to "discard" ("renounce" the old world) the existing culture without offering anything in exchange and the task for others is to strike out—no matter against whom. Positive values have not yet crystallized here. As for our "rock," I will not say that there is no search which cannot be evaluated as constructive here. Therefore, I am listening very carefully to the theme of the "search for Christ" (that is, the moral absolute) in our rock culture. For only where the "esthetic" begins to gravitate toward combining with the moral and when "pure estheticism" (entangled with hedonism) is done away with, in my opinion, can we find a way out of the counterculture ghetto. A way out, though not assuming that it will be a universal one, but one which gives hope. For when a person who lives in a ghetto suddenly notices a star in the sky which is shining not only for him but for everyone, the hope arises in him that he will not be doomed to pass away his years in this—even though comfortable and "prestigious"—Tel-emskiy abode. The star reminds him that an even broader world exists than the world of the subculture which lives by the principle of self-service, self-affirmation, and self-glorification.

[S.A. Efirov] But do you recognize the right to a different star in this?

[Yu.N. Davydov] Demonstrate that it is a star. If it is a rose, then let it bloom. History, in my opinion, has already proven something. Each time in serious crisis situations we return to one and the same scale of values and to one and the same image which sets the principle of their subordination.

[S.A. Efirov] If you have the image of Christ in mind, then an enormous part of mankind is not returning to this image.

[Yu.N. Davydov] It seems that way to you. An "enormous majority"—meaning you—are not returning and will not return. But the trend which I am speaking of, an ethically oriented trend is now dynamic, that is, growing and deepening.

[S.A. Efirov] And what about the Eastern cultures, the Buddhist culture, for example.

[Yu.N. Davydov] The most amusing thing is that Western rock went through all stages of the esthetic game in religion (a variant of the "bead game"), including the Buddhist one. But it is interesting that the most consistent of these seekers came by this path to a type of religious belief oriented to a great degree to the ethical image—a fact that the esthetic, game approach to religions of the past has exhausted itself and a yearning for something else—something serious, stable, and intransigent—emerged. So they came to Christ perceived as an eternal symbol of morality and the human image of the moral absolute. No matter how strange, "politicization" did not save rock culture from the impasses of the "bead game" and a game-like relationship to the world. Politics, perceived strictly esthetically, if not to say as an esthete, in rock culture became one of those games. A game of force and violence which, by the way, is primordial to rock with its lack of faith in the specific-spiritual and, vice versa, noncritical faith in the "corporal-physiological" methods of impact on the "perceiving mass." Today when among people consciousness is rising that even politics can—and must—be subordinate to esthetic and moral principles, the rock game in politics (both "with us" and "with them") is perceived as a complete anachronism. There are two faiths, if you will: one is that ultimately the world is ruled by good, and the other, that the world is ruled by evil. From the standpoint of the first, politics can and must be subordinate to moral principles. From the standpoint of the second, in contrast, moral principles must be subordinate to politics and it is better to discard them altogether so as not to prevent politicians from improvising (in the spirit of rock culture estheticism). And whether you are 100 times a sociologist or 100 times a materialist, if you think about it, it can be determined very exactly who believes in evil and who in good.

[L.G. Ionin] All this proves that faith in Christ is just more politics.

[Yu.N. Davydov] The politicians can "latch onto" it. But they cannot accept morality, which has always been broader than a particular creed. It alienates and discards them. Where are the politicians who "fastened onto" a particular religious doctrine? But morality, the esthetic hierarchy, and the moral absolute remain.

[S.A. Efirov] For the last 50 years Christianity has constantly lagged behind Islam, for example. That is, I want to say that the star is not all that universal.

[Yu.N. Davydov] The star which equates to the moral absolute is "more universal" than the doctrinal differences of Christianity and Islam. Without it there would be neither Christianity nor Muhammedism.

I have laid my cards on the table. Rock must find a unifying—universal-moral—idea if it is not to perish in the counterculture ghetto. And that means going beyond its former boundaries. Overcoming them. Becoming something else. That is all.

[S.A. Efirov] When we are talking of bans and decrees, we must clearly define the limits of the possible and the desirable.

People here have been talking of rock music being one of the manifestations of the mutual lack of understanding and conflict of the generations. I think that is only a surface layer, and we must not stop there. The problem of "fathers and sons" has always existed to a certain degree, but at times it becomes especially acute in connection with a crisis of systems of values and social ideals. In that case in the consciousness or in the subconsciousness of youth the older generations are associated with very questionable social phenomena: with repressive politics, the system of caste privileges, fear, conformism, subservience, hypocrisy, the "double standard," readiness to immediately follow any changes of "course," and the like. Consciously or unconsciously, a large part of youth do not want to have anything to do with all these things. But since the possibilities of denying them were lacking for a long time or were extremely limited, it became inevitable that they would turn to veiled, symbolic, or purely emotional means. Rock music occupied a very significant place among these means. The latter's nonconformist functions were affirmed and repeatedly intensified in the eyes of youth by the extremely negative official reaction and the policy of bans and persecution. That is what always happens in such cases. There are a multitude of such examples, but suffice it to recall the fate of V.S. Vysotskiy. Western rock also contains nonconformist sentiments to a certain extent, but in a smaller dose than in our country because of the larger number of channels for expressing such sentiments. It has turned out that Western rock as a whole is less "ideologized." It is in our country, as nowhere else, that rock is not only and perhaps not so much a music phenomenon as a perception of the world, a psychosocial precept, and sometimes even a specific "way of life." Such precepts were also expressed in avant-garde graphic art and for certain social groups even in academic music, whose prohibited forms, by the way, were significantly more successful because they were recognized and integrated much earlier.

Different, often diametrically opposed points of view exist in views on rock, as is well known. A large part of the public, especially representatives of the older generation are very hostile. Even now there are appeals to resort to the usual repressive methods, not only in letters addressed to editorial offices but even from the very

highest tribunals. The magic of such methods and the view of them as a panacea is one of the saddest legacies of the past which has become firmly rooted in social consciousness. Even now many people do not understand that there are things which in principle cannot be prohibited or decided by decree. It is absolutely useless, for example, to fight against the new trends of fashion and new directions in art and literature and against sentiments and sociopsychological precepts which do not suit the leaders. Sociocultural processes can be checked or perverted, of course (making absolutely blameless things a banner of protest, for example), but the natural course of continual renewal and the birth of new forms of spiritual life which often seem harmful and criminal at first cannot be reversed.

It by no means follows from this that everything must be surrendered to the power of spontaneity and set to drift. By no means. But when we are speaking of bans and decrees we must clearly define the limits of the possible and the desirable. A limit to the admissible is also necessary, of course, but it must not be defined by the bureaucratic caste which usually is incompetent and artistically illiterate, but it must put under the control of the community and people knowledgeable in this sphere. In the most general form one can say that this limit should be dependent on norms of ethics and considerations of health and safety. Here I would like to make a qualification: when establishing the limit of the admissible indefinite criteria open up a broad area for abuses. If it is established by experts that certain forms of activity, leisure, and art, including rock, are harmful to the physical or moral health of people, they must be restricted and in certain cases even prohibited, but one must constantly remember that bans are a dangerous thing and may prove to be a weapon of arbitrary rule and a means of achieving selfish ends. Therefore, they must be treated very cautiously and they must be open for continual discussion and expert evaluation independent of administrative offices.

In general one of the most important lessons of the 20th century is, it seems to me, the following: any incompetent or thoughtless attempts to interfere in the "natural" course of social and cultural processes and attempts to radically alter them have unpredictable consequences which are often extremely serious for mankind. Too many circumstances, links, and patterns are inevitably not taken into account and the result proves to be altogether different from the way it looked "in the ideal." This does not mean, of course, that in general there should be no "ideal," no "guiding star," no "absolute," which are—as was repeatedly said here—the ideas of justice, good, mercy, and fraternity. A complete relativization and pluralization of sociocultural ideals and values would hardly be promising; a completely "relativized" person has no guideposts and often becomes cynical, indifferent, or very unhappy. However, absolutes too, like prohibitions, are in the historical-social sense a very dangerous thing. The bonfires of

inquisition, genocide, mass execution, and concentration camps too often have one and the same foundation—the illusion of the absolute, the highest, the only, and the ultimate truth which has been found and must be "revealed" to mankind, and if mankind resists, then this truth must be imposed on the unreasonable masses by any means. In other words, it is not such a very long way from the absolute to Auschwitz. Therefore, if one speaks of the "absolute," it must be, figuratively speaking, the "absolute without Auschwitz." Historical experience shows that all "absolutes" have proven to be false, or at least far from absolute. Should this not be a lesson in tolerance, or rather modesty? Fanatic dogmatism and intolerance of unconventional thinking which organically leads to universal prohibitory and repressive internal policies and to the imposition of one's own "truth" on other peoples by any means, even military ones, is one of the most dangerous phenomena of contemporary times.

The persecution of rock music was a specific manifestation of the above. In the social sense it was a phenomenon on the same level as the persecutions of the figures of "high art"—the music of Shostakovich, Prokofyev, Myaskovskiy, and Stravinskiy, the paintings of Kandinsky, Malevich, and Chagall, and the works of Bulgakov, Pasternak, Akhmatova, Mandelstam, Nabokov, and many other writers. All this stemmed from monopolization of the right to "high art," the right to determine what is good and what is bad and what is useful and what is harmful for a people. It is this "right" that later leads to repressive policies. It is especially alarming that even now there are no guarantees that these policies will not be revived to one degree or another. Exactly what these guarantees may be and how to find and realize them is for specialists to decide. But I think that in resolving this question we should not disregard the sociopolitical mechanisms which have been developed over the centuries, such as separation of powers, periodical replacement of the administration, and real community control over the activity of all organs of the state apparatus without exception. All these mechanisms are of course far from perfect but have better ones been found up to now? Let us recall the well-known maxim there is no worse system than democracy, but mankind has not yet thought up anything better. In short, as long as the "course" depends to a decisive extent on the directives of the higher administration, which in various periods have been so different, it is impossible to be insured against new swerves from side to side, in the sphere of culture in particular.

Certain variants of rock apparently do indeed cause an effect close to a narcotic one and rouse the lower and aggressive instincts. But the best examples are striking in their altogether special dramatism, depth of symbolism, exceptionally unique parody, and emotional coloring which is hardly comparable to anything else. But whatever our esthetic attitude toward rock, the attitude toward it as a social phenomenon must necessarily include one commonly significant element—tolerance.

This is a question of principle, a question of sociopolitical sophistication and, moreover, one which goes far beyond the limits of the phenomenon under study. Essentially the problem of tolerance in social, political, and cultural aspects is one of the most important components of the new thinking.

[V.V. Marochkin] rock groups have revived N.G. Chernyshevskiy's thesis that "The beautiful is life," which until recently had been replaced by a different principle—"The beautiful is good."

The Moscow urban rock laboratory which I represent here unites about 100 rock groups. Thus amateur contingents got the opportunity for the first time to compete with professional contingents as equals. Space for rehearsals and for creative contacts, organizing concerts, analyzing prepared programs—all this is part of the circle of concerns of our laboratory. Life persuades that the most demanding part of the public is interested precisely in amateur rock, and the concerts of professionals are attended mainly by visitors. The laboratory has a great many enemies. The Composers' Union sometimes tries to put sticks in the spokes, but it is not our main persecutor. We have taken quite a lot of money out of the hands of the underground and all kinds of entertainment merchants. Impinging on material interests, of course, is not forgiven. One of the main functions of contemporary rock is to revive national culture, and not only music culture. In their creative works many Moscow groups date back to the esthetics of F.M. Dostoyevskiy and M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin. They have revived N.G. Chernyshevskiy's thesis that "The beautiful is life," which until recently had been replaced by a different principle—"The beautiful is good."

In the West rock music has become practically folk music. But in our country, if we move away from people who hang out with the metallic types, it is elitist. Necessarily elitist. A self-respecting performer must be a well-informed person in the area of culture and music equipment and must be knowledgeable in the philosophical and sociological problem areas. There are still only a few who have access to this.

What do we dream about? We dream of serious and impartial criticism and active education of youth by the mass communication means. For public opinion on rock most often is undifferentiated. The most varied phenomena of musical life are classified under the rubric "rock." For example, Moscow "metal" is extremely primitive and the critics S. Zharikov and A. Troitskiy not without grounds classify it as popular stage music. Odessa "metal," for example, is something altogether different. It is genuine rock culture moved by the pathos of the struggle against materially secure but spiritually undeveloped people. The poetry of I. Gankevich (the "Bastion" group), which continues the tradition of the stories of I. Babel, was born in the depths of Odessa "metal." Here is another case. If we recall "Primus" of the first generation, we will see that the songs of Yu. Loza fit entirely

within rock culture. His recent recordings show that he has nothing in common with the rock milieu. In short, there is still a great deal of lack of sophistication, misinformation, and legend concerning rock culture. Glasnost helps overcome all this. Its importance here is great.

[V.Ya. Golovanov] rock is an organic part of the general process of our country's cultural life.

It is difficult not to agree with Yu.N. Davydov and N.D. Sarkitov that rock music is a creation of the megalopolis: it is age folklore, a kind of cultural ecological niche. For young people rock is not only a method of crying out their pain, bewilderment, or despair of loneliness, but also a method of overcoming this loneliness in contacts with peers, in the mob, if you will.

[Yu.N. Davydov] It is true that they "huddle up to each other." Remember what Nietzsche says about the last men—they huddle up to each other and blink.

[V.Ya. Golovanov] Rock culture is a method of being for youth. That is the objective basis of the existence of rock music in our country and the key to understanding why the substratum of young rock groups does not disappear with the maturation of one generation of musicians, as their music becomes more complex and "esthetic." Figuratively speaking, rock fulfills the "social mandate" of youth, providing them with a model of behavior in crisis situations and methods of harmonizing their existence in the world. The lyrical hero of the early "Mashina vremeni," a young romantic, seeks resolution of life's contradictions in a dream about a certain ideal "country of childhood" and "quiet harbor" which can be achieved in one way by "fleeing the city." In the early "Akvarium" the hero loses his utopian enthusiasm. He is a kind of aristocrat of the spirit who understands very well that there is nowhere to flee, and, moreover, no reason, if one deals with the surrounding world with a good share of irony. Several friends, the woman he loves, the streets of the city, a tree, the snow on the rooftops—objects of hidden harmony—serve as consolation. In "Zoopark" the same kind of hero is transformed into the image of a man proud of his restlessness and lack of a job and "negativity." He says: I am bad but really I am no worse than you; I have lived my life senselessly, but at least I have not been a scoundrel, I have not lied, I have not dodged, I have not schemed against the bosses, and I have not been a fake.

In this sense the statement made by Yu.N. Davydov seems important to me—"While the tragedy of the socialization of the young generation remains, forms of subculture like rock music will exist." Essentially A.A. Ignatyev expressed the same idea when he said that rock represents a socially tolerant form of overcoming social sentiments. I would put it this way: a method of enduring the pain felt by the generation. A generation must find and name itself. Rock music is one of the methods of this pursuit, a fairly popular one, though surely not the most

perfect. Everything that has been said is important in order to understand how unpromising attempts to ban rock music have been (and will be, if they are repeated): something which has social roots cannot be abolished by a rigid decision.

We have been arguing here about whether rock music in the USSR is "counterculture." It is a pointless argument until we agree what this term means. If "counterculture" means the notorious "sexual revolution" and ostentatious denial of culture, then there is nothing to talk about. In my opinion, the concept of "counterculture" means the aspiration of the adherents of a particular cultural movement to assert their independence—above all from mass culture. Call it "counterculture" or subculture, whatever you will: it is not the name that is important but this desire to open a channel parallel to the main track.

Did this happen in rock music? It did. Suffice it to recall the division of rock music into "amateur" and "professional," the conflict which is by no means reduced to only questions of performer excellence but has meant two different approaches to one and the same thing. In general, arguments about amateur rock music have been so heated because quite recently they were essentially particular aspects of another more important argument—society's readiness for "variant thinking."

Let us recall what we have had in our country. On the one hand, there was the major stage with its own concert rates, authors' rights, titles, and laureate prizes, tours, publicity, and radio and television programs. And on the other—a powerless, scorned mass of amateur musicians. However, thousands of rock and roll volunteers arranged club and home concerts for their favorite musicians and recorded their albums on tape. Typewritten journals appeared. An audience took shape for amateur rock, an audience with an indifferent and often negative attitude toward the works of recognized rock stars. This audience built its own "scale of popularity." The amateur musicians repeatedly rejected proposals of cooperation from concert organizations, which was explained by an unwillingness "to sell themselves" and the fear of censorship and self-censorship. Finally, rock developed its own "bank of themes" and its own system of icons, which—I agree with A.A. Ignatyev in this—is becoming the matrix of urban folklore and which influences not just the stage, which is actively borrowing musical clichés from rock, but other arts as well: in Moscow, for example, so-called rock poetry (A. Marchik, V. Stepantsov) has inherited "rock philosophy" in addition to the tradition of oral poetic speeches. In Leningrad two groups of artists (the "mitki" and the "new artists") work in the mainstream of expressionist esthetics; some Leningrad rock club groups are ideologically close to these artists.

All these interrelationships perhaps give the right to speak of a subculture. It is important that the subculture at that time found itself in "opposition" to public

opinion (assuming the USSR Ministry of Culture position can be accepted as such) when the rock musicians themselves were treated as virtual criminals and their right to creativity was questioned. In these conditions the "restriction" on the activity of rock musicians was interpreted by their fans as the "system's" lack of attention to youth problems and in a number of cases considered social injustice which the "parallel" rock channel was called upon to repair.

The continued development of rock music within the framework of existing associations of amateur rock musicians has proven that the subculture of rock is an organic part of the general process of cultural life of our country. I think that in the future more fruitful contacts between rock culture and the existing cultural institutions are possible. For example, the sound-recording studio of the Leningrad rock club could already become an independent partner of the "Melodiya" firm ("Akvarium's" record, which went on sale recently, was recorded at this studio).

I would like to say a few words about future prospects. Rock musicians are now in a tempting situation. Rock is a popular commodity but concert organizations need box-office success, which comes most easily with the popular fads. What to choose—freedom of creativity or a professional career? The formal division of rock musicians into "amateurs" and "professionals," which really only means a restriction on amateurs relative to authors' and other rights, aggravates the situation. The transition of rock groups to cost accounting would alleviate this contradiction but it would not eliminate the problem as a whole: rock is facing the real possibility of regeneration from subculture into popular culture. In this sense the present flourishing of many metal rock groups is also significant; by virtue of their "lack of conflict," they fairly easily acquire the status of professionals: the internal dramatism of rock is replaced by its imitation, "heroization," and "dramatization" of music through external effects and total sound.

The theme of alienation which has nourished many generations of rock groups is gradually becoming secondary. The crisis of rock music—despite the legalization of rock—which we are speaking of today is related precisely to the crisis of the very theme of denial. While formerly, during the time of persecution of rock, this theme united all musicians and all fans of rock and gave it energy and militancy, with the appearance of a real opportunity to express one's opinion and, moreover, make a living in rock, this motif has lost its significance for many people.

The theme itself is differentiated: if "against," then against what? The motif of total negation is preserved in the works of some groups; it reflects the extreme alienation of that part of youth who do not see the potential to have an impact on society or their place in it and feel only its "pressure." That is where the motif of "opposing force" and opposition to society come from. On the other hand, the changes occurring in the country's life

determine the crisis of this theme. Rock musicians are dealing with the problem of moral choice differently than they did 10 years ago, for example. The escapist theme, which was popular before, that it is better to remain on the sidelines and be oneself, they say, without condemning oneself to lies and personality deformation, is gradually being replaced by the motif of personal responsibility for everything that is happening (the songs "The Fourth Legion" and "Communal Apartment" by the Leningrad groups "Prisutstviye" and "Nol"). Incidentally, in the nonmusic sphere the very same motif is heard in the independent manifesto of a group of Moscow hippies who are calling for active social creativity, at least in "small matters." Other musicians are introducing the motif of parody of popular art into the context of rock music (the groups "Avia" and "Igr").

Yu.N. Davydov made an important comment about the waning of the nihilist attitude toward the world and the limitations of negativist works. Negativism, which people often say applies to rock, has waned. Negation is only a first though important step in the development of the individual and a social movement. Having said what you do not believe in, tell us what you do believe in

A gradual search is underway in rock music for a symbol of faith, some positive ideal. It is a spontaneous rather than a conscious search brought about by young people's spontaneous desire to rely on something stronger than negation, which in itself is not conclusive.

[A.N. Malinkin] We must abandon feudal absolutism in thinking. The method of joining the temporal to the eternal, the new to the old, is a method of including the young generation in the the socium. And if it is true that "species come and go but the earth abides forever," then it is also true that for man the eternal is given and can be discovered only through the temporal (history), while the "eternal" in man himself is given and can be discovered only through his individuality. In this respect the main problem for a sociologist is to know whether people of the "new generation" are becoming a generation of "new people"; if not—why not, and if they are, how? Other questions involving this also arise: what is the structure of pleasures of young people of the new generation and what are their value priorities? What is the ethos, the life program, the "ideology" of the leading social (including youth) groups which serve as an model for imitation and give direction and life algorithms for youth?

This set of questions goes beyond the bounds of a sociopsychological analysis in its generally accepted interpretation. They lie in a different, philosophical-sociological plane which is equally remote from vulgar moralizing subjectivism (the problems of human freedom, the meaning of life, good, and evil should not be confused with the problems of social ethics and pedagogy) and from scientific objectivism (Marxism as a philosophical-sociological doctrine is not a "positive science" modeled on the natural sciences). If in studying

"rock" culture a sociologist renounces the vital, everyday-life factors of its existence, above all sex, age, and the social and economic status of the people who are "drawn in" to the circle of this subculture, he risks falling into purely formal sociopsychological phenomenism. But if he is justifiably guided by the principle of "freedom from value judgements" and he also avoids an "attitude toward the values" of the subject under study, then he commits a blunder that is much more dangerous in terms of its social consequences than the first. Then he will have to agree with the opinion that "one can live in society and be free of the society."

In my opinion, a person's need for higher value criteria ("absolutes," in Yu.N. Davydov's words) must be understood in the philosophical-anthropological as well as personalist sense. It is that need which is significant only within the spiritual individuality of each particular person. If its existence is problematical, the "absolutes" must also be problematical. Then they are simply useless. Then the question "What is truth" either does not arise at all or it remains without a definite answer. You will ask: does a "certain" answer really exist to this question? Yes, we should reject feudal absolutism in thinking, which, in my opinion, people wrongly suspect in Yu.N. Davydov's position. In my opinion, it is absurd to suspect that he has truth in his pocket.

[N.S. Bender] "One of the rock groups proposed a show so obscene that a person could burn from shame..."

Someone dropped the word "banomania" here. Yes, I am a "banomaniac." But do not hasten to hold me up to shame and declare me a reactionary, try to understand my position. For a start let us listen a little to what the heavy metal rock star Ozzie Osburn sings: "Lie down, calm down, take cover from bad luck under the rug. There is a knock at the door. What is it now? Salvation is in suicide!" This is what the rock group "ACDC" calls for: "Don't bother me, I'm going to kill." You object and say that is not in our country, it's over there. Fine, let us look at ourselves. February of last year. The "Festival of Hopes" is underway in the Moscow Palace of Culture imeni Gorbunov. One of the rock groups proposed a show so obscene that a person could burn from shame if he met a female acquaintance at that very concert. Another case. Recently a teenager stopped me on the street: "Uncle, buy a tape, there's such a beat here, you'll start swaying." I bought it. And so what? Some underground group performing in the style of "Krematoriy," hurriedly savoring bawdy stories. And there is more. In my days as chairman of the ispolkom of the Voskresensk Gorsovet it was in our city that the oblast festival of rock groups was held. I well remember my ordeals then. I will say openly: I was afraid of mass riots. The voters would not have forgiven me. By the way, the documentary film "Is It Easy To Be Young?" shows, among other things, teen vandalism fanned by metallic rock.

There is nothing to argue about here. The only possible reaction to cannibalistic morals and to frank obscenity and vulgarity is a ban. In my opinion, it is a completely

normal reaction to what offends one's moral and esthetic sense, contradicts beliefs, and violates the generally accepted norms of decency. It is an altogether different matter when this same "Krematoriy" makes an attempt to interpret the prose of Andrey Platonov and find in his works a basis for their own moral quests. It would be a unforgivable mistake to orient oneself only to affiliation with a genre and impede such a collective. They must be helped here, not prohibited. And to the extent we can we help them. For example, not one of the country's philharmonic orchestras can boast of as many rock groups as exist within the framework of the Moscow Oblast Philharmonic. Among them are the well-known "Master," "Bravo," and "Rodno." Look at the posters in cities near Moscow. You will most likely find in them the "names" of rock ensembles, including the prizewinners of the all-Union festival of rock groups recently held in Podolsk.

[G.S. Batygin] Nikolay Sergeyevich, by education you are a philosopher. And it seems appropriate to ask: what is your attitude to the "search for Christ" proposed here by Professor Davydov?

[N.S. Bender] It is not necessary, Gennadiy Semenovich, to test people for stupidity. They must be tested for intelligence. In the abstract of the book by L. Feyerbakh "Lectures on the Essence of Religion", Lenin formulated the following thesis: Christianity made god from morality. This Leninist idea is the key to understanding the idiom of Yu.N. Davydov.

All kinds of things often end up under the rubric "rock." Rock remains an undifferentiated phenomenon even in the consciousness of its fierce fans. Even those who out of professional duty are supposed to penetrate the essence of the thing do not. I have the tenth issue of NOVYY MIR for this year in my hands. This is what is written about rock music there: "Why do we so diligently stuff fellows with this poison which cuts off the intellect and makes a person twitch as if he were in a narcotic trance?" Who says that? A. Golyga, our well-known scholar who studies ethics and esthetics professionally [Source 6]. Against the background of everything said here, the professor's "we...stuff" provokes an ironic grin. Such an uninformed statement by a knowledgeable person fixes one very notable circumstance: our country lacks constantly functioning and competent music criticism. Demanding, independent, and interested music criticism. Criticism that would make the wool fly in tufts from mediocrity and vulgarity. This kind of criticism is the most effective means of managing the situation in music. The organs of mass information, the organizers of higher journalistic and music education, and institutions of culture owe a great debt to the people and to young people. For up to this point rock has remained beyond proper social control.

Let us pose a question: can rock music be used to propagandize Soviet ideology, to affirm high values, and to arouse real spirituality in a young person? The answer

is unambiguous: it can. Then where are you, masters of culture? Only two or three names of composers who are interested in new forms of music come to mind—Aleksey Rybnikov, Eduard Artemyev, Aleksandr Zhurbin. Do you remember the places from which we got the waltz, the tango, the Charleston, and jazz? But what have we ourselves endowed youth with in the same time, what contribution have we made to the leisure culture? There is nothing to boast of. For almost 30 years we suppressed rock by farming it out to hostile radio voices and homespun operators who make money off culture. The conclusions which arise are bitter ones. Without exception we all are obliged to learn the lessons.

[G.S. Batygin] the only possible cult is the cult of Law and Truth.

Our discussion was so interesting and on so many different levels that I think I will not risk reducing it to any common denominator. However, in studying the problem of rock certain aspects can be outlined.

First, rock in its basic "hypostases"—music, subculture, lifestyle—emerged as a kind of alternative to the stagnant ostentatious phenomena in the culture of society. Of course, we are all proud of our musicians, artists, and poets. We are speaking of something else: there is not enough culture on the amateur level. No, not sad imitations of dances in the "Russe" style on the club stage, but opportunities for self-realization of the spiritual needs of an individual both in dance and in such a seemingly untraditional sphere of amateur activity as the search for the meaning of life. Centralized culture cannot provide these opportunities. And today diversity and choice are needed.

Secondly, whether we want to acknowledge it or not, rock outlines values—cultural and life priorities—in quite a distinct way. It represents a unique spiritual search, moreover, a "blind" search, aside from that line of development of culture which we are too accustomed to calling the mainstream. There should be no opposition and arbitrary pressure, still less appeals to the authorities. We can anathematize rock and ban it, but, it seems to me, it is necessary—the halo of persecution promotes consolidation and infuses new force in a youth movement which is already growing weak. Therefore, I would be wary of speaking of rock culture as counterculture. Why turn differences into opposites. I cannot accept the opinion that the Composers' Union is counterculture. I think that it is dictated by excess polemical ardor. There are many people, and I am among them, who would not approve of turning rock into official music doctrine. Is it possible to escape from the ambiguous prefix "counter"?

Thirdly, today we are observing increased youth activism and many informal movements (among them the rockers) cause crime. No, I am not preparing justification for a ban—a ban would prove to be the most irrational decision—the crime-causing quality does not

at all stem from the subculture values of rock. There is not even a grain of violence in rock. This quality is linked to the low legal and political sophistication of youth, well-known social infantilism, and irresponsibility. This is demonstrated very clearly in the film "Is It Easy To Be Young?" Some cult of force is again forming—gradually and despite declared priorities. If there must be a cult of something, it should be the cult of Law. Then we would not have to speak of the crime-causing quality of the movement.

Allow me to thank the participants in the round table for their work. I hope that our conversation will be continued taking readers' responses into account.

#### Footnote

1. See the article by Yu.P. Shchekochikhin, "For Whom Does the Bell Toll?" published in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (No 1, 1987).

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#### The Motives of Suicides

18060003e Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 52-60

[Article by Ayna Grigoryevna Ambruniova, doctor of medical sciences, professor, director of the All-Union Scientific Methodological Suicidology Center, and published for the first time in our journal, and Lidiya Ilyinichna Postovalova, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Psychiatry of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, who previously published article "Study of Suicides and Prevention Services in the Capitalist Countries" in this journal (No 2, 1978), under the rubric "Applied Research"]

[Text] The study of suicidal behavior (suicide, attempts or imitations of attempts on one's own life) involves the profound question of the purpose and meaning of

human existence. In Vladimir Solovyev's words, "There are serious people among those who deny the meaning of life: they are those who accomplish their denial in deed—suicide; there are also nonserious people who deny the meaning of life merely in talk and whole sham philosophical systems" (cited from [Source 1]). Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, the problem of suicide has invariably attracted the attention of philosophers, theologians, writers, and scientists.

#### The Moral Duty of Social Scientists

Interest in the suicide problem area became more acute at the end of the last and start of the present centuries. At that time Russia was in last place among European countries in terms of the suicide rate, but both publicists and scientists spoke uneasily of the "epidemic of youth suicide" and the "moral infection" which promoted the spread of suicide in different strata of the population (see: [Sources 2, 3]). The foundations of the domestic study of suicide were laid by the works of well-known psychiatrists (S.S. Korsakov, I.A. Sikorskiy, N.M. Bazhenov, V.M. Bekhterev), forensic medicine specialists (P.G. Rozanov, F.K. Terekhovko, I.O. Zubov), jurists (A.F. Likhachev, Ye.N. Tarnovskiy), statistician S.A. Novoselskiy, pedagogue A.N. Ostrogorskiy, and others. Despite all the differences in research approaches a common moral position in evaluating the phenomenon and a common attitude toward it united the scientists. I.A. Sikorskiy conclusively expressed this position: "The phenomenon of suicide imposes on the representatives of various specializations a moral duty—to work in the common field of developing precautionary measures against an evil which has become the disease of the century in our day" [Source 3, p 22]. In 1910 Petersburg and Moscow commissions on the struggle against suicide were set up and among their members were G.I. Gordon, D.N. Zhbakov, L.P. Prozorov, V.M. Bekhterev, and others.

In the 1920's medical social research on the personality of suicides and their immediate environment appeared [Source 4]. The spread of suicide and its links with crime, prostitution, drunkenness, and alcoholism were studied within the framework of a special field of knowledge—moral statistics, which was created by the efforts of M.N. Gernet, D.P. Rodin, and others [5].

In the 1930's the research was stopped and for many decades the problem was in fact outside the consideration of social scientists. The question was consigned to such deep oblivion that even the very term "suicide" disappeared from encyclopedic dictionaries published during the last 50 years (including the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and the Demographic Encyclopedic Dictionary). Statistical data on this topic has not been published in the open press since the late 1920's. Vulgar sociological ideas of the nature of the interrelationship of the individual and the social milieu which had become rooted in social consciousness and had found support in medicine with adherents of the panpsychiatric approach

prevented the development of the suicidology. The essence of the objections against the broad study and organization of suicide prevention measures was that the phenomenon itself was attributed exclusively to capitalist countries. It was asserted that a mentally normal person provided with food and shelter who had the opportunity to choose interesting work and had access to all the other blessings provided by socialist society would not make an attempt on his own life. It only touched people suffering from mental illness. Consequently, suicide prevention was assigned to the field of psychiatry.

Medical workers took the initiative to revive suicide research and organize preventive measures for suicidal behavior. In the early 1970's the All-Union Scientific Methods Suicide Center was set up (it was based at the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Psychiatry of the RSFSR Ministry of Health). Among its associates are psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists. In order to develop practical scientific activity, two different but equally important problems had to be solved. First, the scientific and bureaucratic sluggishness in the approach to the problem under study had to be overcome and, secondly, an optimal—within the framework of our public health service—model of a prevention service had to be found relying on the traditions of domestic researchers and the experience of world suicidology.

#### How the Suicidal Situation Arises

Interdisciplinary research conducted by the center has shown that suicidal behavior is the result of a complex interaction of all kinds of psychophysiological, psychological, socioecological, and sociocultural factors—the result of physical and emotional ordeals and reduced tolerance for them and defects in the individual's moral upbringing. The category of suicides is extremely heterogeneous. Among suicide-critical populations or "risk groups" are elderly and old people, students of higher and secondary educational institutions, teenagers, migrants, divorced people, and lonely people, as well as people suffering from serious chronic illnesses, including alcoholism and drug addiction.

From the clinical psychology standpoint, suicidal behavior can be characterized as a variety of the general behavioral reactions of a person in extreme situations which are typical not only of mentally ill people but of healthy people and people with borderline mental disorders as well. Conflict or trouble in some sphere of a person's vital activities engenders a psychological crisis which is expressed first of all in disruption of the internal emotional balance. We are speaking of frustration of needs which are meaningful to the person. Of course, the nature and course of the psychological reaction depends not so much on the content of the suicidal situation as on the individual's perception of it. As for mentally ill people, who account for about 25 percent of the total number of people who have killed themselves or made attempts on their own lives, here the influence of psychotic symptomatology on behavior is to a great extent

mediated by the sick person's system of personal character traits and the peculiarities of his interrelationships with his immediate environment. The suicide decision necessarily presupposes a stage where the person tries to deal with the conflict situation, no matter how pseudo-real it may be.

However, the role of characterological features of virtually healthy people and of people with borderline disorders as well as the significance of psychotraumatic factors influencing the personality must not be exaggerated. They merely create the conditions for the emergence of the psychological crisis but do not lead with fatal inevitability to spontaneous suicidal actions. Before deciding on such behavior, the person mentally—sometimes for only a fraction of a second—looks over alternatives for resolving the crisis situation. The overwhelming majority of people find adequate means of reaction. The adoption of the suicide decision represents a realization of the person's moral precepts, worldview positions, and life goals.

A person choosing the suicide decision also depends on the historically changing social significance of suicide, that is, on the meaning which is attributed to this behavior in particular ethnocultural groups and communities. Even a relatively short time ago in public consciousness suicide was equated with shameful behavior and considered a criminal act.

Criminal sanctions against suicide were abolished in Russia in 1917 [Source 6]. In our day an attempt on one's own life—unlike other types of social deviation, violent crimes against a person, drunkenness, drug use, and prostitution, for example—does not entail any negative sanctions, neither legal nor moral. News that someone has killed himself usually arouses sympathy rather than condemnation and as a rule is associated with a misfortune which has befallen the suicide and his family. The elimination of degrading repressive measures against people who have made attempts on their own lives is evidence of the humanization of culture and society's sense of justice and the recognition of a person's right to independently manage his own life. Unfortunately, too many people thoughtlessly and rashly rush to use this right without having the internal moral restrictions to resist a passing desire to cut the knot of life's problems with a decisive act. The de facto disappearance of social prohibitions against ending one's life and the neglect of the problem by public figures and scientists engenders some uncertainty in the criteria for evaluating suicidal behavior and society's attitude toward it.

#### "I cannot go on living an empty life any more"

According to our data, one out of every six suicides leaves a suicide note [Source 7]. These texts make it possible to a certain degree to explain the suicides' thought patterns and their view of the problem of life and death. Despite the different human fates behind these notes, one feature unites the authors—the idea of

the relative value of life, whose goal and meaning they equate with its quality: physical or psychological comfort and involvement in some family or social activity. The impossibility of finding the desired "happiness" (understood strictly pragmatically), achieving the love and respect of those close to you or avoiding suffering and the oppressive feeling that you are a burden to others—that is the underlying cause of the suicide decision. The suicide does not negate life itself but its undesirable variant offered by fate—an "empty life." The principle of removing suicide from the bounds of ethical evaluations and introducing certain subjectively determined limits of the acceptability and justification of suicidal behavior which is being imperceptibly introduced into social consciousness is reflected here. The initial meaning of the word "suicide" is concealed more and more. "I fell victim to the instability of my character," writes a 40-year-old engineer in a suicide note. Pseudoscientific psychologizing supplants the moral categories and the recognition of the personal responsibility for one's own life in the person's consciousness.

Usually suicides resort to standard motivations or clichés to justify and substantiate their behavior. Texts represent variants of several themes and repeat the same literary expressions, style, and argumentation; this allows the notes to be relatively easily classified by type of suicidogenic situations and their authors' membership in a particular age or social category. The content and linguistic similarity of the texts and presence of ready-made explanatory schemes ("motivational kits") speaks of the fact that a suicide or a suicide attempt represents the realization of a behavioral model formed within the framework of the mass culture. The fundamental problems of the purpose of existence and of one's own destiny and place in society do not ring out clearly in even one of the notes analyzed. The suicide's attention is focused on the problems of day-to-day life: the upheavals of interpersonal conflicts or a misfortune which has befallen (illness or death of dear ones), loneliness, and so on.

In the case of interpersonal conflicts, killing oneself is considered either escape from a traumatic situation or as the last and weightiest argument in the confrontation of the sides which attempts to prove that the suicide is right. Many notes were written in the form of an interrupted dialogue in which the suicide keeps the last word for himself: "Thank you. I am gone. Bring up our son"; "... There won't be anyone to swear at"; "Nadya, I think how you turned savage toward me, so I ask you to cremate me"; "Nina, you never loved me, you only loved yourself"; "So, Lyusya, you didn't understand me. I cannot live that way without a penny any more. I love you. Mama."

In cases of unrequited love, the suicide decision is frequently made under the influence of literary images or stereotypes created by the mass information media. Here, for example, is the letter of a young girl to her fiancé who has jilted her: "Kolya, my beloved and only one! I do not think it is easy for you now. I cannot go on

living such an empty life anymore. I made a mistake the first time, and the second devoured me. But you knew it would be very painful for me if you deserted me. You understand, the whole wide world is not big enough for you and living without you means merely existing... I do not want to love anyone but you, and let it, this pure and strong love of mine, depart with me..."

Notes which indicate the dominant motive to be some misfortune, trouble, or internal discord differ from those which are written in a situation where communication has broken down. They reflect a condition of confusion and fatigue from life, depression from approaching misfortune and a conclusion that existence is completely hopeless. "Tanyusha, dear one, this insidious illness has canceled out all our life. Forgive me for everything, I'm taking your image with me. How I so terribly want to live. Farewell." A 43-year-old engineer who had lost hope of recovering from a chronic illness involving loss of his sexual potency left this letter for his wife.

Mentally ill people do not necessarily take their own lives on the basis of illusory motives. The humiliating status of "madman," "abnormal person," or "lunatic" and treatment as an inferior member of society can provoke them to it. The realization that the condition may deteriorate to the point of being handicapped and that this will necessitate being in a hospital for many months in the company of ill people, frequently people more seriously ill—with manifest delirium and hallucinations—sometimes acts as a motive. Such people leave laconic notes like this one: "I voluntarily leave life—I do not want to live as a mentally ill person"; or they describe the reason for their behavior in detail. A person suffering from schizophrenia sent his brother this letter: "Greetings, esteemed brother Nikolay! I congratulate you and your wife, daughter, and mother-in-law on the New Year! Be healthy and happy! Kolya. I have gotten worse again. I do not want to go to the hospital. I want to kill myself. Come and find out. There are about 110 rubles in the purse on the table. Don't say anything to our mother. Tell her that I am in the hospital. Live a long and happy life. Farewell."

The basis of the suicide decision for elderly and old people is not only physical infirmity but also the idea that they are a burden to other members of the family. "I am tired of tormenting myself and of tormenting all of you," wrote an 82-year-old woman before she jumped out a window. In a situation of loneliness and isolation from the world when ties with dear ones are not maintained or have been cut off, suicides from time to time leave notes addressed to no one in particular in which they attempt to express their hurt or grudge against life: "My mother exchanged her son for a trinket"; "I have never had a person I loved"; and "I am not needed by anyone or anything."

The fact that some of the relatives of the suicides consider their behavior correct or even justified is also startling. While young people full of strength and health

taking their lives invariably causes sorrow, regret, and a feeling of guilt toward the person who has died, the suicide of the sick and the very old is sometimes interpreted as a less dramatic event. Such a step finds "understanding" among relatives, understanding based on a unique idea of justice and priority in receiving life's blessings: old people have already lived their lives and they should not prevent young people from enjoying all the fullness of life. "We don't pity our grandmother, after all she was old," reports the grandson ingenuously in response to an expression of sympathy. Such opinions are frequently expressed not only of old people but of family members who were heavy burdens to the other members for many years. "Maybe it's for the best that she was taken away—both for her and for us," reasons the daughter about the suicide of her mother, who suffered from alcoholism. "What good was he? He was just idling away his life," says the wife of her husband who had become a drunkard. "Why should he be tormented for nothing, cancer's incurable after all," that is how the relatives of a person who had cancer evaluated his taking his life. In families where a pragmatic spirit which suppresses natural human feelings and affection predominates, each member of that family is evaluated from the standpoint of his usefulness to the rest. Such families not only do not resist the formation of suicidal intentions in the chronically ill, alcoholics, old people, and invalids but even unequivocally encourage such steps. It is perhaps in the attitude toward suicide that the signs of deformation of social consciousness, moral erosion, and lack of spirituality which have been discussed so much recently are manifested most clearly. Comparing a person to a car that has worn out and must be repaired or written off is a tribute to a technocratic orientation and in addition a relapse into the vulgar ways and customs of the past.

The ideals of mercy, self-denial, charity, duty, and personal responsibility today seem to many people to be too old-fashioned or extremely abstract. Such more tangible values as material prosperity, one's own health, and life's pleasures push them aside. The cult of physical strength, everlasting youth, and fullness and novelty of feelings has become very popular. An ever greater number of people are inclined to approach their own lives with these standards, but by no means do all of them manage to adapt themselves to these demands—this is where the ground for psychological discomfort is created. Different types of suicidal behavior in point of fact reflect failures and missteps on the path of achieving obvious signs of material well-being.

#### **Relying on Chance**

By committing violent acts against themselves, some people actually want to leave life and others rely on chance, while still others are not at all yearning for death and choose comparatively safe methods of making attempts and even take measures to save themselves—they leave the doors of the apartment unlocked and ask neighbors to call an ambulance. It is difficult to ascertain

the demarcation line between various types of attempts, since the consequences of suicidal actions are not always predictable and are not unambiguously linked to the subjects' intentions. Quite a few cases are known where a person remains whole and unharmed after a fall from a fifth or even ninth floor. At the same time, however, taking a small quantity of a drug whose toxicity the person does not know leads to a lethal outcome.

What then compels a person who does not wish to die to deliberately commit dangerous acts? Why do people risk their health and lives—swallow handfuls of unknown pills, cut their veins, mimic hanging, and commit numerous other reckless actions for which they sometimes pay all of their remaining lives? The answers of the attempted suicides themselves, especially the young ones, at first are surprising in their naivete, helplessness, and thoughtlessness until it becomes clear that they are typical and behind them lies the infantilism characteristic of a certain category of attempted suicides. "I thought that if I got sick, I would suffer less and for some reason I was sure that I wouldn't die," a 17-year-old girl insulted and jilted by her lover offers this explanation upon regaining consciousness after seriously poisoning herself and adds: "I'm very glad that I was saved. When I think that everyone is alive but me, I'm overcome by terror." In a similar situation her peer cut her veins and tried not to ruin things when she was doing it. She could not give an intelligible explanation of the motives behind her behavior: "I didn't intend to die. I just did it, I don't even know why. When the blood started flowing, I put my arm on the table—on the oilcloth so as not to stain the cover." Those adults (especially alcohol abusers) who assume the role of "grownup children" in the family are no more responsible in their behavior. As a rule, such people demand that they be constantly cared for and they are too sensitive and quite often ask their wives for money or argue with them over their bad behavior. During an argument with his wife one cut open his veins in order to "stop acting like a hooligan," but carefully chose a new razor blade so as not to infect his blood. Another explains why he ended up in the hospital in this way: "I was sitting and thinking now I could make up with my wife. I found a cord in the pantry and started to hang myself." His wife noticed in time and managed to take measures to save him.

To a certain degree the frivolity of many suicide decisions is explained by faith in the unlimited possibilities of medicine and a belief that they will be saved in any case. Consciously or unconsciously, in many cases a suicide attempt is made in order to strengthen the person's life position, demonstrate to his partner the force of feeling, and arouse pity and sympathy in his loved ones. Often such attempts represent a method of appealing to public opinion in order to obtain protection and support against all kinds of oppression on the part of relatives, administration, criminal justice organs (if criminal proceedings are brought against him), and the like. In the opinion of many specialists, in mass consciousness suicidal behavior has begun to be interpreted

as a distress signal and a "cry for help" (according to the famous words of the American suicide expert N. Farberau).

Attempts on one's life are not only made under the influence of dramatic events in life. As was already noted, it can be an imitation or copy of behavioral models shown on television screens and found on the pages of literary works. By portraying suicides exclusively as people with a delicate mental organization compelled to the fatal step by the logic of inexorable circumstances, the mass information media romanticize suicide, attribute a hidden attraction to it, and make it a symbol of real suffering, strength of character, duty, and honor. Guided by such stereotypes, attempted suicides examine an attempt on their own lives not from the standpoint of social ethics but from the position of the effectiveness of actions in resolving life conflicts. If they remain alive, rather than repenting for having committed an immoral act, the attempted suicides repent of having chosen an unreasonable method and punish themselves for not achieving the desired result in the conflict situation. Socially immature people, and teenagers, as the most receptive to new behavioral models, are among them, assimilate and reproduce suicidal models of behavior.

Occasions for the suicide decision include essentially all of life's problems and difficulties encountered by people from adolescence to very old age. Family conflicts and squabbles yield the largest number (more than 40 percent) of suicides and attempted suicides. As for sociodemographic characteristics, this is the situation here. Three out of every four suicides are men. Ages 40-49 account for the largest number of suicides of both sexes and then the curve drops and the next peak is in the group of people 60 years and older. In contrast, women predominate among attempted suicides, and women at the age of 20-29 resort to these attempts especially often.

#### **A Comprehensive Suicide Prevention Program Is Needed**

Analysis of world statistics proves that the problem of suicide is an acute one for all industrially developed countries and in this sense is one of the global problems of contemporary times. People have encountered all kinds of life problems and difficulties throughout history, but the number of people involved in resolving vitally important conflicts has immeasurably increased in the industrially developed countries. For example, in our country the number of people participating in or preparing to participate in divorce proceedings is very large. The number of migrants is increasing and among them the proportion of those who were "torn from their roots" long ago and lost ties with family and relatives and are painstakingly trying to get used to the latest place of residence or labor collective is increasing. The ratio of single people has increased in the structure of the population, especially among elderly and senile people.

The acuteness of the problem demands that a comprehensive program of suicide prevention measures be worked out. Such a program must be built on study of the situation in all regions of the country; on a theoretical level it must be based on the general conception of social deviations, the question of which has been posed in one of the recent works of Academician V.N. Kudryavtsev [Source 8]. Apart from the tasks of general suicide prevention, specific questions involving the study of suicide-critical contingents and developing specific methods of socio-and psychotherapy also demand focused attention.

The first practical steps in this direction have already been made. A suicide prevention service has been in operation in Moscow for several years. It represents a fundamentally new form of organizing medical and sociopsychological help for people who need expert advice or medical treatment. The service is oriented to broad circles of the population and, above all, to people who are experiencing a psychological crisis and people subject to the influence of stress-causing factors and are potentially suicide-critical. When the service was set up the achievements and experience of similar foreign organizations and the recommendations of the International Suicide Prevention Association were used.

One of the main principles of the service's activities is its anonymity. The awareness that intimate questions which are agonizing to the person will not be made public make the patient more unfettered and facilitate making contact with him. One other principle recommended by the international suicide study organizations is also strictly observed—the service branches must not be located within psychiatric institutions. This eliminates the barrier which prevents a person from turning to a psychotherapist. For frequently fear of being said to be mentally ill and being put on psychiatric records prevents this step. However, the service is different from foreign analogues in a number of ways. It is staffed with specialists—psychotherapists—rather than volunteers. In our opinion, the service's main advantage is that its basic units do not operate autonomously but are unified in the system. The structural branches—the "trust telephones," the sociopsychological help offices, and the crisis hospital—are successive in operation and are coordinated by the suicide center. This provides many stages of help for patients depending on the degree of danger and the complexity of the personal crisis they are undergoing.

The successful work of the suicide service in Moscow attests to the need to create similar services in other cities of the country. Unfortunately, scientific stagnation, bureaucratic routine, and inadequate attention to the question on the part of the community checks the development of scientific-practical and prevention activity. Of course, the matter is also being held up by material costs. However, they seem insignificant in comparison to those losses which society bears as a result of suicides and attempted suicides. Death and people

becoming invalids, the cost of rehabilitating, treating, and keeping attempted suicides in the hospital, and finally, paying for sick time, invalid pensions, and social security to people dependent on the people who have died are what make up the economic damages. The influence of suicide is frequently observed many years later. The figure of the father, mother, or other close relative who killed himself surrounded with an aura of secrecy in the family impels already adult people to repeat their parent's experience and reproduce the suicidal actions—a fact extensively known in science.

Such a complex and essentially tragic phenomenon as suicide also poses a number of problems for sociologists. First of all selective regional surveys must be carried out and the range of various types of suicidal behavior must be identified and a well-developed picture of suicidal populations given. For the data of official statistics involve only suicides committed and include a limited set of indicators (sex, age, affiliation with an urban or rural population). The entire diversity of socioecological and cultural factors influencing suicidal behavior must be identified. The nature of the link between suicide and other types of social deviations also needs to be analyzed in detail. Problems of humanizing culture and people's attitude toward the question of life and death and good and evil are of special interest. The role of the mass information media in spreading demonstrative and imitative forms of suicidal behavior must be analyzed in concrete empirical material.

Acute medical-social problems do not solve themselves. Many years of experience in suicidology work proves that there is extraordinarily little foundation for indifference and self-complacency on this question. The sharp activation of scientific-practical activity is needed to break the alarming trends. But not just that. A civic spirit is needed first of all. The moral position of our country's scientists who at the beginning of the century proclaimed the struggle against suicide their professional and moral duty can be the model for such an approach.

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#### The Price of Love (A Survey of Prostitutes in Georgia)

18060003f Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 61-68

[Article by Anzor Aleksandrovich Gabiani, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, chief of the Tbilisi Scientific Research Laboratory of the Moscow Militia Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, author of the books "Ugolovnaya otvetsvennost za prestupleniya sovershennyye v sostoyanii opyaneniya" [Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Committed in a State of Intoxication] (1969), "Normativno-tsennostnaya propaganda i puti povysheniya yeye effektivnosti" [Normative-Value Propaganda and Ways To Increase Its Effectiveness] (1985, coauthor), and "Ot vrednoy privychki k tyazhelomy zabollevaniyu" [From a Bad Habit to a Grave Illness] (1986, coauthor), and author of the article "Drug Addiction: The Bitter Fruits of a Sweet Life" published in this journal (No 1, 1987), and Maksim Anatolyevich Manuilskiy, associate of the editorial office of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA and a regular contributor to our journal]

[Text] After finally taking up the delicate topic of prostitution and raising quite a fuss among the philistines, the mass information media soon played themselves out. Having convinced us that the problem exists, the press found itself in a difficult situation. They were pitting their own ideas against the justified moral censure of "bar girls". They also want to live well and do not intend to leave others their share of the income. Is it nonlabor income? Hard to say. We deal in what is ours, not someone else's. Is it immoral? No more than taking bribes or speculation. That is roughly how the priestesses of love parry the arguments of virtue.

At one time prostitution was a well researched phenomenon. Russian sociological science also devoted a great deal of attention to this topic. But in the course of time the tradition was lost. For too long we pretended that nothing like it was happening or could happen in our country. But no one has yet managed to abolish something which really exists by using literary rhetoric. The end result of such machinations is always the same: the day comes when life makes society face the "long ago abolished" problem and force it to be solved. In such cases we always regret neglected opportunities and time irrevocably lost.

We know very, very little about prostitution. There is a multitude of questions which arise here, but the first one is: who are these contemporary representatives of the oldest profession? Let us try to answer this question by relying on materials of an empirical study. It was done by the scientific research laboratory of the sociology of crime of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the mid-1980's. Most of the women involved in prostitution who came into contact with republic internal affairs organs were surveyed (N = 532).

#### Unrealized Cinderellas

For the most part they are young women, under 30 years of age (70.1 percent). Their social origin is most ordinary: three-quarters have secondary education or higher (see Table 1). At the time of the survey or sometime in the past 91.9 percent were working while 6.8 percent had never worked (1.3 percent did not respond). Perhaps the only unfortunate note related to the parents' education. A large share of them did not even finish the eighth grade or were even completely illiterate. In short, the group we are studying is by no means made up of representatives of the social "depths" and the criminal or close-to-criminal world. The roots of prostitution should be sought in those stagnant phenomena which our society is trying to overcome today and above all in violations of the principles of social justice, deformation of value orientations and consumption principles among certain groups of the population.

Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics and Living Conditions of Survey Subjects (in percentages)

#### Indicators

##### Age

Under 18	3.3
18-20	9.5
21-25	32.4
26-30	24.9
31-40	16.6
41 and older	13.3

Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics and Living Conditions of Survey Subjects (in percentages)

#### Indicators

##### Level of Education

Elementary	1.1
Incomplete Secondary	25.1
General Secondary	61.7
Secondary Specialized	5.0
Incomplete Higher	3.0
Higher	4.1

##### Social Status (through the father)

Worker	34.0
Kolkhoz Member	11.0
White-Collar Worker	31.8
No Information	23.2

##### Family Status

Married:	
lives with spouse	4.9
does not live with spouse	3.6
Divorced	51.7
Widowed	6.0
Unmarried	33.8

##### Type of Dwelling

Own Well-Appointed House	16.2
Separate Well-Appointed Apartment	24.4
Separate Apartment with Minimal Amenities	6.8
Communal Apartment with Shared Amenities	19.9
Dormitory	3.7
Basement Room or Shack	7.0
Rented Apartment or Room	13.7
No Housing	8.3

Despite all the moral bankruptcy of the argument that selling one's own body can be a means of obtaining income, there is a portion of truth in this statement. It is certainly not out of hunger that they go out on the streets today. Prostitution is the result of the contradictions between the real status of women, their aspirations, and their opportunities for self-affirmation and self-realization. What does a young woman encounter in a large city? A modest wage and glimpses of the "good life." Imported boots cost 120 rubles. Her parents cannot always help. By the way, it is just such a situation in our case: 16.4 percent of those surveyed were brought up in a children's home, by relatives, or in someone else's home. Approximately one out of every three of the respondents grew up in an incomplete family, and one out of four where there was hostility between the parents and the children. So, on movie and television screens

elegant business heroines provide models of brilliant careers, and even if everything is not going well in family affairs, the furniture in the apartment, the car, and the dress leave no doubt of their overall success in life. The newspapers and journals tell about laboring women and next to the reports are photos of stunning, fashionable attire which in real life is sampled by those who are able to "get" things, not by the leaders of production. The trade system would offer desirable goods, but only at the end of the quarter, when there would be a big crowd of people and usually a healthy price. What can a young woman trying to look "in style" pit against all this? And, in a situation where nothing much is expected of her at work and, moreover, she cannot hope for much. But status, prestige, and self-affirmation directly depend on how one looks and how one presents oneself. Mass consciousness never regards failures with favor but in conditions of widespread consumer psychology it is especially intolerant of those who do not meet the standard.

The women we surveyed in general had nothing with which to answer this challenge. Few of them occupy a high socioprofessional position (senior engineering designer, secondary school teacher, and the like). Most formerly worked in modest positions with a low salary and for the most part had a lukewarm attitude toward work. For completely understandable reasons the respondents were reluctant to answer questions regarding their present official jobs. And for that reason we do not have sufficiently complete and reliable data on that score. Nonetheless, there is reason to assert that many women worked in low-prestige and low-paying labor. For them prostitution is a source of income, but an additional source rather than the main one.

According to their own evaluations 8.8 percent of the respondents lived comfortably or well and 34.6 percent lived all right. But most had to constantly think about their daily bread. For 4 out of 5 all the money is swallowed up by day-to-day expenses. Many also experience domestic difficulties. Thus, only 40.6 percent have well-appointed housing (see Table 1). The thought is certainly suggested that material difficulties push the women onto the path of vice. But it is not quite like that. The deprivations which many respondents experience are not a reason but a result of the choice they have made.

Of course, meaningless, dull work and the lack of vocational prospects, but more often unwillingness to look for them and unsatisfactory material-domestic conditions all create the grounds for social pathology. However, in itself dissatisfaction with the "official" salary and position are still not grounds to take up prostitution. The reason lies in a deformation of consumer wants and that is the result of the fact that the standards of high consumption are not linked in mass consciousness with the measure of labor contribution. Moreover, management-economic practices and serious violations in the sphere of distribution have stimulated "shady" incomes.

### Everything for Sale

Young women starting life on their own are faced with a complex dilemma, as was already noted. However, the dramatism of the situation is by no means exhausted by the contradiction between the real social position and aspirations, on the one hand, and opportunities and stereotypes of mass consciousness, on the other. The trouble is that the psychology of materialism and philistine sentiments overshadow the problem of choice and substitute materialistic calculations and the need to keep up with standards for ethical criteria. Let us recall F.M. Dostoyevskiy's heroine Sonechka Marmeladova. For her prostitution was a tragedy, the failure of her life. But she did not overstep the line of human dignity, even though she deliberately sold herself. There was no other way to save her family from destitution. Is such a step considered a social and moral choice today? Alas, not always and not by everyone.

From the standpoint of consumer psychology, which covers up the lack of spirituality with militant cynicism, selling one's body is not considered moral degradation. The end justifies the means. As long as the "bar girls" keep themselves "afloat," dress ostentatiously, and lead carefree and comfortable lives there can be no claims made against them. But as soon as such a "girl" loses her position and sinks to the "bottom," yesterday's "client" fastidiously turns away and becomes the first guardian of morals. His well-being and tranquility are endangered. It is not only and not so much women of easy behavior who romanticize and whitewash prostitution. Above all the consumers of their "services" defend its right to exist. The logic here is simple and has been known for a long time. A person who considers the world a collection of things that are supposed to serve pleasure recognizes only one relationship—"buying and selling." A thing is interesting only when it has a price and the pleasure all the stronger the more is paid for it. Nothing must be overlooked in this life and everything can be bought—a car, a dacha, love. The more extravagant the blond and the more expensive the night, the more justified their existence is in the world of things. Despite all the wretchedness and cynicism of such notions, it is difficult to combat them. It is difficult because they eliminate the problem of responsibility for one's behavior and its consequences. If the calculation is carried through in full, there is nothing to discuss or complain about—"justice" has triumphed.

Unfortunately, in conditions of stagnation such psychology took deep root in mass consciousness. In this connection let us refer to the results of the survey of pupils in Moscow schools and vocational-technical schools conducted early this year by the editorial offices of the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Respondents were given the question of professions and types of activity which provided high incomes. The most popular answers formed a list of 20 points. Prostitution shared the 9th-11th places in it along with the positions of director

and salesclerk. Prostitution was mentioned ahead of professions traditionally considered "money" professions such as diplomat, teacher, taxi driver, auto mechanic, and butcher. Let us draw the readers' attention to two circumstances. First, we are speaking of 15-17 year old young people. Even if their statements are the result of bravado and infantilism, all the same they still have in their minds that such a source of income is possible. Secondly, girls predominate among those who mentioned prostitution. Some of them communicated in detail about the rate for "services" and about the way of life of the "night hunters." The survey subjects rejected this path for themselves personally. But the knowledge of details indicates that the topic is discussed among their peers.

In short, a tolerant attitude toward prostitution has taken root in the youth milieu and in certain groups prostitution is even surrounded by an aura of success. Because of lack of life experience, young people judge this phenomenon in a superficial way in many respects and see it as a source of intense experiences and a way to combine something pleasant with something useful, and they are probably sure that they will be able to stop in time. Reasoning that way, they hardly realize that they are standing on the threshold.

### Forbidden Fruit

It is wrong to reduce the reasons for the spread of prostitution to nothing but negative phenomena in the functioning of social relations. To a significant extent it is a result of mistakes in a person's socialization and unsophisticated interpersonal relations and contacts. Schools and other institutions which are supposed to engage in indoctrination have in fact removed themselves from the problem or approached it in a formal way. As a result the formation of the individual in this important sphere of life activity has occurred spontaneously, by the trial and error method. That is precisely how the matter ended in our case.

As already mentioned, approximately three-quarters of the respondents were brought up either outside the family or grew up in unfortunate families. Things were not so good in school or at the institute either. 23.1 percent were good students, 60.9 percent—satisfactory ones, and 15.2 percent—poor students (0.8 percent did not respond). Almost one third of those surveyed quit school. Why? 25.9 percent gave as the reason lack of desire, 25.3 percent—the need to earn a living, 18.4 percent—lack of ability, 15.8 percent had fallen for a man, 11.4 percent got married, and 3.2 percent had a child. In short, for a significant share of those surveyed the family and school did not have substantial influence on the individual's formation.

Sexual awakening occurred early in many of those surveyed (see Table 2). That is a turning point for a teenager and the role of the upbringing is especially great here. However, a large majority of those surveyed received

their sexual "enlightenment" from generally haphazard people (see Table 3). And as a result, after the first talk on this topic 55.8 percent of those surveyed developed an unhealthy interest in persons of the opposite sex. The results were not unexpected. Almost half of those surveyed began their sexual life at no older than 17. They were also not particularly discriminating in choosing a partner. The fact that the circumstances of the sexual contact were far from those which are associated with serious feelings and intentions draws attention (see Table 3). In this way, a significant number of those surveyed entered their first premarital sexual relationship as minors, voluntarily, without any illusions, without thinking of the consequences, in a situation which did not meet the norms of human communal life and sexual ethics, and with men who could not be considered normal partners for inexperienced girls. All this could not fail to leave a mark. It is true that for 18.5 percent the affair ended in marriage, and for 7.7 percent—in the birth of a child. But the happiness built on the shaky foundation of spontaneous attraction proved to be short and could not save the women from degradation.

Table 2. Distribution of Survey Subjects by Time of Manifestation of Sexual Needs, in percentages

Age, in Years	Sexual Awakening	First Sexual Relationship
12	0.8	0.4
13	2.5	1.2
14	3.3	0.8
15	12.9	8.3
16	21.6	15.8
17	22.8	22.4
18	13.7	21.8
19	6.2	12.4
20	5.4	7.5
21 and Older	2.4	9.4
Did Not Answer	8.4	—

Table 3. Conditions of the Formation of Sexual Needs

Factors	%
<b>Source of Information on Sexual Relations</b>	
Teacher	0.6
Mother	3.6
Acquaintances, Neighbors	16.9
Man Who Attempted to Have Sexual Relationship with Survey Subject	23.5
Girlfriend	55.4
<b>First Partner in Premarital Sexual Relationship</b>	
Acquaintance	35.4
Friend	20.9
Expected Fiance	18.5
Neighbor	12.2
Complete Stranger	2.4
Fellow Student	1.0
Relative	1.0

Table 3. Conditions of the Formation of Sexual Needs

Factors	%
Coworker	1.0
Stepfather	0.3
Did Not Answer	7.2
<b>Reasons Woman Entered Premarital Sexual Relationship</b>	
Man Promised to Marry Her	19.2
Physical or Mental Response	15.3
Alcoholic Intoxication	3.5
Sexual Attraction	3.5
<b>Influence:</b>	
of members of the family	2.1
of girlfriends	0.7
Took a Narcotic Substance	3.5
Entered Willingly, Out of Interest	52.2

For most (53.9 percent) the first sexual relationship was premarital. But even those who initially got married did not always show restraint. After entering marriage they looked at other men with interest. In one out of three cases this ended in infidelity to the husband almost right after the honeymoon. To all appearances the cases cited confirm that sooner or later the principles and behavior of those surveyed entered into conflict with the norms of relations between a man and a woman. "A man behaves as a woman allows him to" and "A prostitute is a victim of circumstance"—such a position removes responsibility from those who have trampled on love and turned human feeling into dirty passion. The "victims" themselves must pay for all this.

#### The Costs of the Trade

But what is prostitution? First of all we must note that it is a complex multileveled phenomenon. It has its "elite." This has been the main focus of attention for the mass information media. It also has its "depths," which a normal person is often unable to imagine. Of course, the same stigma attaches to all of them. But we must not forget that it is applied to women who are different in the social sense.

The problem under discussion has clearly expressed regional specifics. The favorable natural-climatic conditions of Georgia, the high recreation potential, and the existence of large resort zones all attract all kinds of antisocial elements here. Thus, among prostitutes 42.5 percent come from other regions of the country, in particular, 19.2 percent are living in the republic temporarily. The following fact is also instructive: the proportion of Georgian women among those surveyed is not large—28.6 percent. Many lovers of "easy money" are quite quickly captured by people who are leading an amoral way of life; they begin to pass from hand to hand. Such adventure-seekers live in the republic without a residence permit for months and at times even years, moving from place to place.

Most of the women of easy behavior have been or are still married (see Table 1). Approximately half have children, among them 60.6 percent with one child, 29.4 percent with two, and 10 percent with three or more. Among those surveyed there are caring mothers who try to give their children a good upbringing and carefully conceal their own occupation from the children. To do so they hire an upbringing at a high price. However, more often the mother's dissolute life takes place in front of the children.

Prostitutes can be divided into two large groups. Young and outwardly attractive women who take good care of themselves and try to give the impression that they "live well" and "have fast lives" make up the first group. At first they move from man to man and try to avoid relationships with many partners at the same time and selling themselves too cheap. Such a "moth" often operates in a pair with another woman. They meet with the client in an apartment and seem to receive compensation in the form of a gift. Some of them were glad to tell about how gaily they live and what success they have with men. Payment for the services of these women is not very high compared to the "elite"—on the average 50 rubles apiece. Gradually they begin to look for clients not only in restaurants and at parties, but also in hotels, and then it all ends with a pimp or on the sidewalks in the literal sense (see Table 4). Incidentally, at first many women who belong to this group work. It is true that the compensation for sexual relations substantially exceeds the salary and the exciting personal life also dulls interest in work; sooner or later they lose the job. From that moment these women quite rapidly slide into the position of the second group of prostitutes—street or train station prostitutes. They give themselves to anyone who wants them for 5-10 rubles. Some representatives of this category prefer to deal with men in cars—they have sexual relations with them, in a perverted way believing that it is more comfortable and there is less risk of contracting venereal disease. Women from this group have sexual relations much more often than women from the first group—sometimes several times a day. The answers to the question of what they feel during chance sexual contacts with men confirms the deep social and moral degradation of a large number of those surveyed. 33.6 percent receive satisfaction, 40.2 percent are completely indifferent, 5.7 percent feel humiliated, and for 20.5 percent it was difficult to answer.

Table 4. Characteristics of Behavior and Motives of Activity of Survey Subjects

Characteristics	%
<b>Attitude Toward Alcoholic Drinks</b>	
Do Not Use	23.3
Use	76.7
including (respondent could mention several positions):	
with friends and acquaintances	74.7
with men with whom they are having sexual relations	57.0

**Table 4. Characteristics of Behavior and Motives of Activity of Survey Subjects**

Characteristics	%
with neighbors	13.5
with relatives	9.1
with family members	8.4
by themselves	7.8
<b>Frequency of Sexual Contacts</b>	
Several Times a Day	30.5
Once a Day	19.4
Several Times:	
a week	38.6
a month	10.9
did not answer	0.6
<b>Place They Meet "Clients"</b>	
On the Street	70.3
Accompanied by Someone	61.8
On Transportation	19.7
In a Restaurant	16.8
At the Station	11.0
In a Hotel	9.1
<b>Purposes Money Earned from Liasons Used For</b>	
To Obtain Clothes and Cosmetics	72.6
Food	64.7
To Support Children	28.2
Apartment Payment	21.6
To Help Parents	3.9
To Save for a "Rainy Day"	7.5

For most of the women selling oneself does not bring in a large income. Approximately half receive 20-50 rubles from each client. They are young and outwardly attractive women who have sexual relations with only one partner a day. Street prostitutes on the average receive no more than 10 rubles for each service. During a day they have several sexual contacts and while they have clients they earn a decent living. Completely degraded women are satisfied with 5-10 rubles, and that only occasionally. Incidentally, the proportion of such women among those surveyed does not exceed 15-20 percent. Most of the prostitutes spend the money they receive on daily needs (see Table 4). Extravagance, drunkenness, venereal disease, hoarding, and fencing stolen goods are ordinary events in their world. The small group of materially secure "dames of the demimonde" make up the exception. They generally have a high level of education, decent work, and an apartment and have sexual relations with men of a certain circle for high pay.

Overcoming stagnant phenomena will undoubtedly help stop prostitution. At the same time it is clear that special preventive measures and a struggle against this evil are needed. In this case we cannot depend on moral censure alone or put our faith in repression (such an approach

predominates in the statements of the mass information media). Of course, administrative measures are needed, if only to put up a barrier to the spread of venereal disease. One thing is obvious: reliable sociological information on the spread of prostitution in the country is needed.

#### **Anatomy of the Book Shortage**

18060003g Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 68-77

[Article by Iosif Sukharovich Goldenberg, librarian at the USSR Academy of Sciences Protein Institute and published in our journal for the first time]

[Text] In recent times we have been increasingly talking and writing about the fact that "there is a sea of books, but nothing to buy." But are we aware of all the dramatism of the situation? There was no great abundance in earlier times either, and there have been book shortages before. But never before has the situation been such that *any needed book* becomes unavailable, that parents cannot even buy their kids Pushkin's fairy tales, that a teenager is deprived of those books which from time immemorial his peers have read, and that a teacher of literature has never seen the books of the authors who are the pride of domestic and foreign literature of the 20th century. And we have resigned ourselves to this.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA held a discussion on the topic "For Whom Are Books Published" for more than a year and here is the summary article: "Readers confirm: there is a shortage of the domestic and foreign classics, children's literature, the historical-biographical genre, the memoir genre, fiction, and detective stories. Of course, you can't stock up enough books for everyone" [Source 1].

So how do you like that. Even those people from whom we have a right to expect the most energetic defense of readers' interests have become so accustomed to the negative social and spiritual-moral phenomena and gotten so used to them that, it seems, they do not even suspect the blasphemous meaning of what they have written. For this is like telling a starving person: "You can't stock up enough bread."

In all civilized countries a person can always buy the works of the classics, and children's books, and detective stories, but in our country even though there are some books in stores, there is nothing to buy (to read!). How does this happen?

It has been reported in the press [Source 2] and confirmed on television that in 1991-1992 unlimited subscriptions to the collections of works of L. Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, and Turgenev will be announced. And once again no one sees anything terrible in the idea that it will happen only in 4-5 years! However, in present conditions when everything should help the people assimilate the wealth of domestic and world culture

more fully and deeply (that is also the task which the "Culture Fund" is posing for itself), the lack of books for sale should be considered a violation of an individual's rights to spiritual development.

In the article "Pangs of Conscience" [Source 3] Academician D.S. Likhachev wrote that publishing houses are issuing the books of contemporary writers at the expense of the classics; this means the books of influential people, as well as of people who know how to arrange things for themselves and people whose services were long ago.

We have the opportunity to show precisely what it is today that paper is being used up for, paper which there is a chronic shortage of and which was the reason for putting off the "unlimited" editions of the classics for several years.

First, two questions:

What do N. Gribachev, A. Sofronov, M. Ibragimov, A. Kotyayeva, V. Kochetov, and W. Faulkner have in common?

Answer: They have been published (or will be published) in six volumes in print runs of 100,000 copies (the first two writers have runs of 75,000 copies each).

What do D. Yeregin, R. Rozhdestvenskiy, N. Sokol Mikitov, P. Fedorov (who is this P. Fedorov? His name is not even in the supplementary volume of the "Literary Encyclopedia), Yu. Trifonov, V. Bykov, G. Gulia, and V. Panova have in common?

Answer: They have been published (or will be published!) in four volumes with print runs of 100,000 copies.

Common sense (and, moreover, all world book publishing practice) suggest that this is the usual procedure: the better the book and the greater success and demand it enjoys, the larger the print run. That is advantageous to the readers, the publishers, and the writers.

But how can the chaff be separated from the wheat in these lists and the lists proposed below? How can a person define who is who if the print run is practically the same for all of them and if any member of the Writers' Union has the right (according to official instructions!) to a collection of works once every 10 years?

Let us see which collections of works of Soviet writers have been published or planned to be published in the last 3 years.

In 1985 the collected works of the following authors continued to come out: M. Aliger (3 volumes with a print run of 50,000 copies), A. Ananyev (4 volumes—100,000 copies), I. Anisimov (3 volumes—20,000 copies), G. Baklanov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), Yu. Bondarev (6

volumes—100,000 copies), F. Gladkov (5 volumes—100,000 copies), N. Dorizo (3 volumes—50,000 copies), D. Yeregin (4 volumes—100,000 copies), M. Zoshchenko\* (4 volumes—100,000 copies), E. Kazakevich (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Katayev (10 volumes—150,000 copies), A. Krivitskiy (3 volumes—100,000 copies), M. Prishvin (8 volumes—150,000 copies), V. Soloukhin (4 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Sofronov (6 volumes—75,000 copies), B. Suchkov (3 volumes—25,000 copies), K. Fedin (8 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Yashin (3 volumes—50,000 copies).

Subscription publications have also been added to them: S. Baruzdin (3 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Belyayev (5 volumes—200,000 copies), V. Bykov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), N. Gribachev (6 volumes—75,000 copies), L. Zharikov (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Kozhevnikov (9 volumes—100,000 copies), P. Kuusberg (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Lipatov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), Ye. Maltsev (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Oseyeva (4 volumes—100,000 copies), S. Ostrovoy (3 volumes—50,000 copies), L. Panteleyev (4 volumes—100,000 copies), R. Rozhdestvenskiy\* (3 volumes—75,000 copies), N. Sokolov-Mikitov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), M. Tank (3 volumes—50,000 copies), L. Tatyanchikova (3 volumes—50,000 copies), N. Tikhonov (7 volumes—100,000 copies), Yu. Trifonov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), P. Fedorov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), M. Sholokhov (8 volumes—1 million copies), and V. Shukshin (3 volumes—150,000 copies).

In 1986 subscriptions for the following new collections of works were announced: A. Adamov (3 volumes—100,000 copies), L. Voronkova (3 volumes—100,000 copies), I. Yefremov (5 volumes—100,000 copies), P. Zagrebelnyy (5 volumes—100,000 copies), M. Ibragimov (6 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Likhonov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), A.N. Tolstoy (10 volumes—300,000 copies), and M. Shaginyan (1) (9 volumes—100,000 copies).

The 1987 program for producing subscription publications looks like this: E. Asadov (3 volumes—50,000 copies), M. Alekseyev (8 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Vinogradov (3 volumes—100,000 copies), G. Gulia (4 volumes—100,000 copies), L. Kassil (5 volumes—100,000 copies), A. Koptayeva (6 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Kochetov\* (6 volumes—100,000 copies), K. Kuliyeu (5 volumes—500,000 copies), M. Lvov (3 volumes—50,000 copies), G. Nikokayeva (3 volumes—100,000 copies), L. Ovalov (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Panova (6 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Popov (4 volumes—100,000 copies), N. Sladkov (3 volumes—100,000 copies), V. Tendryakov (5 volumes—100,000 copies), I. Shamyakin (6 volumes—100,000 copies). (\*The collected works of M. Zoshchenko came out in 3 volumes, and of R. Rozhdestvenskiy—in 4 volumes; the collections of V. Kochetov [6 volumes] and M. Shaginyan [7 volumes] came out 10 years ago.)

Let us note that this year the only new subscription publications (of the classics and foreign authors) being offered are: I. Bunin (6 volumes—400,000 copies), I. Turgenev (10 volumes—300,000 copies), H. Melville (3 volumes—300,000 copies), V. Rzhizach\*\* (3 volumes—75,000 copies), and E. Stanev\*\* (4 volumes—75,000 copies) are offered. (\*\*Why it was precisely these two little-known writers who were favored with subscription publications—no one knows).

Let us add the subscription supplements to the journal OGENOK. In 1986—F. Panferov (6 volumes) and P. Bazhov and A. Gaydar (3 volumes each). The print run of each publication was 750,000 copies. In 1987—the four-volume sets of A. Makarenko, A. Fadeyev and A. Serafimovich. Each print run was 1.5 million copies.

Do all these authors really enjoy the same success with readers and are these subscription publications (both in terms of print runs and in terms of number of volumes) in keeping with the real contribution of each of them to literature? How many writers are there here whose works are foisted on libraries almost in the form of an order, while a subscription to Faulkner costs 50 rubles on the black market! He is also the leader in the "free book exchange" market [Source 9].

A collection of works is *public* recognition of the merits of a writer whose books should be read at least for the next 30-50 years; it is a spiritual legacy to future generations. And will our grandchildren and great-grandchildren want to read many of the writers named above? But that hardly bothered the publishers or those who were published. And what opinion does a literary figure have of himself if as the author of at best one notable book he applies for a collection of his works in five and even nine volumes? One must assume that he considers himself above Faulkner and by no means any lower than Goncharov or Bunin. Such a thing can happen only when neither writers nor publishers are accountable either materially or morally or socially for anything or to anyone!

However, subscription publications are only some of the books being published. The lion's share of paper goes for "current" books of contemporary authors, members of the Writers' Union, and those yearning to become members. As an example let us show what this daily stream of literature represents. We took issue No's 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE [Book Survey] for 1985 and 1986 and 6 issues for 1987; we analyzed the "Russian literature" section (excluding the classics) (see Table 1). Responsibility for dividing authors into well-known authors and unknown authors lies with me and I am certain that I am not wrong. At the same time I do not undertake to evaluate the artistic merits of the works.

Table 1. Distribution of Authors' Articles in the Newspaper KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE

Issue Number	W	U
<b>1985</b>		
No 1	11	21
No 10	14	34
No 20	12	34
No 30	10	10
No 40	16	12
No 50	9	20
<b>1986</b>		
No 1	8	7
No 10	11	15
No 20	12	26
No 30	6	45
No 40	7	21
No 50	22	26
<b>1987</b>		
No 1	9	6
No 2	11	24
No 3	15	26
No 4	8	12
No 5	26	29
No 6	14	26

Note: We arbitrarily divided all authors into well-known (W) and unknown (U).

#### KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 25 July 1986, No 30.

Well-known authors: S. Dangulov, Ye.N. Dobrovolskiy, V. Kozhevnikov, B. Lavrenov, G. Paderin, K. Sedykh.

Unknown: V.B. Bakaldin, V. Bednov, Ya. Vasilyev, V. Volkovets, V. Gilov, A. Gritsenko, V. Demchenko, V.I. Dzyuba, Ye. Yefremov, N.A. Zhuravlev, G. Zaytsev, N. Kalinina, V.D. Kovalev, A.F. Krasnoperov, N. Krakhmaleva, V. Kuzmin, B. Lastovenko, I.Z. Lepin, A. Loginov, V.N. Maksheyev, P.G. Malyarevskiy, V. Matveyev, S. Mekshen, N.S. Nikolayev, B. Olk, V.V. Popov, P. Prikhozhan, F.M. Pudolov, B. Ryabukhin, A.A. Sazonov, I. Seleznev, M. Seleznev, V.A. Sergeyev, V. Sidorov, I. Sotnikova, O. Tarutin, A.L. Ter-Grigoryan, Yu. Tret'yakov, M. Trofimov, Ye.A. Fedorov, I. Filippenko.

#### KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 3 October 1986, No 40.

Well-known: V. Ardamatskiy, N. Zabolotskiy, V. Mayakovskiy, F. Panferov, V. Pikul, S. Shervinskiy, M. Sholokhov.

Unknown: S. Babayan, M. Belavin, N. Budennaya, V.I. Voronov, K. Gedrov, G.G. Golubev, D. Yevdokimov, P. Krenev, A. Podmogilnyy, S. Ryadchenko, A.M. Startsev, K. Titov, S.A. Khomutov, A. Khromov, A. Chayka, V. Chebotnikov, N.M. Chernova, B. Sheremetyev, M. Shchukin, A. Yakhontov.

Every week from 6 to 45 works of authors which he does not know are hurled down at the reader, and that has been happening for many years! As a result, in the second half of the 1970's and in the 1980's (that is, just when the country was experiencing an acute book famine!) the number of books which no one ever asked for rose in libraries and a large part of the stacks of large libraries were written off as waste paper. Thus, for example, 700 million new books arrived at state libraries in 5 years (1976-1980), and about 500 million were written off [Source 4]. And while in early 1986 the fund of 326,000 libraries included 5.6 billion books [Source 5], in 4 years 10 percent of the entire public book fund was written off as waste paper (that means destroyed!).

And, finally, let me give one more example of print run policy. Here are four books published in late 1986: A.N. Pleshcheyev, "Everyday Scenes", Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya—print run of 400,000 copies; V. Okolotin, "Voltaire (Lives of Outstanding People)", Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya—print run of 150,000 copies; "Living Water. The Soviet Short Story of the 1920's", Moscow: Moskovskiy rabochiy—print run of 200,000 copies; Vs. Ovchinnikov, "Hot Ashes (Documentary Prose)", Moscow: Pravda—print run of 500,000 copies.

If one recalls that one of the most significant works of recent years, "Sign of Trouble" by V. Bykov, was published by "Molodaya gvardiya" in 100,000 copies, then the print runs of the books cited above cannot be explained by any reasonable considerations. But if one adds that the essays of Vs. Ovchinnikov "The Cherry and the Oak" are being printed in two books of a novel newspaper (2.5 million copies each), then it will appear that this publicist exceeds Leskov, Bunin, Bulgakov, Pasternak, Akhmatova, and Tsvetayeva many times over in terms of print runs. In light of this data the following report is questionable: "With consideration of reader demand (quotation marks supplied by author) the publishing house 'Sovetskiy pisatel' is planning to publish the works of O. Mandelshtam—"Selected Prose" (1990) and "Poetry" (1991)" [Source 6]. So, another 4 years is needed to publish a small volume of prose and 5 years to republish the volume of poetry. Undoubtedly, a profound discrepancy exists between the interests of the publishers and the authors, on the one hand, and the interests of the readers, on the other. 10,000 members of the Writers' Union are interested in having their books published; State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade and the book trade organizations are interested in fulfilling the plan. And, despite the shortage of printing facilities, the wear on equipment, and other objective reasons, the plans are fulfilled. "The sector ended last year with satisfactory results: 2,500,000,000 books and pamphlets were published in the country" [Source 7]—that is certainly a plan for gross output! M.F. Nenashev, the chairman of Goskomizdat, reports that while in 1976 consumer demand was 41 percent satisfied, in 1985—it was 56 percent satisfied [Source 8]. Progress has been made. It is true that no one knows how these percentages were figured

and what they mean. Does that mean that 1 out of every 2 (56 percent nevertheless!) of the buyers leaves the store with those books which he intended to buy or each one buys half of what he would like to? But either one is completely unrealistic.

For the time being this is the real situation: records and reports are organized in such a way that plans are fulfilled, but there are no books. And all statistics are good until we begin to ask questions. Even the indisputable and, it would seem, comforting fact that there are 10,700,000 subscribers to the 3-volume set of Pushkin also has another side: this means that until now 10 million families did not have even Pushkin in their home libraries! And we will not labor under the delusion that everyone has suddenly stopped reading the great poet. In many cases these books are bought as a "reserve," for later, for those who will "take" Pushkin in school. And even this unique three-volume set met the fate of the emphasis on quantity: the press has mentioned the low level of editorial and textual criticism work in the publication [Source 13].

Unfounded publishing restrictions are often motivated by the "narrowness" of the subject area. I.D. Kovalchenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chief editor of the journal ISTORIYA SSSR, believes that the works of Solovyev and Klyuchevskiy are needed only by a small group of researchers; and the scholar advises those readers who are interested in domestic history to turn to the "remarkable series 'Lives of Outstanding People'" (is it really so very remarkable or did it exhaust itself as a series a long time ago?) and the war memoirs and historical novels of Zagoskin and Danilevskiy [Source 10]. Original, don't you think?

In conditions of a shortage the spiritual function of a book is distorted. Books today are part of the individual "ration" of management workers; they are an invariable attribute of all kinds of special services. Some books arriving in the stores remain at the complete disposal of the director and frequently are set aside for "essential" people; the most valuable books are sold in the "Beriozka" stores and abroad; a small percentage of the scarce books are distributed among book collectors and end up in libraries; *all* books which are even the least bit interesting and valuable are *always* on the black market.

Books printed which are of no use to anyone are written off as waste paper or kept forever on library shelves while those which are needed are unavailable to the ordinary reader and cannot be found in most libraries, so it is no accident that the prestige of the latter falls. On the other hand, according to official statistics there is no problem here. The encyclopedic dictionary "Book Studies" (1982) cites the following data: in 1979 libraries of all types registered 200 million readers, including more than 120 million readers in mass libraries; books were taken out 2.4 billion times; in early 1980 libraries satisfied the demands of 200 million readers and practically the entire population was involved with library books. The statistical reference book "The National Economy" reports that in 1985 the number of people

"served by libraries" was 234 million people, but there were only 150 million readers; 90 million urban (for 180 million inhabitants) and 60 million rural readers (for 96 million inhabitants).

The data are fairly recent but it is difficult to believe in them: they seem to resemble the data which says that consumer demand is 56 percent satisfied!

We all console ourselves with the ideas that nowhere in the world are belles lettres published in such enormous print runs, that the Soviet reader is the best in the world, and that the Soviet people are the most well-read. Perhaps we really are the most well-read people in the world, but we should answer other questions as well: *why* do we read (or have we read) more than others and, most importantly, *what* have we read and what do we read?

What is our real knowledge of today's reader? At the present time plans are merely being made to organize the Institute of Book Sociology, which in M.F. Nenashev's words will study reader demand and give scientifically substantiated recommendations [Source 8].

However, in 1966-1969 (20 years ago) a group of sociologists of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences conducted a broad survey(1) of the subscribers to PRAVDA, TRUD, IZVESTIYA, and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA [Source 11], covering altogether about 20 million people; we also gave them questions on reading belle lettres. The general impression was that when asked to name a book he liked the mass reader most often thinks of the last book he read. Thus, for example, 2,500 (of 3,700) subscribers to the newspaper TRUD named 1,000 books they liked. They proved to be so varied in all parameters that it attested to the complete spontaneity of the choice and the lack of any reading range whatsoever. The subscribers to

IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA confirmed the uncomplicated opinion of the mass reader. And our surveys and research by the associates of the USSR State Library imeni V.I. Lenin confirmed that the esthetic merits or shortcomings of an artistic work have no special meaning for the mass reader: the subject area (something about the Chekists, about the militia, about love, and the like) attract them above all.

But what has the mass reader become today? What authors does he prefer? Or has he stopped reading altogether? That is what N. Novikova writes about. The Burevestnik Kolkhoz in Vladimir Oblast has a whole young people's street of "tower" houses. Carved window and door framework, a high roof, big windows, polished walls and several pairs of little crystal shoes displayed under glass. The correspondent saw two piles of books on agriculture in one house. He did not notice books in the other house. The woman of the house sometimes borrows books "about love" or "about the Chekists" to read for a while from her sister. The neighbors hardly have anything to do with each other; they live similarly, but separately. Spiritual interests are minimal [Source 12]. But according to the statistical data which we cited, two out of three village residents are supposed to be library readers! Of course, for a qualified reader as the subscriber to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has proven to be, the attitude toward contemporary literature is altogether different: sympathies and antipathies were clearly expressed here and the "consumption" of literature was of a clearly individual nature.

We will cite just one table where information has been assembled on the positive and negative evaluations of contemporary writers in the three reader groups of subscribers to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA [LG]. Among other things we will see what different positions the subgroups of the readers of NOVYY MIR and OKTYABR have taken.

Table 2. Evaluations of Contemporary Authors by Subscribers to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, in percentage of total of each group (1960's data)

Readers' Opinions	All LG Subscribers	Subscribers to LG and NOVYY MIR	Subscribers to LG and OKTYABR
<i>Percentage of Readers Who Liked the Books of:</i>			
Simonov	14.1	14.5	21.6
Bulgakov	13.8	27.0	8.2
Ehrenburg	10.2	15.1	8.9
Katayev	8.8	15.5	4.1
German	7.2	3.6	15.2
Aytmatov	6.9	11.8	7.8
Paustovskiy	6.9	5.7	8.5
Polevoy	4.9	1.8	7.4
Kozhevnikov	4.0	0.6	4.8
<i>Percentage of Readers Who Did Not Like the Books of:</i>			
Babayevskiy	2.6	3.9	3.3
Kozhevnikov	2.9	6.9	2.2
Kochetov	5.3	13.9	4.4

Note: The list of books which people liked included 21 authors. The list of disliked books included 15 authors.

Although this survey was conducted on assignment from the LG editorial office, information on the literary tastes of readers in those years could not be published. Until quite recently reality could be determined at will; one could ignore any facts when printing the multivolume sets of mediocre writers and one could consider the collected works of Bulgakov, Pasternak, Tsvetayeva, Mandelstam, and Akhmatova which were published (but not in our country!) to be nonexistent. Not only the absence of glasnost but also the ignorance, incompetence, and simple irresponsibility of those who made the decisions led to negative consequences. Why, for example, were "Yemelyan Pugachev" by V. Shishkov, "Port Arthur" by A. Stepanova, and "The Signet Ring" by A. Berkeshi among the "waste paper" books which come out in print runs of a million? Are these really the most relevant or the most valuable books in an artistic sense? Why are a six-volume set of F. Panferov (750,000 copies) and a four-volume set of Serafimovich (1.5 million copies) among the supplements to OGONEK?

The following question was also in the sociological survey of the LG subscribers: "Which works of Soviet writers written in 1920-1940 have in your opinion stood the test of time?"; 90 percent of those surveyed answered the question. In the list of 35 names the authors of OGONEK subscriptions held the following places: P. Bazhov was for some reason not named at all; F. Panferov—33 (1 percent); A. Gaydar—26 (2 percent named him); A. Makarenko—28 (2 percent); A. Serafimovich—14 (6.4 percent); and A. Fadeyev—5 (14 percent). However, the critics have always had a positive attitude toward the works of these writers. For comparison let us point out the rankings of those authors whose works were not so unambiguously evaluated in the 1960's: B. Pasternak—19th place (3.9 percent), A. Platonov—17th (5.3 percent), A. Akhmatova—25th (2.3 percent), O. Mandelstam—35th (0.9 percent)—a collection of poems by the latter only came out 6 years later.

Of course, time has made corrections in these evaluations, especially in the attitude toward the second group of authors. But there was no reason for the stock of Panferov, Serafimovich and even Makarenko to rise so suddenly! What determined (or who determined and why) the fantastic print runs of their multivolume sets?

In the 1960's when we were conducting sociological research NOVYY MIR was for many people a textbook of literature and life. The brilliant galaxy of its critics headed by V. Lakshin and I. Vinogradov energetically fought against mediocrity and false reputations. It was not until later, after the defeat of the "old" editorial staff, that enterprising authors "organized" literary memorials to themselves—when Tvardovskiy was there they did not dare.

We lost at least 15 years. It would be naive to think that such a lengthy absence of good books did not change the reader. Here is the humdrum existence of today's book life: "the paucity of the reader's ration and the book

shortage, less interest in reading, especially among young people, the increasing television focus of leisure, the fall in prestige of the library," writes V.D. Stelmakh, the sector chief of the sociology of reading of the USSR State Library imeni V.I. Lenin [Source 13]. The item book expenditures has almost disappeared from the family budget: "an average of only six rubles worth of books (any books, not just belle lettres!) are sold to each inhabitant a year" (same author). Let us compare that with how much money is spent for alcohol(2), if even now, in conditions of the active struggle against drunkenness, each person accounts for seven liters of pure alcohol [Source 14].

We have given up one position after another. It has turned out that we by no means have the highest number of books published (if it is compared to the number of readers); that even in questions of artistic translation the infamous emphasis on quantity has predominated and does predominate [Source 16]. And it is hardly worth rejoicing that only in our country is a handbook "Poets of Africa" possible (print run of 300,000 copies!) or that a 40-volume library of Chinese literature will soon come out.

Cicero wrote: "A house where there are no books is like a body without a soul." In the last 15 years millions of people have received apartments. And these apartments are without books and we still cannot imagine the damage the print run policy of recent years has done to the spiritual life of the people. As radiation painlessly destroys the body, so the lack of books destroys the soul. What is happening in our country must be considered a national disaster.

Articles by chief editors of publishing houses frequently appear in the press. However, not only do they not propose any fundamental changes in publishing and print run policy, but, it seems, they do not even contemplate that. For example, an interview with the manager of the "Khudozhestvennaya literatura" Publishing House does not contain anything consoling for the mass reader. Even though A. Puzikov proudly speaks of the series "The Classics and Contemporary Works": "I am absolutely certain that this series must be developed, we must simply latch onto it. Because they are really books for the mass reader, for the people" [Source 17]. But really, this series is the worst that publishing has been able to create in its entire history! The books of the series fall apart (I attest to this both as a librarian and as a bookbinder) after the first reading, the spine breaks, the glue does not hold (there is not enough of some particular component in it), the paper is low quality, almost newsprint, and the price is not low at all. That is books for the people? At one time books were passed from generation to generation: from the father to the son, and even from the grandfather to the grandchildren. But books of this "people's" series are saved only if they are never opened or read. It is true that they are suitable for reports: "In the last 5 years we have issued more than 200 million volumes" [Source 17].

The "work" of the 17-million-member society of book lovers is also suitable for reports. But is this enormous voluntary bureaucratic society at all necessary?

It is bitter and shameful: no one is interested in or needs either the reader himself or his money. None of our creative organizations are to any extent dependent on filthy lucre and or in any way involved with the unpleasant financial consequences of their activity. The pictures and the opera and the symphony and novels and poetry—no matter how low quality they might be—are completely paid for by the state. That means by all of us.

No matter how paradoxical it may be, the impression is given that the main obstacle on the book's path to the reader is... the writer. In France, for example, there are only 600 professional writers (but four times more paper is used per capita than in our country); while in our country there are 10,000 professional literary figures (members of the Writers' Union alone!)! Every 25 years the number of members of the Writers' Union doubles (in 1934 there were 2,500, in 1959—5,000, and in 1986—10,000). Among them there are 3,000 poets who are members of the union. The names of 25-30 poets are known in our country, and it turns out there are 100 times that many of them!

Writers should be published—that is where almost all paper goes and that is what determines the so-called print run policy. And no matter what promises about changing this policy have been given, they are all unfulfillable in today's conditions. For that reason fundamental, truly revolutionary changes are needed in publishing work and the same kind of changes must take place in the writers' organization.

Didn't the whole situation in the Writers' Union facilitate the appearance of energetic hack writers at all levels? Wasn't the quantity of writers converted into some new negative quality? And is that not the reason that the fates of the most talented ones, Dombrovskiy, K. Vorobyev, Trifonov, and many others, for example, were so terrible?

No small blame is to be laid on the Writers' Union for the fact that our great reader empire has collapsed. The education of the reader must be begun from the beginning, but in more difficult conditions than before: television has become a serious competitor to reading and in terms of efficiency and sharpness the newspapers surpass artistic works. In addition the time of the videocassette is coming. Restructuring of the interrelationship with the reader must be begun immediately.(3)

The following figures were cited in one of the issues of the novel newspaper (No 1058) in a short message from the editorial office: 60 years have passed since the day the first issue came out; by this date 1,066 issues with a total print run of more than 1,300,000,000 copies will

have been published; in the 60 years 528 authors have appeared in the novel newspaper, 440 novels, 380 stories, and 12 poetic works have been published in the novel newspaper.

What what do figures mean in art? And does not one novel by Bulgakov or a story by Platonov surpass all this infinite number of works? How many books have gone for waste paper, and how many, despite the fantastic print run, were not noticed by either critics or readers? I remember: when the LG subscribers were being surveyed it was explained that the enormous majority of qualified readers simply ignored the novel newspaper. Although that was 20 years ago, nonetheless very little has changed since that time. And why has any author of this series been doomed to a print run of a million ahead of time? Is that economical? Paper must not be squandered so carelessly. For "War and Peace," "Brothers Karamazov," "Master and Margarita," and "For Whom the Bell Tolls" could be printed on it. The novel newspaper now has a prestigious editorial collegium. I would like to believe that it will manage to improve the work of mass publishing of works of artistic literature.

The time has come when we should not only talk of spirituality but promote its growth with all our strength. The mass publication of children's books must be begun *now*—in color, on good paper, with illustrations by the best artists, and in dependable bindings. Each child should have "Russkiye narodnyye skazki" (Russian Folk Tales), the fairy tales of Pushkin and Anderson, Hauff and Perrault, Kipling and Chukovskiy, Marshak and Lindgren. All of them have been published but in scanty print runs. The publication of books for adolescents must be immediately organized, and they too should be well made. This is especially important for schoolchildren who have not yet begun to "take" literature and have not yet been weaned of reading the classics. Every teenager needs the books of Maine Reid and Jules Verne, Cooper and Scott, London and Yefremov, the Strugatskiy's and Bradbury.

We think that restructuring book publishing is completely feasible: what people read should be printed on the paper which has already been allocated and what goes for waste paper should not be printed.

#### Footnotes

1. The author of the article directly participated in it.
2. In 1985 each of the 425 families in Yaroslav Oblast whose budget is constantly observed spent an average of 251.8 rubles on vodka, wine, and beer and in 1986—231.5 rubles [Source 15].
3. Many problems touched on by the author of the article are being resolved at the present time. As follows from the conversation of M.F. Nenashev, the chairman of Goskomizdat, with the NEDELYA correspondent, the shortage of books in great demand will be reduced by

realizing the appropriate all-Union program, unlimited subscriptions, and improvement of the novel newspaper. In addition, the publication "Teacher's Library" is now being prepared and books for family reading will soon begin to come out. The decision has been made to increase the publication of individual or only selected works of authors in good health today while multivolume collected works will be reserved for those works which have stood the test of time [Source 18]—editor's note.

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### Two Historical Types of Demographic Behavior

18060003h Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian  
No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 78-88

[Article by Anatoliy Grigoryevich Vishnevskiy—doctor of economic sciences, chief scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission to Study Production Forces and Natural Resources, and author of the monographs "The Demographic Revolution" (1976), "Reproduction of the Population and the Society. History, the Present, and a Look into the Future" (1982), and "Reproduction of the Population in the USSR" (1983, coauthor)—based on a report at the Seventh International Demographic Seminar "Demographic Behavior and Its Changes" (Berlin, GDR, 27-30 October 1986), under the rubric "Demography"]

st German demographer Charlotte Hoehn, it is proper to use the concept "demographic behavior" only as applied to a situation when one can speak of a person making a decision when there is a choice. It follows from this that an analysis of behavior is useless, let us say, when studying the mortality rate, "if only we disallow the stupid joke that under certain circumstances people die from bad behavior or we do not deal with the study of suicide" [Source 26, p 2].

It seems to us that such a formulation of the question unjustifiably narrows the concept of demographic behavior and reduces it to one of the possible historical types which is most common today. But demographers know very well that choosing and making a decision is by no means always feasible when it is a matter not only of death but birth as well or a decision not to have a child. Does that mean that in such cases we cannot speak of behavior? On the other hand, death itself is by no means always independent of choice and decision-making. People very often have considerable freedom of preference in actions and deeds that affect the health and life both of themselves and of their children—so why must one not speak of behavior even here?

Perhaps, it would be better to take demographic behavior to mean any system of actions and deeds (individual acts of behavior) of an individual which have certain demographic events as their direct or immediate result. The main types of demographic behavior are: *procreative*, which leads to the birth of a child or the decision not to have a child (for the most part we will speak of that later), and *vital*, which has a direct effect on preserving the health and life of a person.

In analyzing demographic behavior, it is useful to single out its *results* and *methods* of achieving those results, as well as the factors *motivating* people to take certain actions using certain means.

For a long time the attention of specialists was riveted on changes in demographic behavior. The knowledge accumulated in this field is conceptualized in the concepts of

the demographic revolution or the demographic transition. However, the level of comprehension of the changes in various aspects of behavior is not the same. Thus, the changes in the *results* of behavior—transition to a low birth rate and mortality rate, the main demographic and social consequences of this transition, the aging of the population, for example, the increasing freedom of married women, changes in the structure of the family and in family relations, and so on—have been comprehended with sufficient clarity.

For the most part what has happened with the *methods* of demographic behavior is also understandable: the prohibition on intrafamily regulation of procreation has been replaced by its permissibility and widespread use, and in the struggle against death passivity and helplessness have been supplanted by effective activism.

In themselves these trends are so significant that they make it possible to speak of the replacement of one historical type of demographic behavior with another, traditional behavior with modern behavior. But attempting to more deeply comprehend the reasons and nature of the observed changes leads to the conclusion that one can really comprehend their meaning only by turning to the study of the third component of behavior—the *motives* on which they are based.

Changes have taken place here also, of course, changes which are perhaps the most important among those which have occurred and are occurring with demographic behavior during the demographic revolution. But what is the essence of them? Different authors approach the answer to this question from different methodological positions. The difference in the views on where to begin building the whole structure of the explanatory conception of behavior and the changes taking place in it seems the most important to us: whether one should proceed "from below," from the spontaneously forming individual interests, expectations, and inclinations of people, or "from above," from the social whole and the social needs stemming from its functioning and reproduction. Both approaches to understanding the nature and functioning of social mechanisms which determine people's demographic behavior are encountered in literature. We shall somewhat arbitrarily call them "instrumental" and "terminal."

Under the **instrumental approach** demographic behavior is considered derivative behavior governed by other types of behavior, economic for example, rather than independent and sovereign behavior. Accordingly, even the goals of demographic behavior are not of value in themselves and its motives are not independent, while demographic behavior itself serves as an instrument which one can use to achieve other goals. For example, the birth of a child is linked to the fact that the child proves to be a means to achieve personal (by no means demographic) goals of the parents [Source 6, p 182]. Economic, social, and psychological "advantages" which

the birth of children bring to the family, and most often economic advantages are especially stressed, are always in the lead. The current fundamental changes in procreative behavior are also linked to the changes in the instrumental role of children and in their usefulness and "benefit" for the parents. Thus, the Australian demographer J. Caldwell asserts: "In any type of society and at any stage of development... the birth rate, both a high one and a low one, is the result of the fact that it is specifically that birth rate which is economically advantageous to the individual, married couple, or family" [Source 25, p 355]. In the scientist's opinion, the present low birth rate is the result of the economic benefit of minimizing the number of children while in the past it was beneficial to maximize it [Source 25, p 322]. Some Soviet demographers also hold such a view. They explain high and low birth rates by the high or low "need for children," which depends on the children's ability to be economically or socially useful to the parents. By virtue of general historical changes the economic and social usefulness of children has declined, and the birth rate has declined along with it [Source 5, pp 197-211; Source 6, pp 176-187; Source 11, pp 94-125].

Despite all the differences in the views of authors who acknowledge the link between the usefulness of children for the parents and the procreative behavior of the latter, a common feature unites them: recognition of the uniformity of the system of motives to have children or not. In all cases children perform an instrumental role in relationship to certain more general goals and the non-demographic demands of the parents, and in this sense represent a greater or lesser and positive or, so to speak, negative value to them. During the transition from the traditional to the modern type of reproduction of the population, and hence of demographic behavior, it is precisely the value of children which changes (declines sharply), but the principles of the functioning of values remains the same. These principles also predetermine the parents' choice: as before they respond to a great value of children with a high birth rate and to a low value—with a low birth rate.

The viewpoint which says that the decline in the value of children to the parents is the main reason for the changes in the type of procreative behavior is extremely widespread in contemporary demographics. Even in classifying questions of the dynamics of values and changes in the mechanism of their action, researchers attribute incomparably more significance to the former than to the latter. The American scientist R. Bulatao proposed distinguishing the "content" and the "process" of making decisions on procreative behavior. He classified motives, ideas, and precepts which predetermine the decision to have a child or not as "content" and the rules by which the content, procedures, and continuity of the stages of making the decision are evaluated as "process." "Content answers the question of why a decision was made; process answers the question of how it was made and may be extended to include the question of how it was fulfilled" [Source 24, p 164]. It would seem that by

separating the process of making procreative decisions and pointing out various strategies in which they are realized, one should pose the question of the internal character of those different strategies, especially since the fundamental nature of certain differences is obvious. But R. Bulatao took a different, more conventional path. For him all strategies prove to be simple functions of "content." "A great many things may influence the choice of strategy but the crucial factor is most likely the particular content of the decision: what is greater—the positive or the negative value of children; how available procreation regulation is; how one's own procreative potential is evaluated" [Source 24, p 185]. The logic is well-known: people always react the same in the same circumstances, and changes in their behavior and a change in its strategies is invariably the result of changes in circumstances.

We had to criticize the instrumental approach (or rather, the "usefulness model" of determining procreative behavior which corresponds to it) as an unsystematic and unhistorical approach as well as for ignoring many important factors of demographic reality [Source 7, pp 159-167]. Continued research has provided additional material for such criticism. For example, the historical-demographic analysis of the Russian prerevolutionary countryside made doubts stronger as to the unconditional economic benefit of children in the traditional situation [Source 8], and that is one of the cornerstones of the instrumental approach. Other authors who have studied the question of whether children always make a positive contribution to the family's economy in conditions of developing countries have also expressed such doubts. "Speaking of pretransitional situations, Caldwell gives a definite affirmative answer to this question: children were economically advantageous for the main persons (he equates them with the oldest members of the family) who made the decision to have children. On the other hand, there is considerable empirical data (Mueller, Cane, Li, and Bulatao) which attests that the economic contribution of children is almost always negative" [Source 24, p 171].

The argument dealing with the actual change in the number of children in a family can again be repeated. If a large-scale decline in the usefulness of children which many people write about has actually occurred and if the number of children in families has really been determined by this usefulness, then it should have declined sharply. But that did not happen. The average number of children who survive and become adults in families before and after the demographic revolution is approximately the same. What has undoubtedly changed is the number of children being born, but that is how it should be with the enormous decline in the mortality rate and the invariance in the final number of children who survive.

However, the main reasons for criticizing the instrumental approach are factological rather than theoretical-methodological.

To describe the logic of the instrumental approach to analyzing demographic behavior, it would be good to use J. Homans's exchange concept of social relations; he assumes that "the interaction among people represents the exchange of values—both material ones and nonmaterial ones," and welcomes psychologists "who explain behavior as a system of transactions" [Source 22, p 83]. Some demographers try outright to explain the changes in procreative behavior in terms of exchange. Thus, Ch. Westhoff proposes considering marriage "a system of economic exchange in which the woman exchanges her services in having children, taking care of the home, and satisfying sexual needs for the economic and social status offered by the man and protection on his part" and links the decline in the birth rate "to very low levels, most likely even lower than the level of the simple replacement of generations, if the states do not allocate substantial means for programs giving incentive for larger numbers of women to have larger numbers of children" with the decline in this economic stimulus [Source 21, p 97]. Ch. Westhoff speaks ironically about "singing the praises of socioeconomic changes" and the idea that "the demographic transition is accomplished by establishing a numerical balance of births and deaths at a low level" which, in his words, "are more of an esthetic than a realistic nature" [Source 21, pp 93-94]. Certain Soviet demographers also share similar views.

From the standpoint of the instrumental approach, the logic of behavior leads from evaluating the predicted result through comparing the latter with the costs necessary to achieve it, to the act. Are we obliged to agree with that logic and "think of the 'demographic man'... as 'economic man' who lives in a world of universal interchangeability and is capable of progressing only along the track of equivalent exchange?" [Source 7, p 240].

All kinds of doubts arise here. First of all such logic does not coincide well with recognition of the qualitative specifics of demographic behavior. Such logic turns it into a variation of economic behavior and proceeds from the assumption that their results are interchangeable and commensurate. If one can believe that, in observing the behavior of particular people, as G. Kelly and J. Tibo have done, for example, and examining L. Tolstoy's story "Family Happiness" in terms of compensation and costs" [Source 12, pp 64-71], then after raising the abstraction to a higher level and analyzing the functioning of society as a whole it is impossible to agree that human behavior has such an unstructured and undifferentiated quality.

The historical universality of the principle of economic rationality (striving to maximize usefulness and so on) is more than disputable even in relationship to economic behavior itself. The Italian medieval merchants who began their trade books with the words "may our wealth and our children multiply and may our souls and bodies be saved" [Source 10, p 293] most likely did not believe wealth and children to be interchangeable but were at the very least close to the contemporary understanding of

the logic of bargaining. However, this was not at all relevant to other strata of the population, the feudal seigneurs, for example, who on the one hand spent without counting and on the other robbed their subjects without giving them anything in exchange. And, moreover, in general what could calculation and maximization of usefulness be in a society based on a subsistence economy, personal dependence, insurmountable class barriers, and so on?

In discussing the problems of determining behavior in the demographic sphere, we inevitably arrive at the general problems of determining human behavior. A long-time tradition exists of explaining any actions of people using the postulates "goal-rational action" (a tradition apparently older than this Weber term itself), which include the postulates of goal orientation, consciousness, rationality, and information [Source 9, p 86]. But this system of postulates is the basis for the "instrumental" explanation of demographic behavior. Both in the past and now the family "makes the decision" (at the very least people speak of a "zero decision") on having a child, using contraception, and the like, recognizing their goals, having access to information on the real situation, and trying to ensure that the decision is the best one. Such, for example, are the six strategies of R. Li and R. Bulatao, in relation to which a "choice" is always assumed. Ch. Hoehn has the same logic: as was already mentioned, she generally considers it possible to speak of behavior only when a choice is made and a decision is made.

Such ideas seem irreproachable to many demographers. They are "an important element of everyday consciousness. They are a kind of social institution." It is not easy to "rid oneself of the hypnosis of the stereotypes" of these ideas [Source 9, p 99]. Nonetheless, the authors who specially study the theories of behavior have sufficiently convincingly shown the fundamental limitation of the idea of purposefulness (see, for example, [Sources 9, 14, and 15]). Among other things it is noted that the model of purposeful behavior, "in subordinating some... spheres of life to other spheres and thereby turning them into a means (which we often see in demographic works as well—author)... narrows the field of meaning of the activity" [Source 15, p 226]. One more criticized feature of "purposeful" logic—"taking the process of goal setting beyond the limits of reality" [Source 15, p 227]—is just as typical for many opinions on demographic behavior. Among demographers goal setting is frequently reduced simply to the formation of the "precepts" for determining the number of children, while the theoretical explanation is limited to a reference to "needs," whose social nature, if it is studied at all, is studied merely on the level of the functioning of the individual or the family group.

At the same time, however, "the chain of concepts—objective conditions to objective needs (of the individual and so on) to recognition of them (?) to the formulation of goals—has long been known. The fundamental and

unresolved problem is the mechanism of transition from the first link to the next" [Source 9, p 92]. But it is precisely the unsolved nature of this problem that demographers usually do not notice. It seems to them that if they have discovered a ploughman in historical space interested in insuring that his family has more work hands, then this already explains his "desire for a high birth rate." Such straightforwardness may possibly be suitable when explaining the principle of the action of a crank and connecting rod mechanism, but it is hardly appropriate when the subject is one of the most complex forms of social behavior. Essentially here we are dealing with a unique "Robinsonada" in whose framework determination of behavior is moreover considered on the subjective-consumer level rather than the objective-reproductive level.

In demographic works an extraordinary amount of attention is devoted to the category of "need," which is treated as the "key concept of the psychology of behavior" [Source 6, p 176]. The structure of behavior is defined as a continuum: need, goal-setting, motivation, action [Source 6, p 177]. Demographers who study "reproductive goals" love to cite D.N. Uznadze and in particular his words that "concepts of need and the situation of its satisfaction are essential concepts without which the behavior of man or a living being is altogether inconceivable" [Source 19, p 169]. But will any psychologist today agree with the "need" interpretation of determination of behavior, especially under the flat interpretation of needs which is typical for demographers? It is no accident that a warning against inflating D.N. Uznadze's idea rings out in literature and that the meaning which he attributed to the non-"needs" foundation of individual activism is stressed [Source 4, pp 6, 11]. For example, labor, in his opinion, "signifies an altogether different kind of activism which has the force to operate without pressing need and create values independent of the latter" [Source 20, p 375]. If this thesis is true in relationship to labor activity, then why must it lose its validity when the subject turns to procreative activity? D.N. Uznadze's undertaking to "surmount the idea of reducing the individual and his activity to needs really signifies a decline in the 'consumer' conception of the personality and the corresponding understanding of its activity" [Source 4, p 13]. "The development of the subject of the activity takes place not in the chain of need—the object of its satisfaction, but in the system of its relations to other people" [Source 4, p 9].

If the explanation of the determination of behavior using a chain leading from need to action cannot be considered a universally recognized psychological paradigm, then it agrees even less with the sociological tradition which is in general linked more to an analysis of the societal level. "Socially caused motivated behavior... is always a social relationship" [Source 16, p 4]. It also seems to us that within the framework of Marxist sociological tradition social relationship should act as the key concept when explaining determination of activity. Of course, each

particular person behaves by conforming to his own needs and interests. But, as K. Marx wrote, "Private interest is already itself socially determined interest... It is the interest of private persons; but its content, like its form and means of realization, is given by social conditions independent of the individual" [Source 1].

Even the very criticism of the instrumental approach to a certain degree leads toward the development of an alternative approach which we have called **terminal**. In accordance with it demographic behavior is considered independent and sovereign behavior which has its own system of social determination sufficiently independent of the systems of determination of economic or any other types of behavior. The logic which leads up to the formation of the terminal approach is simple, but all the same a higher level of abstraction is needed to understand it than to understand the logic of the instrumental approach. It requires moving not "from below" but "from above" and is not satisfied with reasoning locked into the level of the individual or the family, but requires an idea of the society as an integral organism which possesses various noninterchangeable functions. With the constant interaction of people, a stable system of relations necessary to fulfill all functions which is characteristic of the particular society takes shape. These relations in turn generate a system of social institutions, values, norms of behavior, and all that social fabric in which a person lives from birth to death. In socializing himself, he assimilates the corresponding values, norms, and rules of fulfilling institutional roles and becomes aware of the system of sanctions related to deviating from these norms and rules and, ultimately, by being included in the system of relations which have taken shape, he behaves more or less in keeping with the functional demands of society. Demographic demands are always among them and, consequently, there are always mechanisms which bring demographic behavior into line with these demands.

Of course, the mechanisms which we are speaking of are closely related to all social mechanisms of the given society and demographic relations are a part and aspect of all social relations. Demographic behavior has the same "coloring" as the rest of the types of behavior of the given epoch. If the society is based on personal dependence, then it has an equal effect both on economic (noneconomic constraint to work) and on demographic behavior (constraint and the system of strict demands and sanctions, direct bans, and the like also predominates here). If, however, the "free contract" (with all the restrictions which the inevitable quotation marks mean here) predominates in the society, the mechanisms determining economic, demographic, and any other behavior must be set up in an altogether different way. But this is where demographic behavior's proximity to other types of behavior ends, and it is inconceivable to separate one from the other.

But how does the "organization" of the mechanisms which motivate people to act in one way or another, to limit or not limit the number of children in the family,

for example, differ under the old and new types of demographic behavior? From the standpoint of the terminal approach, the answer to this question is related not to the differences in "value support" of behavior but in the principles and mechanisms of the functioning of the values. Often the postulated fundamental devaluation of demographic values is impossible from the standpoint of such an approach, since the objective demands on the demographic process cannot change fundamentally. If this idea is expressed in ordinary demographic terms, one may say that today, as in the Stone Age, at least one daughter must come to replace each mother to insure the constant renewal of generations and this goal is just as important for a society now as 1,000 years ago. But the methods for achieving this goal are changing very fundamentally—and not only because the same result can now be achieved with substantially fewer children due to the decline in the mortality rate, but also because society and man are changing drastically. If the adherents of the instrumental approach assume that maximizing usefulness is the historically universal mechanism of behavior and that a person has always had a choice of paths leading to this maximization, then within the framework of the terminal approach behavior based on freedom of individual choice and freedom of will is interpreted as a relatively new historical reality.

In the late 19th century in European culture such behavior was already considered to be self-apparent, and F. Engels spoke ironically of the "greatest discovery" by which "all our progress, as compared to the previous eras, consists of moving 'from status to contract'—from an inherited order to an order established by the free contract, but to the extent this is generally true, the 'Communist Manifesto' already spoke of [Source 2, p 82]. However, the preceding eras were not familiar with the free contract and hence, free choice. A different principle operated here—a text from the Koran can illustrate it well: "Neither the male nor the female believer has any choice in the matter when Allah and his emissary have decided the matter" [Source 13, Sura 33, Article 36].

Only "since the time of the Lutheran and Calvinist reformation has the proposition that man bears full responsibility for his acts only if he carried them out with full freedom of will" become firmly established [Source 2, p 82]. It has only been since that time that freedom of will gradually gained a firm foothold in economic relations, the "right of free personal choice unceremoniously intruded into the sphere of the church and religion," and "a certain amount of free will was granted" in the area of marriage [Source 2, p 83], and so on. The time came when freedom of choice received recognition in the sphere of demographic behavior as well, and this separated the new historical type of such behavior from its previous type in a fundamental way.

Behavior based on free choice becomes universal when the whole functioning of the society becomes extremely complicated and former, relatively simple methods of

social control of human behavior lose their effectiveness. In pointing out the differences in the principles of this control, Karl Marx wrote: "An enormous difference exists between whether barbarians can be adapted to everything or whether civilized people themselves adapt to everything" [Source 3].

Both internal (endogenic) and external (exogenic) components are always present in motivation of human behavior, but the important thing is which of them predominates. Exogenic components predominate in the behavioral motivation of the barbarian: without sufficiently developed individual needs, goals, and the like, he behaves by obeying external forces and the impulses coming from them. It is precisely that motivation which is characteristic of the **traditional type of demographic behavior**.

Let us try to describe its main principles. Women of the family practically have no choice in the question of having children. After reaching a certain age, a woman must get married, begin sexual life, and become a mother. Having children is one of the important demands related to the social role of the married woman. The woman did not choose either the role itself or the rules for fulfilling it. The precepts of religion, secular laws, public opinion, the daily "censorship" of the immediate environment (the rural community and the like), the minutely elaborated system of customs and rituals all stand guard to insure that a person strictly observes the social norms. These norms could be different. In some cases they led to a very high birth rate and in others, in contrast, to its limitation, but the question of a person's desires and of individual choice never came up.

An observer of the life of the Russian prerevolutionary countryside cites the peasants' words: "It's good to have children... whether there are one of them, two, or best of all, three. When there are more than that they get to be a burden to the parents." "However," he adds, "no matter how many children the woman is burdened with, she never decides to use a contraceptive. That is considered an unpardonable sin" [Source 18]. The example cited illustrates the principles of the traditional type of demographic behavior very well, but it does not particularly agree with the idea of perpetual maximization of usefulness. If the peasants in medieval Europe and in the traditional Chinese and Indian countryside had tried to limit the number of births in their families, it would have entailed the most severe sanctions.

The historical specifics of traditional demographic behavior were recognized by demographers a long time ago—it is no accident that J. Caldwell reproaches the literature on the demographic transition for "being full of references to the *precepts of religious belief, tradition, and irrationality*" rather than the behavior or reaction... of people [Source 24, p 325]. But can it be otherwise? For it has been repeatedly shown—and by no means just as applied to the demographic sphere—that the idea of

choice and the possibility of linking one's own behavior to rationally understandable results from it, not to mention to maximize their usefulness, is absolutely alien to a traditional person. Religious belief and prejudices are the basis of his understanding of the world and real life relations appear in mystical form to him. "Credo, quis absurdum" (I believe, for it is absurd) is the ideal principle for such a perception of the world. Among the rules, norms, prescriptions, rituals, traditions, and beliefs, in short everything that governs the behavior of that person, there are specifically demographic ones. They have an important independent effect on his behavior—independent in the sense that the events occurring in other spheres of life activity—war, crop failure, epidemics, destruction, and the like—cannot serve as justification for deviating from normative demands which exist in the demographic sphere, let us say, the intentional interruption or prevention of pregnancy. That does not mean that in real life these demands are never violated, but usually that it is a rare, censurable exception and the attitude toward it merely proves the general rule.

The transition to the **modern type of demographic behavior** is signified by the fact a person (since we are talking of his demographic existence) for the first time in history really becomes an individual who makes decisions. Such a transition became possible only when the society in its development performed a fundamental and exceptionally important task. Mechanisms which govern behavior "from within" came to replace mechanisms which govern human behavior from outside and therefore presuppose direct social control over behavior (surveillance of fellow villagers and the like); and because of this, among other things high mobility of the population, an anonymous life in enormous cities, and the like became possible. The increasing individualization of the person and the development of the person's internal world created the prerequisites to supplant exogenic motives with endogenic ones, and the role of the components of motivation linking each of a person's acts with his internal, personal, individual experiences, desires, and goals grew in an unprecedented way.

Now having a child is no longer an automatic result of reaching a certain age and entering marriage, but is as a rule the result of a consciously made decision which in turn is the result of a socially oriented rational choice of demographic goals and means of achieving them. It takes shape in the searching process, in the constant comparison of demographic goals and values with other social goals and values, as with biological, economic, moral, and other possibilities. Rationality appears in the constant presence of elements of calculation, prediction, and evaluation of the situation taking into account the goals already achieved, changing possibilities, and so on, and in the aspiration to actively influence the process of achieving goals and make it more efficient, thereby increasing the level of realization of those goals.

"The main principle and the mechanism of free choice on the level of individual existence is the *existence of*

*alternatives*, an alternative structure of life, including the world of goals" [Source 17, p 203]. Modern man always faces a multitude of paths and an endless number of variants of passing along them. He may or may not enter into marriage, he may or may not have children, he may take one step or another now or later, he may seek, try, make a mistake, correct the mistakes—in this sense he is incomparably freer than the man of past ages who lived in a world almost deprived of alternatives. Nonetheless, we have not called his choice "socially oriented" without reason. Today we walk under a "sky of values" forming on the superindividual level and in many cases on the level of the entire society, just like people who lived a thousand years before us. The only difference is that these values make up the content of our internal world, are experienced by us, govern our behavior, and direct our choice "from within" to a much greater extent than before.

The historical step which is taken when moving from the traditional to the modern type of demographic behavior can be characterized as the appearance of *demographic self-consciousness*, that is, as the individual's recognition of the independent existential value of demographic behavior and its results. Developed demographic self-consciousness also orients a person toward the world of endless alternatives and allows him to judge his own demographic interests fairly completely (he may not even suspect their "celestial" origin), not to give them up, and not to "sell them too cheaply, for example, by refusing to have children in pursuit of other, even important values—material well-being, education, work position, and the like.

The confines of the article do not allow us to dwell on the question of the particular forms which the new demographic self-consciousness takes. It possibly appears in the shifting of children to the focus of the interests of the family and the society, which is characteristic of modern times (the French historian Ph. Aries writes about that) and it is possible that it has other less-studied manifestations. In general this question deserves much more attention than demographers involved in looking for proof of the decreased usefulness of children have presently devoted to it. It is especially important because no matter how the development of demographic self-consciousness is manifested, it is a fairly complex and lengthy process which requires that the customary ideas of people be broken down and which frequently arouses opposition from them. It cannot go smoothly. The problem of the impact on the birth rate which has fallen too low is now being discussed in one way or another in all countries which have found themselves in a posttransitional situation. From the standpoint of the terminal approach, the only way here is to strengthen the new demographic self-consciousness, support all its manifestations, and eliminate obstacles on the way to developing it. But in order to act successfully one needs to know that self-consciousness influences this and how it does so, and one must seek the shoots of new developments engendered by social practices.

The "terminal" view of demographic behavior permits us to end this article on an optimistic note. For if the adherents of the instrumental approach are right and procreative behavior is determined by the value of children, and that value is falling irreversibly by virtue of objective historical reasons, then demographers concerned about the decline in the birth rate have nothing to hope for. But if the whole point is not the change in the mechanisms by which society's "will" is brought to individual consciousness, then the situation is different. Historical development simultaneously creates new mechanisms for social control of human behavior and shapes people who are receptive to the operation of these mechanisms. Since we are speaking of demographic behavior, this makes implementing demographic policy which effectively helps accelerate and synchronize this two-sided process possible and historically justified.

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- Moonlighters: Stereotypes and Reality**  
18060003i Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian  
No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 89-94
- [Article by Nikolay Nikolayevich Alekseyenko, scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Agroindustrial Complex (city of Saratov), appearing in our journal for the first time, under the rubric "Individual Labor Activity"]
- [Text] Jurists assert that in juridical process the term "shabashnik" [moonlighter] is not used. But in rural construction (in business correspondence), in addition to such neutral definitions as "seasonal" and "temporary" worker, the phrase "so-called moonlighter" is sometimes encountered. This "so-called" has continued in newspaper pages for three decades now. The moonlighter is the constant hero of notices published under the rubric "from the court chamber." However, to completely deny the labor-related nature of the moonlighter's income is absurd and does not bring us any closer to identifying parasitic activity which undoubtedly exists in this form of organization of labor.
- An idea of the scale of moonlighting as a method of performing pressing economic tasks and the level of its labor contribution to the general results of rural construction can be gotten from the data in Table 1.

**Table 1. Indicators of the Work of Temporary Construction Brigades ("Shabashnik's") in the 11th Five-Year Plan, in percentages (For the wage fund, the number of people working in construction-installation jobs, and the volume of this work done by the Mezhholkhozstroy Association in Saratov Oblast, taken as a whole.)**

Indicators	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Proportion of:						
number of people	38.8	44.0	44.0	40.2	36.0	33.6
volume of work performed	46.3	49.2	45.1	44.0	39.3	36.6
wages	49.2	50.0	49.4	47.0	43.7	39.2

Note: Here and in what follows the calculations cited are taken from the annual report figures of the Mezhholkhozstroy Association.

The disparity between the volume of work performed and earnings is apparent. This proportion becomes even more perceptible when we compare the payment of wages per ruble of construction-installation work by permanent and temporary workers (Table 2). The differences would be economically explicable if we compared the regions of the country in which the zonal coefficient could influence this indicator. There is nothing like that in our example. The data cited serve as an illustration of M.A. Shabanova's conclusion that "the gap emerging in

a number of cases in the payment for similar labor of seasonal and permanent construction workers is intolerable" [Source 3]. It is precisely this gap which in our opinion is the essential feature of moonlighting. Since we define moonlighting as disparity between the measure of labor and its payment, it is appropriate to analyze the situation using indicators of productivity and wages which are generally accepted in labor economics. Certain patterns of this correlation can be judged by the data in Table 3.

**Table 2. Correlation of Wages of Permanent and Temporary Workers (the pay of permanent workers is taken as 100 percent)**

1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
112.5	103.6	119.1	113.0	120.6	111.6

**Table 3. Average Monthly Output and Wages of Temporary Workers (indicators of permanent workers are taken as 100 percent)**

Output	135.6	122.3	104.3	116.4	114.8	113.8
Wages	152.1	125.8	123.7	132.6	124.4	126.7
Coefficient of excess of growth in wages	1.13	1.02	1.19	1.14	1.08	1.11

We are aware that to some extent the numbers obtained taken in physical terms are not comparable. After all, we know that the season for temporary work is usually less than a year and the length of the work day is as a rule longer than that determined by labor law. Ideally we could, of course, calculate the corresponding coefficient taking into account both the long work day and the short work season to get identical indicators. But such a comparison is inadequate for evaluating the socioeconomic essence of moonlighting. For a temporary worker is not nicknamed a moonlighter because he makes easy money. The problem is that the "length" of this ruble is not equal to its labor contribution. And in this case any correction coefficient for the length of the season and the length of the work day cannot change the disproportion which has become established between the growth in labor productivity and the wages of the moonlighter. Of course, only the corresponding indicators of the permanent worker must be taken for comparison, otherwise, the content analysis loses any meaning. Let us specify that we use the indicators of organizations which do construction by the contract method. Where construction is done by the economic method, there may not even be any permanent workers. After determining the average monthly labor productivity and wages of the temporary worker according to the calendar of the permanent worker, we will obtain a certain reduced model

which preserves the traits of the original. The coefficient obtained for the excess of growth in wages of the temporary worker over his labor productivity may serve as a reliable indicator of the general evaluation of the phenomenon.

The second aspect of the problem of comparability, in our opinion, is even more fundamental. It comes from the established practice of economic activity, and involves the assertion that that share which he supposedly does not receive from the social funds should be included in the seasonal worker's wages. This assertion is objective only within certain limits.

In our country no documents on how income is obtained are required to go to the doctor or receive treatment in a hospital. This applies equally to payment for municipal services, for example. The seasonal worker is not done out of his fair share of other social blessings which cost the government either. All of them are paid out of the social consumption funds. However, the coefficient of the excess of growth in average wages of temporary workers we calculated serves as confirmation that they do not make their contribution to the social funds which they use on an equal footing with all members of society.

Then where is the inequality preserved? The answer is clear: the continuous labor length of service is not recorded for the seasonal worker and consequently there is no foundation to claim social security for old-age and temporary inability to work related to the length of service.

The higher growth rate of their labor productivity is very often cited as an argument for enlisting seasonal construction workers. Our calculations also refute this claim (Table 4). We are absolutely certain that the efficiency of the labor on the economic plane cannot be helpful in acceleration since it is based on extensive methods of work. In other words, using the labor of seasonal workers in its present form does not contain positive prerequisites for expanding the reproduction process.

Table 4. Rate of Growth in Output,  
in percentage of 1980 indicators

Construction-Installation Work	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
throughout the association	105.0	107.9	105.4	106.7	112.1
including					
work of permanent workers	108.8	120.5	112.1	115.2	122.1
work of temporary workers	98.1	92.6	96.6	97.7	102.3

However, the moonlighter is convenient for some economic managers in many respects: he does not burden the administration and social organizations with a demand for housing, he does not expect them to organize public catering, provide transport to work, and procure vegetables and fuel for the winter, he does not ask for passes for rest and treatment, consent does not have to be gotten from the trade union for an extended work day for him, and he does not have to be paid bonuses and the 13th-month payment. According to the deepest conviction of the numerous monitoring services, he is not supposed to receive overtime pay. The only thing that is done for him almost without impediment is to calculate his wages at higher than the amount of his labor contribution, and that is what turns economically acceptable and even necessary seasonal work into moonlighting.

For what purpose is this done? In our opinion, the reason for turning seasonal work into moonlighting must be sought first of all in plan assignments. Are they determined according to scientifically substantiated rules and norms or are they based on a level reached only once, no matter how? In practice bureaucratic centralism in management which functions by the long-obsolete emphasis on quantity indicators which insure a "level of achievement" which has prevented making ends meet for decades still prevents plan assignments from being formulated correctly. The unlimited right of higher-ranking offices to interfere every day in the organization of construction locally has a demoralizing effect on the managers of construction organizations and compels them toward economic irresponsibility. We have already become reconciled to the fact that the actual period of construction is double the normative period. According to some data [Source 2], 600,000 projects are under

construction at the same time. Every year the number of important, especially important, extremely important, and urgently needed projects snowballs. The vicious circle closes up even more: construction schedules are not observed because of a shortage of work hands and there are not enough of them because too many projects are under construction at the same time.

The picture of the present methods of planning in construction fits entirely into one Leninist phrase: "Fewer Tit Titych methods ("I may approve, or I may not") and slightly more study of our practical mistakes" [Source 1]. There are becoming no fewer Tit Titych's either on the vertical (the department) or on the horizontal (local organs of power). The corresponding methods of planning which reflect management jargon very well have become established: "to nail down the plan" and "to pound a post into the plan". Of course, with such methods the plan ceases to be legal. It creates the chaos in which moonlighters thrive.

It is paradoxical but a fact: the economic manager has been made dependent on the moonlighter who personifies the reserve work force. The moonlighter enters the production process only when it is advantageous for him and not for the state (in the person of the organization with which he concludes a contract). And that is his fundamental difference from the seasonal worker (we see the essence of seasonal work in the migration of a certain part of the population from labor surplus regions of the country to rayons which are experiencing a shortage of labor resources). The moonlighter may set an example of skill and productivity, but that does not make his essential features more positive in the social sense since he initially placed himself above the economic law of distribution by labor. And the manager who is compelled to conclude the contract officially acknowledges the violation of the law: the higher-ranking organs of state administration alone can change the rates of labor payment.

In order to return seasonal work to the track in which it was formed as something truly useful to society, the remoteness of official organs must be overcome. An attempt to resolve the problem in the sphere of labor payment alone does not yield a positive result. And it cannot. The root of the evil is that "... nonresident construction workers can choose the place to use seasonal labor and, all other conditions being equal, can give preference to that economic unit which pays more" [Source 3]. An unattractive reality is concealed behind this corrective formula—the seasonal worker speculating in his own labor. There is another side to the coin here. "Distinguished by internal discipline, seasonal brigades at the same time frequently weaken discipline in local construction brigades by enticing crane operators as well as other specialists to work at their projects first of all, so they go off to seasonal brigades when the season starts" [Source 3]. This is also characteristic of Saratov Oblast. According to data of a survey (1986) by the Agropromstroy Yershov mobile mechanized column, 28.6 percent of seasonal construction workers are residents of this

rayon, which is not among the labor surplus rayons.(1) Everything stated above gives reason to classify moonlighting as one of the forms of realizing personal or group interests to the detriment of nation-wide interests.

Does an alternative to this negative phenomenon in the economy exist? Without a doubt. It is disseminating the principle of the brigade and collective contract to the activity of seasonal construction workers. The idea itself is not new. There is even reason to assume that the brigade contract arose as a result of the reinterpretation of the best features of seasonal work.

Most important, in our opinion, is the fact that under contract conditions the brigade becomes the vehicle of economic information which in its foundation coincides not only with that generally accepted in the construction system but also contains a uniform set of indicators. If a figurative expression is used, a brigade on contract is comparable to a tagged atom in physics. Economists get the opportunity to hang the results of the activity of seasonal construction workers on the scales of the commensurable indicators. In other words, the brigade contract helps eliminate statistical anonymity. But that is not the main thing.

When analyzing the efficiency of the work of contract brigades the fact that construction schedules are set in the contract in accordance with the calendar plan which

envisions putting the project into operation on time is frequently not taken into account. That means that the length of the work day has virtually no significance. The main parameter in operation of the brigade contract is the normative construction schedule for the project set by contract. In this case the lengthening of the work day attests merely to the lower intensity of the worker's work regardless of whether he is permanent or temporary.

After receiving an assignment, temporary workers independently set the length of the work day (12 and even 14 hours a day). It is the length of the work day rather than its final results which creates the illusion not only of greater labor productivity but of its special intensity as well. And the maximum earnings which the seasonal worker guaranteed for himself when the contract was concluded is by no means equal to the limit of his physical potential. Let us turn to Table 5 for confirmation of this conclusion. What do we see? We see that during all the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the level of labor productivity of seasonal workers on the average was one-fourth below the level of permanent construction workers on contract. And their wages were always higher!

Table 5. Correlation of Average Monthly Output and Wages of Permanent and Temporary Contract Brigades (indicators of permanent brigades are taken as 100 percent)\*

Indicators of Temporary Brigades	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Output	86.2	78.4	83.2	58.4	72.4	65.4
Wages	116.6	126.1	107.6	106.4	111.1	103.4

\*Figured from indicators of the work of cost-accounting brigades of Mezhholkhozstroy Association who fulfilled their contract conditions. 2,209 cases were analyzed. The results of the work of temporary brigades on contract make up 44 percent of the total sample.

If the output of permanent workers on contract is considered the standard of the present labor intensity of construction workers, then fulfilling the conditions of the contract agreement is also the basis which enables one to abstract from the possible negative effects of the organizational-technical factors of production on the efficiency of live labor. Therefore we will supplement the economic analysis with data on the existence of production reserves. Returning to the opinion of the Agropromstroy construction workers (387 workers and 60 brigade leaders were surveyed), one can put together a definite picture of the reserves for increasing the productivity of their labor. Only 13 percent believe that work conditions are normal and make a greater increase impossible; 38 percent are certain that it can be made a little larger; and 36 percent assume that the volume of work can be substantially increased (one and one-third or even two times its present level). The brigade leaders answers were even more categorical. One out of five believes that the work can be increased to one and one-third its present level, one out of six—to one and one-half its present level, and the same—to two times its present level.

Now, if one compares both the arguments, that is, the already existing lead of the labor productivity of permanent workers on contract and the readiness to increase it further expressed during the survey, then we will answer the question of whether the present volume of capital investments can be incorporated by the forces of the regular construction workers with a categorical "yes." According to our calculations, labor productivity in contract conditions can exceed the present level by a factor of 2.5. But one must not forget that for the brigade to fulfill the conditions of the contract, it needs complete engineering support. It is complicated to do that within the framework of the present economic mechanism. That is why many managers prefer to deal with seasonal construction workers not only because of the shortage of work force but also because these brigades do not require organization of labor and are much less trouble.

A paradox arises: the brigade contract which integrates the interests of the primary labor collective and the society proves to be unprofitable to the particular economic manager while the moonlighter, with his clearly

expressed priority of personal interest, is profitable. It turns out that the brigade contract is the stepchild of the economic manager, while the seasonal worker is the stepchild of the state.

Reducing the number of projects under construction at one time will reduce construction times. However, the problem will not be solved by that alone. We need persistent and consistent work to create conditions where the seasonal worker cannot refuse to "do as the Romans do when in Rome." Unity of interests and equal material incentive of seasonal workers and permanent workers must be formulated in the general context of improving the economic mechanism. The peaceful coexistence of the moonlighter and the permanent worker removed from performing economic tasks attests to the latter's lack of economic responsibility for the final results of production. Only full cost accounting will allow permanent labor collectives to see the disadvantage in recruiting temporary workers at those conditions of labor payment which now exist. I think that the time for a reckless attitude toward moonlighting has passed. The time has come for "economic democracy"—equally high prices for labor independent of the person's residence permit and the place the labor is applied. People must be rendered equal due for equally productive labor and conditions should be created which are equally favorable.

#### Footnote

1. Here and in what follows we cite results of a study done under the direction of A.P. Gavrilov, candidate of philosophical sciences, and with the participation of the author.

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#### A Lucrative Place for the Specialist with a Diploma

18060003j Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian  
No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 94-102

[Article by S.K. Mikhaylov: "A Lucrative Place for the Specialist with a Diploma (A Sociological Essay)"]

[Text] Today is a day off. I am on my way with Anton Kiryukhin in his Moskvitch car to the new construction rayon to "pound on doors." That means upholstering

doors, putting in locks, hanging ledges—in general performing the work of the Zarya firm. Anton is the head engineer of our department. He offered me this work two days ago after an institute lawyer shattered my hopes for holding two jobs formally. I already had an agreement at a tekhnikum to conduct laboratory classes for students. It turns out that I, a young specialist, have no right by law to hold two jobs. But how can I live on 130 rubles a month? After Aleshka was born, my wife Ira divided all my earnings or, as she says, "pension" into little parcels—for food, for light, for clothing. And still there is not enough. Sometimes my parents help, but taking from them is shameful somehow.

I came back from the lawyer's beside myself. I said: "What should I do now, go out and steal?"

Anton took my arm and led me aside: "You don't have to steal, Seryozha. I'll help you make some money. Only don't say a word to anyone. The work is honest but the people at the institute won't understand us right."

#### Why Upholster Doors?

And so we are on our way.

"First let's run in to the household goods store. We'll get leatherette and nails," Anton says. "We still have time. It's bad to wake citizens up before 10:00 o'clock on Saturday."

At the household goods store the pot-bellied section chief in jeans and smock met us cordially and immediately took us to a side room. Anton asked me to climb up to the top shelf and throw down several rolls of leatherette secreted there. While I was shaking the dust off myself, he settled accounts.

"Eh, who doesn't pound on doors now," muttered the chief recounting the tens, "clowns, and violin players, and militia men. Once I asked a violin player here: 'But how'll you hold your bow after the hammer?' He answered: 'Don't worry, for money I'll get through it.'"

The chief frowned and said even more quietly:

"But, Antosha, add another ten. The tax has risen. It's gotten hard to work."

"Keep it, robber," Anton said with a sour smile and took out another 10 rubles.

The fat man was offended:

"But I did my best for you. If you don't like it—go to David. He won't stand on ceremony with you."

"OK, keep it, OK," Anton reassured him.

At the cashier's desk the chief paid for the purchase and punched the control receipts for the material sold, but for Anton he wrote goods receipts in accordance with the sales norm: for one person, four meters of leatherette. The receipts for the decorative nails and the screws were separate. "The OBKhSS loves order," the chief sighed, as if justifying himself. He wrote with difficulty, in illegible handwriting. His face got red. His hand shook slightly. Obviously, he would not be putting the illegal money to any good use.

After we got in the car Anton said:

"That's an obvious example for you—the more restrictions and the stricter the law, the richer someone gets. That mug didn't risk anything at all. He simply gave me more of the goods than is allowed for one person. And he put a 30-ruble note in his pocket."

I was surprised: "But leatherette and nails aren't high-fashion boots. There's no shortage of them. Go around to the stores and you can buy everything with no trouble."

"Maybe," Anton grinned. "But I lose time. And I earn more money on houses during that time. Besides, sometimes even leatherette is scarce. But now I've supplied myself for a month in a few minutes. By the way, about the boots. No one goes barefoot! So, they have them in sufficient quantity. It's just that someone is getting rich in that business."

Anton drove the car easily and well. His moves were deft and precise, which somehow did not seem to fit a heavy man weighing near 100 kilograms. And Anton's age is respectable—over 40. In the department he is considered a failure, a cynic, and a boor. The reason is that he did not "slap together" his candidate's dissertation. When people would ask him about it, he usually answered: "Why make more untalented scientists? There are too many of them already." Regarding his own lack of talent, Anton did not mean it. He was perhaps the most talented specialist-practician in the department. No one was equal to him in developing new electronic circuits and carrying out experiments. The rest of the members of the scientific group did nothing but process his results and compile reports. And some did not do anything at all even though they had academic degrees. Anton called them spongers behind their backs, but he reconciled himself to this state of affairs—he could not get more than his 220 rubles a month anyway.

"So, I won't sign a labor agreement for scientific research work by some teacher who does nothing," said Anton, "and so what? His salary for scientific research will go to the state and I will have made myself an enemy. I'm not even offended by our own spongers. That's the way the system is. I used to fight against them, but I'm sick of it now."

Once Anton had a terrible falling out with his own deputy lab chief. The scene was a classic one, straight out of Cervantes. Anton shouted the words of Sancho Panza: "So what do you know how to do, lickspittle? If you're sacked—you'll die of hunger! Here you act like a scoundrel and grovel in front of the bosses. But I have hands and I will find work for myself everywhere."

From then on Anton's path to science was closed. He had a great deal of life experience and his own opinion on every question, and the bosses did not like him. Boys fresh from the institutes were preferable for "science." After finishing graduate school they obtained a teaching position and a high salary. Losing their position and salary was terrible because other than the institute these young teachers had not seen anything in life and they knew that they simply would not be able to get 300 or 400 rubles a month anywhere else. Sometimes, vexed, Anton would say to one of his friends: "Just what can they teach the students if they themselves only know their subject from books? If they themselves don't know how to do anything? Eh, paper souls! So we create bureaucrats and we lag behind the capitalists!"

Blocks of new buildings appeared ahead. My stomach contracted unpleasantly. What would my first day in the role of moonlighter be like? How would the occupants of the new building look at me? I was curious and a little terrified. Anton seemed to read my thoughts:

"Don't be afraid, clients treat us well. There are lots of citizens who are 'all thumbs'—they can't pound in nails and the state service is hard to find right now. The militia doesn't touch us either. What can they arrest us for—suspicion of robbing apartments? I was taken to the department one time. I upholstered the door while they fussed over the papers. They smiled—and the papers went into the trash can. But I still wasted that day. They took me as a witness to an investigative experiment. An apartment robber was showing how he opened doors. He was a nice guy, about 28 years old. He was smiling—he had nothing more to lose. And he was dressed decently. He looked like a member of the intelligentsia just starting his creative life. Full of ideas and hopes. This member of the intelligentsia stood with his back against the door and kicked it, like a horse with his hoof, near the lower hinge. Half the job was done. Then he pushed against it with his shoulder near the upper hinge—and it fell off. 'In you go,' the member of the intelligentsia said with a Caucasus accent. Not many people pick locks these days. The doors are made of cardboard and the posts are held by two small nails. They are smeared with just a little cement solution. There are cracks all around. You can see what is in the apartment. The modern thief goes up to the stairwell and rings four apartments right off. If someone comes out he can ask: 'Owners, do you need an oak door?' Or some other such nonsense. If no one is in the apartments—he can do his work peacefully. That is how it is. So the first thing occupants of new buildings try to do is fix the door—upholster it, strengthen it, put in locks, and so on."

I asked guardedly: "And they won't take us for thieves?"

"No," answered Anton. "Who we are is obvious right off. Thieves don't go around in work clothing carrying bags. But you always have to have your passport and goods receipts for all the materials on you and moonlight during time off from your main job. Then you're pure as a babe. Our rights are recorded in Article 18 in the New Constitution."

"But what about taxes?" I asked. "Might it be better to buy a license and work freely?"

"I do work freely," Anton suddenly got angry. "What should I pay the state for? If I pay taxes, the state should help me. It should offer an assortment of materials and tools and provide orders for work. Did you see? I just paid the 'tax' to that parasite—the chief. Now I'm going to give you 5 rubles for each apartment we find. The state doesn't offer me such help. Just some bureaucratic games using personal time. Look, they invented the law! Citizens have been helping each other on their own for a long time. Here's an example—I dug up the garden at my neighbor's dacha for him. He gave me a bottle for doing it. So, do I have to pour a glass for the financial inspector? Sure, it's a correct and necessary undertaking," Anton said a little more softly, "but while it's being carried out it gets so messed up that it's nothing but trouble for us. If only there were an office where they sold high-quality materials not found in stores to individual workers! With a price increase and by licence. They would sell orders—orders for a job right there too. So in that form the tax is both control and help. But a licence can be issued for a minimal fee after checking out the person and the quality of the work. If there's a complaint from a client—the license is taken away. The law should operate economically, not administratively."

We approached a building with six entrances. I counted 12 floors. Anton parked the car a little further out of view, behind a transformer shed, with the hood toward the road.

"I just want to get out of here quick. All kinds of things happen," he explained vaguely. "Your job is to look for work for me. That's called a 'runner.' While I work you find the next apartment for me, help me carry the knapsacks, and run on ahead. That's the ideal. And while you're walking with me, you'll learn to talk with the clients. It's a subtle business."

Two guys were walking between the entrances. They greeted Anton sullenly.

"'Runners.' And they're the guards," Anton said quietly. "Vitek and Ulitka are working here. For the most part they upholster doors. An outsider doesn't butt in here, even if he has five licences. But you can always come to

an agreement with the militia. Some of them 'pound' or 'run' themselves. They know me as Kiryukha here. You can call me Kiryukha too. Only not at the institute, of course."

### Illegal Money, Legal Money

We found the first client quickly. A polite, benevolent old woman asked what organization we represented.

"The Zarya firm," Anton answered cheerfully.

The old woman smiled slyly:

"The Zarya firm doesn't go around like that. It sits at its own desk. I was there, I put in an order. Then I waited for three days for them to come to me. Half of what I asked for they didn't do. They said—'We don't do that kind of work'—it's not on the price-list, they said. But it seems to me that they only do the work that's profitable. Well, good luck to them. In general the door has to be upholstered and strengthened. And can you put up shelves in the kitchen?"

"We can do everything," Anton said. "It's 30 rubles for upholstering the door. Strengthening the doorposts and the doors is 15. Hanging two shelves on a reinforced concrete wall is 6." The old woman did not argue. Anton also offered to hang up cord on the windows for curtains but she refused.

To my surprise, the apartment was richly furnished, one might say luxurious—a room divider, plush furniture, a large carpet on the floor, a Japanese colored television, a Finnish refrigerator. Exotic African masks hung on the walls.

Anton put on a special belt for his tools. Instead of his watch he fastened a magnet for the nails on his wrist. A hammer, several screwdrivers, a long awl, and a large pair of sewing shears—the tools constantly needed within easy reach—protruded from the belt. Tools which were also necessary but used less often were in his belt pockets, and his knapsacks held many more iron articles which I was not familiar with. Anton quickly took the knobs and intricate locks off the door, removed it from the hinges, and laid it on two stools in the corridor. I poked my nose in to help him, but he growled angrily, "Don't bother me."

He worked quickly and well, without superfluous movements. A boy about 6 years old, the old woman's grandson, came out of the apartment into the corridor. The three of us looked spell-bound at Anton's masterly work. The door was transformed right before our eyes. Covered with diamond shapes in relief and fine golden wire it seemed huge and gleaming.

"Look, lad, and learn. When you grow up you'll be a moonlighter just like me," Anton joked.

"No," the old woman smiled, "our Pavlik is going to go to school."

She looked at me sympathetically.

"You, young man, are not doing the right thing. You need to go to school!"

"What in the world for?" Anton was surprised. The old woman clasped her hands indignantly.

"What do you mean, what for?! He'll enter an institute and graduate from it."

"And so what?" Anton did not stop.

"He'll go on to graduate studies. Then he'll take a trip abroad. After all, you only make kopecks here," she patted the boy's head. "Now Pavlik's dad, my son-in-law, has already gone abroad to work twice. There's nothing to discuss, you go to the institute first."

"My father had pull," Anton sometimes made feeble jokes. "In the film 'The Wanderer' Dzhaga said: 'The son of a thief will be a thief.' But with us it's the opposite: the son of an academician will be an academician."

Offended, the old woman pursed her lips. For some reason I did not feel like telling her that I had already graduated from the institute with honors.

The door was already almost done. The old woman looked suspiciously now at the elegant door and now at Anton.

"But you're not who you say you are."

"And just who am I?" Anton was surprised.

"The party organizer."

She was not far from the truth. Anton was the trade union organizer of the department. He smiled and answering nothing, turned to me: "Sergey, while I'm finishing up here, run around to the entrances and find me a job."

When I left the half-dark stairway filled with construction trash, I suddenly got scared. At the same time I was excruciatingly ashamed, as if I had come there to steal or to beg. Dim lights burned on some floors. The elevator did not work yet. It had deliberately not been connected up, so that the new occupants would not ruin it moving things in. I made my way up. I could see something big and shapeless in the poorly lit stairwell. Suddenly some sort of movement began there. "Maybe that's the runners, the guards of the competing firms, waiting for me there? It's a pretty good place to stick somebody with an awl or hit them with a hammer." I peered into the darkness for a few minutes. I got used to it and realized that it was a pile of cardboard boxes mixed up with

packing paper. A draught of wind was moving the paper. Walking past, I kicked the "monster" with my foot and began to bellow in pain—inside the boxes was something hard and heavy.

After hobbling up to the 12th floor, I began to go around to the apartments. Moving from top to bottom, I had a way to retreat—I did not know what awaited me behind the door. The building was just starting to be settled. Most of the doors were still sealed. On some the new knobs shone with nickel but no one lived in the apartments yet. So I went around the 12th, the 11th, the 10th floor—no one. The boxes for an imported videocassette machine were lying around near one of the doors on the 10th floor. The boxes invited a likely petty thief to break into the apartment. And the conditions were ideal. An irate young man in glasses opened the door to me on the eighth floor. I saw an enormous black Great Dane right behind him. Without making a sound the dog rushed toward me across the space between his master and the wall. His master adroitly pinned the dog to the wall with his hip. Breathing heavily and noisily and scratching the floor with his paws, the Great Dane kept trying to reach me. I babbled something about the Zarya firm. Without answering me the young man took the dog by the collar and slammed the door. Depressed, I again pushed off down the stairs.

Withdrawing into myself, I did not immediately notice that three militia men were coming right toward me. Suddenly something snapped inside me and my legs got rubbery. For some reason I got a vivid image of the Komsomol meeting at our institute. I heard the voices of the young careerists, "How did you sink into such a life?" To my surprise the militia men, two master sergeants and a sergeant, passed by. I quickly ran down to the apartment where Anton was working. He was already gathering up his things.

"What's wrong, did a snake bite you?"

"No, the militia's here. Three militia men went up the stairs."

Anton lived up: "And you got afraid? You're amazing. They're new occupants too. With the same problems as all the rest, by the way."

I remembered that the militia men were carrying some things.

"Did you notice which apartment they were heading for? Let's go and find them. I tell you again: in people's consciousness I'm an honest laborer. The militia understands and sympathizes with me too. And no laws are going to force them to fight me. They don't have enough time to catch criminals."

We found the militia men on the ninth floor. A tired-looking but energetic young woman—the mistress of the apartment—was with them. She agreed to have the door

upholstered and strengthened without personal questions. Her husband, a master sergeant, tried to have his comrades sit at the table but the woman unpacked the things and made them help her carry them into different rooms. Finally the mistress invited the men into the kitchen. After half an hour the excited and happy militia men came out into the corridor where Anton was working and began to noisily express their delight in his work.

"How about that, when we came in the door was drab and unattractive but now, when we didn't even have time for a snack, it's been made attractive and solid. It's obvious right away—real people live here."

The master sergeant, flattered and wanting to show his working knowledge, began to give Anton advice. He listened condescendingly and without interrupting continued to work. The mistress came into the corridor. She said spitefully: "You students should learn how to make money honestly."

#### Reflections Near the Entrance

I found the third apartment myself, after Anton reprimanded me: "If you want to work with me, you'll have to overcome your shame."

This time we were working for an elderly, slightly drunk man. After standing for a while near the door Anton had removed, he offered to have us in for a quick one.

"We don't drink on the job and we don't advise you to either, old man," Anton answered.

"Young fellows. I don't drink on the job. But today's my day off. However, better call me Viktor Ivanovich. Anyway, I'm a shop chief. I've been working there for more than 20 years."

Viktor Ivanovich looked at us with calm intelligent eyes and complained: "I'm out of balance now. Before I'd drink two glasses of vodka after supper every day. And for many years. I'm used to it. And I felt fine. I made the plan, I helped my children and my grandchildren. But now on my way home from work the line at the wine store is enormous. It's no use to stand there. Sometimes you can buy from speculators, but a lot of times you sit down at the table with no glass. Is that good? No! An organism demands its due. Next time I won't stop at two glasses. Five! After all, my health isn't what it should be anymore. My engine has begun to miss. It likes a regimen too. I've begun to fear I may not reach pension age."

Viktor Ivanovich clapped himself on the left side of his chest a few times and pointed with his hand to the corner of the room where a battery of vodka bottles stood.

"That's a psychological study for you. I stood in line. What then? Do I take one bottle? No, I take as many as I can. But at home I lose my sense of measure. There are just so many bottles. The daily ration of fuel rises sharply. So am I drinking less?"

"You mustn't judge by yourself alone. Drunkenness is an enormous problem of the entire state," Anton responded provocatively, like the newspapers do.

"True," Viktor Ivanovich's face livened up and his eyes shone excitedly. Obviously, he had reflected on the subject a lot. "That's one of the problems of our state. Or rather an indicator of how sick society is. The whole organism in its entirety has to be treated. Not just pick out drunkenness from the pile of problems and work out a program against it. There's more harm than good done from that. Take my shop. The guys drink anything now. A lot of them go to the hospital for poisoning. Not long ago we buried two men. They unlocked my cupboard. A little bottle of used toxic alcohol was standing there. I hadn't had time to write it off. This alcohol was kept like it was supposed to be—in a closed place with a skull and crossbones on it. They drank it anyway. Or take the other day. Three young fellows got hold of some alcohol somewhere in the shop. But they were afraid to drink it. They cut an onion and plunged it into this alcohol—it didn't turn blue. Fine. They caught a dog in the plant courtyard. They poured diluted alcohol into its mouth. The dog put its tail between its legs and sneezed but it survived, it didn't die. They waited a bit and drank it themselves with a snack. They looked—the dog was lying on its side. They ran to the medical station. They panicked. Their stomachs were pumped out good. The ambulance was called. In the morning they come to work and the dog was running around the courtyard. The dog had slept it off. Obviously they had given it a big dose. It may be funny to you, but that means quarterly and annual bonuses down the drain. And you get set back in line for an apartment."

Viktor Ivanovich beckoned us to the window. Below in the neighboring building was a wine store. An enormous line stretched among the blocks. Along the sides a multitude of people had made themselves comfortable—on old boxes, in the construction trash, and on their own bags.

"Just look at the kind of people that are hanging around. Good luck to them, the pensioners and alcoholics. You can't destroy them any longer. They've lived their lives, you might say. But what about the young speculators? They're only just learning to live."

He pointed to the end of the line. Fashionably dressed young people were hanging about there. Students, maybe. The same fellows were standing around the corner of the building with big sports bags.

"Those over there in the line are looking for clients. The others, around the corner, have 'goods' in their sacks. When they find a client, they run around the corner and bring a bottle. I don't know how much they make a day, but they never pick up a hammer, like you. And they don't come to me in the shop either. They'll spend their whole lives like that looking for easy money."

"Well, what do you propose?" Anton asked.

"Open stores. Don't cause lines. Sell alcohol from 1400 hours at a high price. Before people used to drink at dinner. Now they don't drink. The price of vodka is 10 rubles—that's too high. How much can you drink on your earnings? That means either a person is a thief or he lives without a family. You have to begin with that. With nonlabor incomes. And continue on to the work place. So you refused to drink with me? Even for free. The reason is that you know that you earn less when you're drunk. At my shop everyone is sober when we are doing rush work. But at the start of the month, out of idleness, there are incidents."

"So how do you react?" I asked.

"I fight it energetically. By the principle: it's not the severity of punishment, but the inevitability. I greet everyone in the shop and talk to them a little. If I notice that a person's not himself—I take him to my desk and give him a sheet of paper. 'I am requesting a day off to be counted against my vacation.' Well, and part of his bonus goes down the drain. That is all there is to it. It works great. They don't catch drunks from my shop at the entrance."

"You're really an ideological champion of restructuring. But what about the imbalance and the engine?" Anton joked.

"I'm not the point," Viktor Ivanovich answered earnestly. "We can't go on living and working like this. I believe in restructuring. A lot of good things are being done. But there are always mistakes in the first stage."

After that we worked for an old artist. The apartment smelled pleasantly of paints and something else familiar and needed to make them. The old man gave us tea. The whole time he smiled in a somehow incomprehensible manner. In a large room I saw a canvas with a sketch on it, as it seemed to me. Going closer I was stupified. My throat suddenly constricted and my chest got warm and sweet. A beautiful girl such as there never is in life looked at me from the canvas. She was not simply pretty. With a few strokes the old man had conveyed her character and the condition of her soul—pure, tender, trusting. She was dreaming of something. And something was sacred in her. After standing there enchanted like that for a few minutes I looked at the artist with surprise. He was an ordinary old man.

Unnoticed he came up to me. Clearly rejoicing, he said unexpectedly: "Yes, there's a lot more work to be done here."

"Leave it like that, you might ruin it all."

"I can't leave it like that," the artist answered.

I took the journal KROKODIL from my knapsack and showed the old man a drawing of a Russian bear.

"It's reprinted from TIME magazine. A Somewhat Terrifying Mishka. But how did the artist convey the terror?"

The old man looked at the drawing carefully.

"The eyes. They're the eyes of a half-man. The wrong form of the pupils. The unnatural color of the irises. A bear with those eyes is a monster. A master was at work."

After the old artist we went around to a few more apartments. Anton did most of the work. But I was so tired, as if I had been hammering all day instead of him. In the car on the way home I slept. Near my house Anton counted the money. The net, minus the cost of materials and the gas, came out to 130 rubles. He gave me 20. That was fair.

"Listen, Anton, why should we go to the institute at all? It would be better to work for the Zarya firm all the time," I joked.

Anton looked at me attentively: "I used to know people who had a whole lot of money. They all ended up badly. They weren't people. All their talk was of how much they drank, what woman they had picked up, and what other deals they could pull off. To be a man, you have to interact with decent people and be involved in socially useful work. You'll understand that later. Don't envy me. Once your nerves are shot, you're ready to put in for disability. The changes of identity alone are costly. At the institute I conduct a meeting and circle the room with my eyes—is there a former client of mine present? I'm tired of the double life. So go to graduate school and study. For someday real restructuring will come even in science."

"I'd like to know what science will like after restructuring."

"I don't know. Maybe like in a novel by Arthur Haley. A group of scientists. One chemist, one biologist, one electronics engineer, and so on. They take orders for scientific developments. For example, a plant needs to speed up the cutting of metal alloys. In doing so the wages of the members of the collective will rise. They agree to give part of their raise to the scientists who can present a method for quick cutting. I emphasize that it's not worthless planned money but money earned by the sweat of the brow, from the wage fund. It's as if the

workers take the scientists into their cost-accounting brigade for some period of time. The contract is concluded and the amount to pay the scientists and the maximum period of time which the contract will be in effect is indicated in it. If the scientists get an idea and the next day deliver the completed solution—they receive your money. A mass of paper isn't needed to report on scientific work. You just stand at the machine tool and show how the metal needs to be cut. The main thing is that the plant begins to work with new productivity and the collective doesn't have any claims against the scientists."

Anton yawned.

"I'm like that, I fantasize. Obviously there are special people who think about that."

He extended his hand to me, I wearily pressed his hard strong palm and plodded home to sleep.

#### **Alcoholism and the 'Harmony of Pathology'**

18060003k Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE

ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 103-104

[Article by Ivan Ivanovich Apostolov, psychotherapist, appearing in our journal for the first time, under the rubric "Facts, Commentaries, Notes (From the Sociologist's Workdesk)"]

[Text] The treatment for alcoholism is frequently restricted to the use of medicines. However, medicinal therapy is an auxiliary method. It is merely the first step in the work to rehabilitate the sick person's personality. After that psychotherapeutic adjustment and rehabilitation, a kind of "social technology" of recovery, must follow. Its main content comes down, in our opinion, to changing the value-motivational structure of the personality and the stereotypes of behavior.

Experience in dealing with patients permits us to conclude that alcoholism is closely related to various forms of mental pathologies, by which we mean in this case any deviation from the norm. Springing from such kinds of diseases, alcoholism in turn creates new deviations, so in such an "escalation of cause and effect" the mechanism of their manifestation cannot always be clearly explained.

Let us cite several examples. Patient N, 31 years old, is a VUZ instructor. He requested help at the initiative of his father when he had already reached the alcoholism stage. The patient has conflict relations with associates and relatives and is volatile and impulsive. When drunk N. frequently disturbed public order, but his relatives got him off every time. His parents' "over-protectiveness" and the atmosphere of permissiveness deprived the son of independence and a sense of responsibility for his own actions. Psychopathology developed in him on this basis and incidents of asocial behavior increased. Analysis of

the patient's mental state showed that the treatment had to begin with changing the living conditions and way of life, above all eliminating the "over-protectiveness."

Patient S., 55 years old, a trade worker, married the second time to a woman 21 years younger than he. In-depth analysis revealed that the alcohol abuse served as refuge from real marital problems, in particular in the sexual sphere.

Things are even more complicated with female alcoholism. According to our data, neurotic aberrations are observed in half of the women suffering from alcoholism. Here is a characteristic case. Patient A., 29 years old, a woman of striking appearance, has enjoyed great success with men since adolescence. She is not married and lives with her child and mother, from whom she very much wants to separate herself, since she believes that her mother limits her freedom. Alcoholism developed against the background of the hysterical-type psychopathization, and the fact that the patient's mother had completely removed her from any concerns about the home and the child played a definite role here.

Here is one more example. From talking with Patient P., 26 years old, it was revealed that a year ago he had moved from the countryside to the city. He works as an electrician-mechanic at a large plant. Recently he has been drinking a lot, but when he lived in the countryside, he never touched a drop, as they say. But now there are obvious signs of an abnormal predilection for alcohol. In all probability the start of the disease is related to the move to the city. Difficulties in adapting, longing for home, and the change in his way of life served as the cause of the stress with the subsequent neuroticization, which resulted in the development of alcoholism.

Of course, the immediate surroundings to no small extent promote the intensification and consolidation of unhealthy attractions. And the phenomenon which may be called the "harmony of pathology" is often observed. We will dwell on this phenomenon in more detail below, but now let us turn to one more destiny. Patient V., 53 years old, complains of disturbed sleep and heightened irritation. Her husband is an alcoholic. V. considers her husband's drunkenness to be a lack of discipline, hopes to reeducate him, and sees that as the main goal of her life. But how are these seemingly good intentions carried out? Every day an intense but futile argument goes on in the family. If the husband returns from work drunk the wife makes a scene, but if he is sober she continues to watch his every step. The husband in turn looks for more and more ways to deceive his wife's vigilance. The spouses' life has become constant pursuit and secrecy and a constant series of the same kinds of arguments and reconciliations. Repeated over and over again, the tragedy is becoming a tragicomedy. The partners' interaction is conflict-oriented in form but harmonious and compensatory in essence. The phenomenon which we are speaking of has very different forms. Thus, in certain cases the person consciously exploits the other and looks

for material advantage and opportunities to satisfy his own unhealthy needs. Another widespread variant is parental "over-protectiveness," which cultivates dependence and immaturity in children and generates asocial behavior, including alcohol abuse, in them.

A similar situation frequently takes shape in families where petty tyranny and one spouse's desire to be in command completely suppress the initiative of the other. By the way, in our practice the representatives of the stronger sex frequently prove to be the suffering party. Naturally, they may "resist" the wife's unlimited power with drunkenness.

"Harmony of pathology" does not necessarily presuppose the pursuit of strictly material goals. Perverted forms of relations may be built on an unhealthy vanity roused by adulation and excess praise. They occur not only in the family but also in production collectives. A unique kind of "harmony of pathology" is observed in interrelations between a lawbreaker and the victim when the latter's provocative behavior acts as one of the reasons for the crime.

If a person "suffers" and does not do anything to change the situation, then for some reason it suits him. Difficult children, troubled families, asocial behavior, and even crimes as well as chronic family scenes which do not lead to any change are the essence of the manifestation of "harmony of pathology." The dynamics of the development and formation of this phenomenon should be taken into account in the prevention and treatment of alcoholism and other forms of pathology.

Obviously, the problem of the struggle against alcoholism demands a strictly individual approach. From the common tasks we must inevitably come to the need to study the personality. If every doctor, middle-level medical worker, and every manager could be involved in antialcohol propaganda, then psychiatrists, narcotics experts, specially trained psychotherapists, and social psychologists must head the work to prevent, identify and treat people ill with alcoholism.

#### USSR Goskomstat Reports

The material-technical base of many medical institutions needs improvement. Only 35 percent of the rayon hospitals have hot water, 27 percent do not have a sewage system, and 17 percent do not have water pipes. Only one out of five of the polyclinics and outpatient stations is located in a specially constructed building. The situation in maternity homes and children's polyclinics is especially bad. According to the data of a survey conducted by the statistical organs, of 87 maternity homes and children's polyclinics, 50 were located in unadapted buildings, more the half of which need capital repair or complete reconstruction. Many institutions are not well-equipped and do not have the elementary conveniences.

In more than half the maternity homes the area for one hospital bed is only half the norm. There is a shortage of medical equipment, medicines, patient care items, and furniture.

#### Internal Theater Management (The Results of an Expert Survey)

180600031 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE

ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 105-107

[Article by Yelena Serafimovna Petrenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and chief of the survey study department, and Almin Moiseyevich Rabinovich, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate of the department of the study of cadre problems, both associates of the State Institute on the Design of Theatrical Enterprises]

[Text] Almost a year has already passed since the day the comprehensive social experiment to restructure the theater business began [Source 1]. During the experiment the viability of forms and methods of the work of creative collectives is being revealed. Before beginning to introduce innovations, we were instructed(1) to study the opinion of the managers of Moscow theaters which are part of the USSR Ministry of Culture system. What exactly did they want to improve and how?

In so far as the sociocultural goals of the theater are achieved within limits set by the financial plan [Source 2, p 139], two types of activity exist: artistic-creative and production-economic. The main director, the main artist, the producers, the aides to the main director for literary matters and for personnel manage the first, and the director, his deputies, and the chief of the artistic-production section manage the second. In the future we will call the first group the "artistic" managers and the second—the "administrative" managers. The main director and the director of the theater are the leaders of these groups.

In the 18 Moscow theaters, 13 main directors, 16 directors, 9 of their deputies, 11 producers, 12 heads of artistic-production sections, 13 assistants to the main director for literary matters, 5 assistants to the main director for personnel, and 6 main artists were surveyed. The "artistic" managers group was represented by 48 respondents and the "administrative" managers group—by 37 respondents (experts). As was to be expected, the opinions of the participants in the survey on the role of the director and the main director in resolving the basic questions of the activity of theaters differed. The "artistic" leaders believe that the director's word is decisive in questions of rental policy and in determining the cost of productions; the "administrators" extend the director's priority to two other functions: determining the schedule for preparing performances and setting salaries and tariff rates. The representatives of both categories were certain that the main director's opinion is indisputable in including a play in the repertoire.

choosing the creative cadres, making up the production groups and performers, authorizing the musical and artistic staging of a show, and determining its degree of readiness for release. In the unanimous opinion of the respondents priority in managing the theater's artistic-creative activity should belong to the main director and production-economic activity—to the director.

In accordance with the "Statute on Socialist State Theater Enterprise," under the director's one-man management the main director bears responsibility for the theater's artistic-creative activity along with him [Source 2, p 30]. The survey participants give preference to the main director in making decisions dealing with this sphere of activity. This enables one to say that in practice the director's one-man management is formal in nature. As for the management of the theater's production-economic activity, the respondents' answers are in full agreement with the normative document. The survey participants were supposed to evaluate the merit of the following models of internal theater management:

1) the director supervises all the theater's work, while the main director, who shares full responsibility for the plays' quality and their ideological-artistic level equally with the director, supervises the artistic-creative activity;

2) the director has general control over the theater's work; the main director, who has all legal rights (heads the artistic council and takes care of the artistic-creative side of the theater's life), has the main responsibility for all the theater's activity;

3) the theater is headed by the artistic manager who is responsible for all the theater's work, thereby fulfilling the functions of both the director and the main director (the director-organizer carries out the operational management of the production-economic activity under the main director's control);

4) the artistic manager, who is responsible for all the theater's activity, heads the theater, thereby fulfilling the functions of the director and the main director with the exception of staging plays.

Common to the first two models is the principle of directorial one-man management. The essence of the other variants is to combine administrative and artistic leadership in the hands of the theater's creative leader. Expanding the rights and responsibilities of the main director is a specific feature of the second and third models.

The data obtained (see the table) showed that most of the "administrative" and "artistic" leaders gave preference to those forms of internal theater management which retain the director's one-man management. However, the "administrators" preferred model number one, which is normatively confirmed by the above-mentioned Statute, while the "artistic" leaders preferred model number two, which expands the rights of the main director. And most

believe that the director's one-man management should be retained. In this way, the "artistic" leaders of the Moscow theaters would like to refine the present Statute in accordance with existing practice, while the "administrative" leaders, in contrast, would like to bring the practice which has become established into line with the normative document. In other words, in the respondents' opinion, conditions have not yet matured for completely eliminating the principle of the director's one-man management.

**Table 1. Distribution of Answers on the Preferred Variant of Internal Theater Management,\* in percentages**

Category of Theater Managers	No 1	No 2	No 3
"Administrative"	51.3	24.3	18.9
"Artistic"	16.7	60.4	20.8
All Managers	31.8	44.7	20.0

\*Model No 4 received no support. Some respondents could not clearly define their positions.

As is obvious from the table, only 20.8 percent of the "artistic" leaders gave preference to model No 3. That means that most of the main directors of the Moscow theaters are not attempting to assume responsibility for all the theater's activity. Obviously, they want to avoid those forms of internal theater management which may detract them from realizing the artistic-creative tasks and the staging work. In all probability this position also stems from the fact that the directors of the Moscow theaters are professionals with higher theatrical education and a great deal of work experience (more than 10 years) in entertainment organizations.

Most of the respondents share the viewpoint of the director of the Leningrad Academic Bolshoi Dramatic Theater imeni M. Gorkiy, G.A. Tovstonogov, who believes that an administrative-organizational work load for the directors lowers their creative potential [Source 3, p 75]. A smaller number support the main director of the Moscow Theater imeni Leninskiy Komsomol, M.A. Zakharov, whose view is that the creative leader should also be responsible for the financial side of the work [Source 4].

In choosing the optimal variant of internal theater management, the survey participants emphasized the relative nature of their choice. In addition, the overwhelming majority of both "artistic" (93.7 percent) and "administrative" (83.8 percent) leaders assume that the form of managing the collective in different theaters should vary. In the main directors' opinion, the diversity stems from the "professional-skill and psychological qualities of the leaders" and the "moral-psychological climate in the

collective," while in the directors' opinion, it stems from the "specific combination of fiscal-economic and artistic-creative tasks" facing the particular theater and the "traditions which have become established in the given theater."

That also had an effect on respondents' evaluation of the prospects of setting up theatrical associations. More than half (52.9 percent) of the survey participants do not consider such an association a progressive form in conditions of Moscow or another large cultural center. In their opinion, the creation of a theatrical association leads to limitations on the theater's creative independence and to increased additional organizational difficulties and tougher external control over its work. It is important to mention that although the questionnaire dealt only with questions of internal theater management, the respondents emphasized the need to expand the rights and creative and economic independence of the theater.

Among those who supported creating a theatrical association, the number of "administrative" leaders was almost double the number of "artistic" leaders (24.3 percent and 12.5 percent, respectively). However, almost all of them believe it would be good to join the production-staging parts of several theaters.(2)

The artistic council is an important link of internal theater management; using it the troupe realizes its right to participate in management. Many "administrative" leaders (62.1 percent) and "artistic" leaders (77.1 percent) assume that most of the members participate in the artistic council's work. However, half of the respondents note that the artistic council does not play a notable role in the theater's life.(3) Moreover, one-third of the "administrative" and the "artistic" leaders believe that the council's activity is formal in nature.

The results of the interviews on distributing roles among the creative and administrative leaders conducted among the main directors and directors of the theaters of Moscow and of the capitals of the republics of the Transcaucasus, Belorussia, and the Baltic Region showed(4) that the directors' support of the normative model of internal theater management is made for effect. In other words, the directors no less than the main directors consider improving the Statute on Theatrical Enterprises necessary. Both the "artistic" and the "administrative" leaders tie the main direction of the reform to expanding the rights and increasing the responsibility of the main director—even to the point of giving him full power in deciding artistic-creative questions.

The unanimous acceptance of this position by the leadership workers of the theater confirms: today the practices of theater life are moving from the principles of directorial one-man management which took shape back in the 1930's to a theater where the main director occupies the leading position.

#### Footnotes

1. D.B. Khristoforov participated along with the authors in the study.
2. Thus, for example, a single combine to supply all the republic's theatrical collectives with stage equipment, gear, and costumes exists in Georgia.
3. Let us note that the directors of theaters who as a rule are chairmen of the artistic councils evaluate their importance much more highly than other theater managers.
4. The work was done by N.M. Rumyantseva.

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#### Divorces in Tajikistan

18060003m Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE

ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 108-110

[Article by Sadullo Ibodovich Islamov, candidate of economic sciences, docent of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin, author of the monographs "Scientific Technical Progress and Cadres" (1981) and "The Demography of Tajikistan" (1985), appearing for the first time in our journal]

[Text] In Tajikistan a new regime of reproduction of the population is gradually forming, the process of changing from the family with many children to the family with an average number of children is developing, and the old customs and norms of family life are disappearing into the past. Along with the progressive aspects of the family structure, negative trends are also being observed, in particular a greater number of divorces. In order to prevent a greater number of broken families, it is important to know whether there are specific features in the factors and motives for the divorce in oblasts where the traditional type of family and marriage relations exist and in this sense what they have in common with the situation in large cities. The study conducted in 1984 by the Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin in the rayon and city Civil Registry Offices of Leninabad, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts, and in Dushanbe was devoted to that. Surveyed were 750 married couples who had

applied for a divorce (men and women separately). Among those surveyed were representatives of all nationalities living in the Tajik SSR.

The data cited in the table attest to the diversity of the motives for divorces and to their varying significance for the residents of the different oblasts. The main motives which induced the respondents from Dushanbe to decide to get divorced are psychological incompatibility, unfaithfulness, unwillingness to live with parents and relatives, the drunkenness and alcoholism of spouses, lack of children, and lack of love. But among the respondents of the other two groups lack of children was in first

place among the motives for divorce, psychological incompatibility—in second, and lack of love—in third and further, among Leninabad Oblast inhabitants—infidelity, while for the rest of those surveyed it was jealousy. The substantially lower percentage of people, as compared to the capital's residents, who noted drunkenness and alcoholism of the spouse (11.1 percent, 4.1 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively) as well unwillingness to live with parents and relatives (12.5 percent, 9.5 percent, and 5.5 percent, respectively) draws attention. On the whole one may say that a family breaks up to a greater degree for social and psychological reasons rather than economic ones.

Table 1. Motives for Divorce in Relationship to Place of Residence, in percentages

Motives	Dushanbe	Leninabad Oblast	Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube Oblasts
<b>Psychological*</b>			
Psychological Incompatibility	17.6	14.9	14.4
Lack of Children	11.0	19.4	19.2
Lack of Love	9.9	11.2	13.0
Lack of Harmony in Intimate Relations	1.6	0.4	—
Appearance of New Feelings	3.3	0.8	0.7
Jealousy	5.7	4.5	10.3
Spouse's Illness	0.8	2.9	3.4
Spouse's Personal Characteristics	4.1	1.2	10.2
Children's Illness	0.8	—	—
<b>Social</b>			
Unwillingness to Live with Parents and Relatives	12.5	9.5	5.5
Unfaithfulness	14.8	11.2	6.2
Amoral Behavior of Husband (Wife)	7.8	9.9	2.7
Conviction of Spouse	0.4	0.4	0.7
Drunkenness and Alcoholism of Spouse	11.1	4.1	2.1
<b>Economic</b>			
Dissatisfaction with Material Status	4.5	3.3	3.4
Dissatisfaction with Living Conditions	7.0	5.4	4.8
Lack of Cooperation in the Household	2.0	0.4	1.4
Other Reasons	—	0.5	2.0

\*The separation of motives into psychological, social, and economic is arbitrary.

Analysis of the motives of divorce in relationship to the age of all the survey subjects taken as a whole revealed the following picture. In the 18-24 age group the main motives were lack of children (14.1 percent), lack of love (14.1 percent), psychological incompatibility (12.9 percent), and unwillingness to live with parents and relatives (11.2 percent). Among persons 40-44 years of age unfaithfulness is in first place (21.9 percent) and the spouse's alcoholism is in second (18.8 percent), followed by psychological incompatibility (18.8 percent), then amoral behavior of the husband (wife) (9.4 percent). The following trends are observed in the age cohorts between these two categories: the significance of psychological incompatibility, the fact of lack of children, infidelity,

the spouse's alcoholism, and lack of harmony in intimate life is increasing and the significance of such motives as lack of love, jealousy, and unwillingness to live with parents and relatives is declining. And finally, in the groups 45-49 and 50-54 years of age the proportion of those people who named the spouse's alcoholism (66.6 percent and 50.0 percent, respectively) and the personal characteristics of the partner (26.7 percent and 33.3 percent) was higher. Most of the rest of the motives among those getting divorced at this age were practically negligible.

Now let us examine what features of change there are in the motives for divorce with age in relationship to the place of residence. In this regard the three separate

groups have a great deal in common, but there are still certain differences. So, for both the residents of Dushanbe and the residents of the oblasts surveyed psychological motives lose their significance with age; among the former their proportion for all age cohorts does not exceed 49 percent and is for the most part limited to psychological incompatibility and lack of children, while among the respondents from Kurgan Tyurbe and Kulyab oblasts the corresponding indicator is 86.3 percent and besides those named also includes jealousy and lack of children.

Social motives—unwillingness to live with parents and relatives, infidelity, and the spouse's alcoholism—in Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab oblasts increase with age, but for residents of the capital they are much more telling. The opposite trend is observed in Leninabad Oblast.

The same pattern is revealed as applied to economic motives. In Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tyurbe and Kulyab oblasts their proportion in the general list increases with age; in the first case we are speaking of dissatisfaction with living conditions and in the second—dissatisfaction with the family's material status is added to it. But in Leninabad Oblast both of the motives level off with age.

In this way, certain trends which are related to the age of those getting divorced and the place they reside are revealed in the hierarchy of motives for divorce. These specifics must be taken into account when formulating particular measures to strengthen the family.

Dissatisfaction with material status and living conditions and the lack of cooperation in labor in the household for respondents of native national groups are of less significance than for others surveyed. And in rayons which are more developed in the industrial sense, the motives listed are paramount, but this relates only to nonnative residents.

Among the married couples getting divorced whom we surveyed there were people with different levels of education: 22.8 percent had graduated from VUZes; 23.7 percent had received secondary specialized education; 42.4 percent—general secondary; and 11.1 percent—incomplete secondary and elementary education. Of course, it would be interesting to analyze situations when the husband and wife have different educational status, especially since there are quite a few such marriages because women of the indigenous nationalities of the Tajik SSR get married quite early and frequently, unlike their husbands, do not have the opportunity to go on with their studies. Nonetheless, we will restrict ourselves here to examining the general trend which stands out from the respondents' answers regardless of what kind of education the former spouse had. On the whole the conclusion may be drawn that the significance of such

motives for divorce as psychological incompatibility and infidelity intensifies with a higher level of education, while the fact of lack of children and loss of feelings of love plays a smaller role.

Tajikistan is among the regions where in accordance with national traditions the complex type of families is very widespread; most son's families live with the parents and there are frequently several married couples living under one roof. And although such families continue to be in the majority, the process of nuclearization, especially in the republic's capital, is gaining ground. The structure of complex families has its own advantages, but, needless to say, contradictions and conflicts arise here. Sometimes they are resolved by one of the families separating; in these same cases when some of the members of the expanded family oppose that and the conflicts do not disappear, divorce becomes inevitable. Such a situation is not a rarity in the large cities of the Tajik SSR these days.

The proportion of psychological motives for divorce is generally higher in complex families than in nuclear families. Dushanbe, where the reverse relationship is observed, is the exception.

The significance of social and economic motives, which we arbitrarily combined into one group, are, in contrast, manifested more strongly in nuclear families. As for the particular motives, they were distributed in the following way: in expanded families lack of children, unwillingness to live with parents and relatives, and psychological incompatibility are first and in nuclear families—psychological incompatibility, lack of children, and unfaithfulness.

In Dushanbe the main motive for divorce in nuclear families is drunkenness and alcoholism of the spouse, in Leninabad Oblast—amoral behavior of the husband (wife), and in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts—psychological incompatibility and lack of children. In Dushanbe expanded families' unwillingness to live with relatives is in first place among the motives for divorce and in the other rayons surveyed—lack of children.

The data cited allow us to draw the following conclusion: developing measures to strengthen the family demands a differentiated approach and consideration of sociodemographic features of the married partners as well as the type of settlement, particularly the industrial and cultural development of the rayon of residence.

**The Empirical Basis of Sociological Science**  
*18060003n Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE*  
*ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian*

*No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87) pp 111-117*

[Article by Vladimir Georgiyevich Andreyenkov, candidate of philosophical sciences and chief of the department of methods and information support of sociological research, who has published the articles "The Empirical Substantiation of Hypotheses in Sociological Research" (No 1, 1974, coauthor), "On the Question of Creating a Bank of Sociological Information" (No 1, 1982, coauthor), and others in our journal, and Olga Mikhaylovna Maslova, candidate of philosophical sci-

ences and chief of the scientific methods department, who has published the articles "Sociological Research on the Reader Audience in the 1920's-1930's" (No 4, 1977), "On the Question of Designing a Sociological Questionnaire" (No 1, 1981), and "Cognitive Potential of Open and Closed Questions" (No 2, 1984) in our journal, both of whom work for the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute, under the rubric "Methods, Equipment, and Organization of Mass Surveys"]

[Text] The empirical results of sociological research are often published in newspapers, heard on the radio, and seen on television and are used in substantiating management decisions in the sphere of labor, leisure, the family, education, the struggle against drunkenness and drug addiction, and the like. The well-known aphorism "statistics know everything" is becoming at least debatable against the background of this popularity—especially since the traditional source of social information has revealed various questionable aspects. Cases of padding and clever methods for calculating indicators and their selective publication and "evasive" interpretation, which enables black to pass for white, have become known. In other words, controlling the quality and authenticity of data and insuring the glasnost of evaluations involving the process of obtaining them is very pressing today. "Glasnost is that instrument which society uses to control the state of affairs in all spheres of life, including science" [Source 1, p 21].

However, sociological information is used extensively without discussing the problems of its reliability and authenticity and the consequences and "limits" of its use. These questions are examined only by specialists. In the 20 years of active sociological research, 5 or 6 monographs and some 20 articles have been written on the problems of quality. Some of these works have been devoted to the philosophical and gnosiological aspects of obtaining sound scientific knowledge in sociology [Sources 2 and 3], and others—to evaluating the quality of the indexing procedures in metrology, mathematical statistics, and psychology; and to experiments with the goal of adapting this experience to the subject and methodological specifics of sociological research [Sources 4-7]. And still the results obtained remain the property of isolated research groups.

A number of reasons stemming from the organizational-economic situation in sociology and the state of methodological knowledge and theoretical support of research prevent further elaboration of the problem of quality.

The complexity of the process of producing information urgently requires the "distribution of labor" and specialization of sociologists. This question was raised back in the early 1970's [Source 8]. It is obvious that the methodological support of sociological services at enterprises is becoming the function of the sector's head subdivisions. Such problems as developing normative bases for planning and organizing the labor of plant sociologists,

the principles of controlling quality, and evaluation of the efficiency of introducing results have not been resolved. Part of the task of the services is to create standard methods for producing sociological information taking into account the sectorial and regional specifics of the problems under study. Approval of methods and evaluation of the reliability of methodological decisions, including experimental evaluation, is a necessary condition for performing methodological and coordination functions.

The specialization of participants in the stage of collecting empirical data dependent on the types of work being performed is extremely essential. A whole complex of questions which demand operational decisions exist here.

At the present time the practice of using volunteer survey-takers is the most widespread form for organizing the field stage of a survey; and the recruitment of volunteer workers to a significant degree determines its methodological version. As a rule data is collected at the work place and using group audience questioning. We conducted an analysis of the organizational-methodological features of research contained in the data bank of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute (for the 11th Five-Year Plan period). It turned out that in the average statistical study with a sampling range of 1,500 people surveyed, up to 50 survey-takers were used, and the average norm of people surveyed per questioner is 30 people. That is the typical situation for group questioning in production.(1)

The popularity of this organizational form stems from such advantages as cheapness and efficiency. A less obvious reason for its popularity is that the overwhelming majority of sociological centers do not have officially authorized subheadings in the finance system to pay for the labor of survey-takers and interviewers. It is understandable how this situation arose: applied sociology took shape based at Academy institutions of philosophy and at the philosophy departments of VUZes. However, the further development of sociology graphically demonstrated the incompatibility of organizational and economic principles of obtaining empirical information as compared with traditional forms of organization of the labor of philosophers. The field stage requires organizing and financing the work of sociologists in a way similar to that used for the labor of ethnographers, archeologists, and so on, who use expedition methods.

And as for the cheapness of the field stage conducted on a volunteer basis, that is illusory. Sociologists do not pay survey-takers and respondents, but obtaining the information is "paid for" by the losses of work time of the survey-takers and (or) respondents who are diverted from performance of their job responsibilities.(2)

In addition, it should be taken into account that sociology pays for the simplicity and efficiency of this organization by the low quality of the information obtained, even though these losses are not so obvious.

The negative features of the established working practice are reduced to the following. First, there is no preliminary evaluation and selection of survey-takers in terms of their psychological and intellectual conformity. Secondly, with people who are taken away from their jobs it is difficult to form the psychological goal of cooperation, serious and in-depth perception of the questionnaire, and procurement of authentic information. Thirdly, the training of "volunteers" is generally limited to oral instructions. Inasmuch as their participation in the survey is a one-time thing, they are not oriented to thorough assimilation of the methods of this work or to consolidating and increasing professional skill and the proximity of the survey situation to everyday dealings gives them the illusion that it is accessible and simple. Fourthly, the orientation to group questioning at the work place leads to neglect of territorial samples and interviews at the dwelling place, the advantages of which are universally recognized in world sociology. Fifthly and finally, the lack of permanent networks of interviewers deprives domestic sociology of the opportunity to accumulate information on the quality of the methodological decisions being used in a centralized and systematic way. Related to this is the lack of an empirical base for unifying and standardizing methods on pressing problems which are of long-term significance. This also accounts for the lag in studying the theoretical problems of the survey based on the empirical and methodological experience of its use.

There have been isolated attempts in domestic practice to set up permanent networks of survey-takers and interviewers as well as respondent networks for conducting mail surveys. The experience of sociologists working at the computer center of Estonian Radio remains unique. They set up a network of paid interviewers who systematically conduct surveys based on a territorial sample that represents the republic's population; it has been successfully used for 15 years [Sources 9 and 10]. A similar effort has been undertaken by UkSSR Gostelradio [Source 11].

Analysis of the experience of world sociology confirms that good organization of the collection of empirical information demands a high level of professional skill from its participants, norm-setting for their labor, monitoring of the quality of performing individual operations, and material (and not only moral!) incentive [Source 12]. This applies not only to the work of survey-takers and interviewers but to the labor of observers, recording clerks, and coders as well.

Let us examine the practice of using technical means at different stages of sociological research which has been actively developing in recent years. Above all this applies to the use of computer technology in mass surveys of the population (the statistical analysis of data, automatic coding, expanded monitoring of data, and the like). The first experience in work with electromechanical automata like Sotsiometr [Sources 13 and 14], which is patented in our country, demonstrated the fundamental

importance of introducing elements of automation into the seemingly humanitarian sphere of contact with respondents. But it also showed all the limitations of the technical base which was used.

If we confine ourselves to large-scale surveys, then two parallel lines for using computer equipment at the data-collecting stage have been noted today. One of them may be called the centralized line and the other—the decentralized line.

Among the centralized methods the telephone interview is the most promising and rapidly developing direction. Concentrating interviewers conducting the survey by telephone in one center permits a greater part of the routine operations (generation of a sample, phoning of the respondents, continuous data input into the computer, tracking of the logic of the survey, monitoring of mistakes, and so on) to be automated. A number of scientific centers are disseminating KATI (computer-assisted telephone interview) software on a commercial basis. The publications of leading specialists in the field of telephone surveys mention about 100 such systems used in foreign organizations for studying the market and 20—in university centers [Source 12]. The flexibility of KATI is achieved by using the potential of the latest personal computers. In cities with an adequate level of telephone support, above all in Moscow, there are no fundamental difficulties for setting up domestic KATI systems. Obviously, our inertia has an effect. At the same time it is clear, however, that because of the low level of telephone support KATI cannot perform all the tasks of the survey in our country. The traditional interview will remain the main method for obtaining information for many years yet.

The use of computers in the field stage of sociologists' work is the essence of the decentralized approach to the problem of automating surveys. Later we will use the KAMO (computer-assisted mass survey) system. It is assumed that KAMO has all the advantages of KATI, and in conditions of the field stage of the interviewer's work. Above all this applies to demands on the technical characteristics of the computer. Its weight cannot exceed 1 kilogram; it must use a battery that will last 24 hours without recharging; it must have a standard display of 24 lines of 80 characters, main memory of at least 5 megabytes, and the possibility of two-way communication through telephone lines with the central computer; it must have a letter and number keyboard for inputting the respondent's answers; and it must be highly reliable in conditions of constant moves from place to place.

The experience of using even such imperfect equipment as the Sotsiometr has shown that in addition to the technical problems the numerous methodological questions of the "interviewer-automaton-respondent" interaction must be studied. These include the problem of training the interviewer in the methods of compiling and presenting the questionnaire and the influence of the

technical equipment on the answers in different socio-demographic groups of the population, and questions of trust and anonymity. Obviously it is not worth waiting for the ideal equipment to appear; it is already time to begin intensive research in this direction.

The problems of data collection draw the attention of researchers substantially less often than the questions of using computers and methods of mathematical analysis. Among the publications reflected in the most complete bibliographic bulletin [Source 15], methods of collecting data are cited only 40 percent as often (50 citations) as methods of processing and analysis, and this trend has lasted for two decades. Even in large collectives of sociologists specialization in the area of methods of collecting data as a permanent type of scientific activity is more the exception than the rule. A paradoxical situation has taken shape: the most refined processing equipment and the most perfect mathematical methods of analysis rely on initial information whose quality is not insured by any strict criteria and procedures of evaluation. The researcher's experience and the common sense of the authors of the methods and organizers of the field stage remain the guarantee of quality.

In recent years attention to studying the cognitive possibilities of the mail survey technique has increased substantially. Above all this is explained by its economy and efficiency. Experiments conducted by Leningrad and Ukrainian sociologists showed that personal communication with respondents, repeated reminders, and certain other organizational-methods devices make it possible to raise the return of the questionnaires to 70-85 percent with adequate completion and quality [Sources 16 and 17].

The study of the potential of telephone interviews was devoted to increasing the efficiency and economy of the survey method. In the experimental surveys special attention was devoted to the specifics of the communication between the interviewer and the respondent (establishing contact, rules of formulating questions, controlling the respondent's attention and perception of the meaning of the questions as well as the technique for recording responses). It was proven that during the telephone survey the respondents behaved in an active and interested way and the proportion of refusals to do the interview were no higher, and in a number of cases even lower, than with a personal survey. In pure form this method is effective only in conditions of cities with good telephone support. However, it is entirely correct to use telephones mixed with other strategies (telephone and mail survey and telephone and personal survey) [Source 18].

Searching for mixed strategies allows sociologists to improve the cognitive potential of the survey method. For example, the results of the survey conducted are offered for interpretation to a group of respondents who take the role of experts [Source 19]. Another example is turning to the psychological tradition of using survey

methods [Sources 20-21]. It should be noted that we are speaking more of identifying the similarities and differences of testing and the traditional survey methods on the technical-methods and organizational level. At the same time, however, the question of the potential for using tests in sociological research involves the problem of the adequacy of this method to the nature of the subject of sociology.

In the 1980's increased study by sociologists of the cognitive potential of specific types of questions has been observed. A special discussion was devoted to this [Sources 22-24]. However, the theoretical outlines and experiments of sociologists are not an end in themselves. They make sense only when they are realized in the form of normative ideas, instructions, or recommendations which regulate the process of the production of sociological information. The normative demands are set forth either in research methods or in the methodological sections of textbooks.

Textbooks are of special interest, since they determine the state of our science in the future. Let us note that only in recent years have a few publications of this type been issued [Sources 25-32]. While the instructional aids of the 1970's contained methodological recommendations on the general sociological level, their active adaptation to the subject specifics of the sectorial directions has been going on for the past decade. Evidence of that is the sectorial specialized instructional aids [Source 26; Sources 30-32]. However, the experience of adaptation appeared here only as individual examples which illustrate the same general sociological-methodological recommendations. Does that signify that survey methods do not have any fundamental specifics stemming from the subject content of this branch of sociology?

Needless to say, the problems related to taking into account the respondents' level of information and insuring logical and semantic clarity in the formulation of the questions are common to the various sectorial directions. However, in each of them these problems have very specific meanings. Unfortunately, there is no particular information in sectorial aids, since special methodological research which has not yet been developed is needed to obtain it.

How is the activity of sociologists in the stage of data collection regulated in instructional aids? Most often in the form of advice and recommendations. For example, it is customary to consider (and authors of instructional aids are unanimous in this opinion) that the number of people who did not respond is an indicator of the quality of the questionnaire question. This is approximately how methodological recommendations sound in this case: "a large number of unanswered questions should alert the sociologist." A person can be alerted, of course, but how should he deal with the particular question? What does "a large number of unanswered questions" mean? Very contradictory information is cited in different sources on this: from 15 percent to 50 percent. It is clear that here

we encounter a very serious methodological problem which urgently demands to be studied. Only two (!) articles have been published on this theme in domestic sociology [Sources 33 and 34].

Here is another example: how is the quality of the questionnaire which has been put together to be evaluated? Aids No 25 (p 385) and No 35 (p 179) give a list of criteria which can be used for an expert evaluation of the questionnaire. However, in the first place, the possibilities of using such expertise has not been studied and, secondly, there is no research involving developing procedures for empirical verification of each of the criteria.(3)

Instructional aids which contain the general sociological rules for developing methods of data collection do not adequately cover the problems of substantiating methodological decisions, the experiment, and empirical testing of methods. The chapter "The Sociologist's Workbook" devoted to this problem [Source 25, pp 383-391] is only the first approximation to resolving these questions. The leading academic and VUZ sociological centers must make an important contribution here.

The shortage of empirical information and lack of formulation of methods for evaluating quality is graphically shown in an article by B.Z. Doktorov, who attempted to make up a metrological map of public opinion [Source 37]. It turned out that the idea of a comprehensive approach to evaluating the quality of the results of sociological research is only being declared at the present time. Its real support of more or less substantiated criteria of quality does not exceed 5 percent of the number of methodological decisions used in the process of producing information.

But even if one supposes that the empirical base for filling out such a map has been formulated, the reasonable question of the theoretical-methodological substantiation of the results obtained in particular stages of sociological research arises. It turns out that the criteria used to evaluate quality are by no means reduced to "technological" operations and the consistency of their use in producing empirical data. These criteria reveal a genetic link with the nature of sociological phenomena and processes and with the specific subject of sociology.

As the history of science confirms, in the initial stage methodological knowledge is not separated out as a special type of research activity. Creating methodological devices, evaluating the success of their use, and choosing the most effective methodological decisions—all these tasks are gradually included in the process of obtaining meaningful knowledge during the time the new science is taking shape. As the structure of the research activity becomes more complex, along with expanding its applied fields and practical use of results, methods of

producing scientific knowledge and methods of evaluating its quality are singled out into a special direction. Metrology is the clearest example of this specialization; it serves the whole complex of natural and technical sciences.

In our opinion, certain features of this "pre-methods" condition were distinctly manifested in the development of sociology of the past decades. Needless to say, in pure form this process cannot be observed either in the development of sociology or in any other science, since the formation of new directions relies on the historical experience of more developed sciences. In particular, the formation of the empirical base of sociology relied on the experience of statistics, psychology, and social psychology.

Separating methodological problems of producing empirical information into an independent research direction is one of the leading trends of development of contemporary sociology. We are speaking of the formulation of the methodology of research as a system of knowledge on the procedure for substantiating a scientific conclusion.

The link of the methodological support of sociology with general and specific scientific methods of cognition remains undeveloped. On the level of direct research practice sociologists are compelled to make decisions "on the run," without special study of the question of psychology (testing practices, self-observation practices, and the like), social psychology, history (the experience of source study analysis), ethnography (methods of observation and the expedition method), sociolinguistics (the linguistic adequacy of the methods of surveying for the capabilities of those being surveyed), economics, statistics, and others. Without special logical-gnosiological and methodological analysis and substantiation, this process of interaction has a spontaneous effect and is frequently limited by the purely external mechanical transference of methodological devices ("techniques") of research to the subject and meaning context of sociology. The adequacy of such borrowings should be the subject of special analysis and methodological experiments.

Questions of correlation of different methods of collecting empirical information and their cognitive potential and limits of interpretation also demand serious study. Thus, the obvious predominance of the survey method in applied sociology occurs in a situation where the theory of survey does not exist. A similar picture exists with other methods of collecting data: observation, experimentation, and analysis of document sources. Does the popularity of this survey method mean the absolutization of its cognitive potential or are we dealing here with the natural realization of the specifics of the subject of sociology? How does the principle of comprehensive methodological support of a sociological study, which is being declared in literature, correlate with the prevalence of single-method survey methods? What facets of real phenomena remain beyond the limits of study

if the sociologist rejects analysis of document resources and the observation method? Do these methods together with the survey make up a conglomerate of devices or does each method insure the cognition of certain unique aspects of the subject of sociology which are accessible only to that method? Finally, what are the nature, sources, and typology of random and systematic mistakes which arise in the "questionnaire—interviewer—respondent" interaction, and how do these mistakes determine the limits of the content interpretation of the empirical data?

The search for answers to such questions, only a few of which have been mentioned, requires specialization of sociologists in the field of methodological research and coordination and long-term planning of research strategy. The experience of the 2 years of work of the seminar "Methods of Sociological Research" based at the department of methods and information support of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute and the two central sections of the SSA [Source 38] confirm that the prerequisites for developing this direction in domestic sociology have become fully established.

#### Footnotes

1. In world practice the individual interview and the individual written survey predominate. And the survey at the dwelling place (personal, by telephone, or by mail) is considered preferable.

2. For example, during the all-Union survey on the Study of Way of Life a total of more than 2,000 people were involved and substantial capital was spent for the business trip expenses of USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute associates—the organizers of the study. According to estimates by experts, the total costs for the field stage of a project approach the costs of annual maintenance of a network of interviewers numbering 300-400 people.

3. Interesting research on developing methods of indepth piloting is being conducted by the Lodz Methodological School [Source 36].

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## Publication Data

18060003q Moscow  
SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYEISSLEDOVANIYA in  
Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 87 (signed to press 3 Nov 87)

[Text] English Title: SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Russian Title: SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA

Author(s):

Editor(s): G.S. Batygin et al.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Nauka"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: November-December 1987

Signed to Press: 3 November 1987

Copies: 9891

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**END OF**

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**DATE FILMED**

22, Aug 1988